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ABSTRACT
In this thesis I examine the relationships between the scientific adviser
and the civil service during the interwar period, with particular emphasis
upon the gentlemanly status and values that eased the entrance of
outsider scientists into the world of professional administration. I study
how gentlemanly values became a constituent of professional identity for
the scientist through inculcation in the public school system and how they
formed a shared system of values and assumptions that allowed
professional elites to communicate with each other. This gentlemanly
culture formed the foundation for the personal networks of scientists and
administrators that directed interwar scientific research.
Chapter Two examines how gentlemanly values moulded the professional
identity of the elite scientist by following the careers of selected scientists
through their public schools. Chapter Three extends this analysis to their
lives at Oxbridge and widens the discussion to show how gentlemanly
values moulded the professional demands of the scientific community
during the First World War. This study of gentlemanly professionalism is
completed in Chapter Four through a) examining how the Athenaeum
Club was able to adapt to the rise of a professionalised society by offering
a private site for meetings amongst the metropolitan professions and b)
through a prosopographical study of declared members of the Athenaeum
Club in the Royal Society of London to construct a picture of part of the
scientific elite.
The last four chapters contain case studies that present gentlemanly
values and the Athenaeum Club within the context of interwar politics and
the civil service. Chapters Seven and Eight examine the professional
conflicts between the Medical Research Council and the Royal Colleges
through the meetings at the Athenaeum Club that negotiated the
establishment of the Radium Beam Therapy Research Board. Chapters
Nine and Ten examine the workings of the Tizard Commiftee and the
development of radar within their political context. The shared values of
the scientists and their rift with Professor Lindemann stemmed from his
unwillingness to respect and conform to the professional practices
demanded from committee members.
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INTRODUCTION: THE GENTLEMAN OF SCIENCE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY
This thesis sits comfortably in the interdisciplinary atmosphere of the
history of science and draws upon the strength of arguments and texts
from other historical fields. The most important derivation from these
historical sources is the concept of the gentleman of science, a term
usually applied to earlier periods of history but which is also, I would
argue, a useful descriptive term for members of the scientific elite during
the first half of the twentieth century. Its application derives from recent
work in general narratives that have modified our perceptions of continuity
and change in British history since the Industrial Revolution. The historical
arguments that underpin this concept, its utility in studying the scientific
profession during the twentieth century and its consequences for our
perceptions of British science form the subject of this Introduction.
British history in the twentieth century is one of unremifting decline. From
the position of a military superpower that dominated the global economy at
the turn of the century, Britain has been reduced to a disadvantageous
position in comparison to the other advanced industrial economies of the
northern hemisphere. This decline is relative and comparative, both in
contemporary and in historical terms, but the analysis of this phenomenon
has become sharply debated over recent years. Historians cannot deny
that militarily, diplomatically and demographically, Britain wields far less
influence over the globe in 1997 than it did at the Diamond Jubilee of
I
Queen Victoria in 1897. As a consequence of this, Peter Clarke notes
that, "The history of twentieth-century Britain.. .threatens to become a
history of decline, centred on the question: where did it all go wrong?"l
The question of decline dominates twentieth-century British history and
sketches, through an inverted Whiggish narrative, the inevitable decay of
Britain from the weary titan to a small island.
A comparison can be drawn with the postwar histories of the Second and
Third Reichs. By assuming a model of normal modernisation amongst the
countries of Western Europe leading to liberal democracy, social
historians of Germany have constructed a Sonderweg, a 'special path' for
Germany that lends a Whiggish inevitability to its descent into the Nazi
Dictatorship. This "specific path of modernization" argues that:
far more so than was the case in western societies, pre-
industrial, pre-capitalist, and pre-bourgeois authoritarian and
feudal traditions survived in a society which was never truly
bourgeois, existing in a relationship of tension with a
modern, dynamic capitalist economy and finally exploding
into violent protest when that economy collapsed in crisis.2
The importance of this approach to history is its similarity to histories of
British decline. These have purported to explain the causes of British
decline through the strength of a pre-industrial and anti-modern ancien
1 Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990, London: The Penguin Press, 1996, p.
3.
2 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation,
London: Edward Arnold, 1989 [1985], pp. 18-19. For further information about the concept
of the Sonderweg, see Jurgen Kocka, "German History before Hitler: The debate about
the German Sondei'weg", Journal of Contemporaiy History, vol. 23, (1988), pp. 3-16.
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regime that shaped the institutions, culture and direction of British
capitalism throughout the twentieth century. As long as this ancien regime
remained in existence, decline was inevitable.
The two historians who have popularised and promoted the cultural
causes of decline are Martin J. Wiener and Corelli Barnett. Both have
argued that English culture constructed a "cultural cordon sanitaire
encircling the forces of economic development - technology, industry,
commerce". 3 Their books have argued that Britain was ruled by a
gentrified bourgeois elite which idealised rural society and actively
constrained urbanisation and industrialisation. This elite was educated in
the public schools and directed towards gentlemanly professions that
inculcated service and independence from salaried work at the expense of
efficiency, expertise and specialisation. The entrepreneurial skills of the
manufacturing industry in the North of England were replaced by
metropolitan professionals as the dynamo in the direction and rate of
economic growth. These social and cultural changes took place during the
latter half of Queen Victoria's reign and restrained the potential economic
growth of Great Britain. In a comparison of the modernisation processes in
Britain and Germany, Wiener stated that the aristocratic elites retained a
dominant role in politics and culture in both countries. In his simplistic and
reductionist comparison, Britain adopted liberalism and capitalism but
rejected industrialisation while Germany embraced industrialisation and
rejected liberal capitalism. The result of one was decline, the other
fascism .4
3 Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980,
Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1985 [1981], p. ix.
4 Ibid., pp. 3-22.
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This 'cultural critique' of British economic performance has come under
sustained attack since the publication of Wiener's book in 1981. 5 The
institution on which this debate centres is the public school. After the
Arnoldian reforms of the mid-Victorian period, these educational
establishments became the training grounds for the professional classes.
They turned their pupils into gentlemen. For Wiener, the standards of the
gentleman were the primary cause for moves by managers and
entrepreneurs away from profit-seeking and the maximisation of
productivity. The encouragement of amateurism and public service
replaced the mid-Victorian emphasis on utilitarianism and realism that
drove the motor of industrialism. The economy was restructured through a
gentlemanly "consensus of outlook and behavior.....that was based on the
cultural dominance of Whitehall". 6 Both civil servants and directors now
belonged to companies and ministries that had been remodelled along the
lines of gentlemen's clubs. With their ethic of service and their
paternalistic sense of responsibility for their workers, these gentlemen
sought stability and secure profits through a regulated economy and
industrial cartels. Therefore, slow economic growth could be attributed to
"a pattern of industrial behavior suspicious of change, reluctant to
innovate, energetic only in maintaining the status quo".7
Wiener also attributed the division between pure and applied science (or
disinterested and useful knowledge) to gentrification. In this argument, he
5 W. D. Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain, 1750-1990, London:
Routledge, 1993, pp. 16-23. Rubinstein uses the term 'cultural critique' to unite and
polemicise the works of Anthony Sampson, Martin J. Wiener and Corelli Barnett as one
school of declinist historiography.
6 Ibid., p. 151.
7 Ibid., p. 154.
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was drawing upon the writings of Corelli Barnett. Barnett argued that
Arnoldian ideals of pacifism and gentlemanly behaviour had transformed
the elite as part of a greater change in 'national character', brought about
by romanticism and evangelical Protestantism. From the artisanal class
upwards, polite respectable actions became the norm. In the public
schools, an academic syllabus "inoculated" pupils against the world by
promoting conformity and conservatism whilst stifling innovation. 'Old
boys' behaved with an "inculcated expectation of common standards of
gentlemanly decency and respect for the rules". 8 However, this lack of
utilitarianism was the foundation of Barnett's depiction of British culture as
anti-modern and anti-industrial. The consequences of this culture included
a failure to develop science-based industries. British industries were "a
working museum of industrial archaeology" and British laboratories "were
German technological provinces".9 Science formed a small part of this
'cultural critique' which concentrated upon economic performance. The
conclusions of Barnett and Wiener were that British science was pure,
anti-industrial and far less capable of achieving success than its American
or German counterparts.
This portrayal of "an anti-scientific, anti-technological and anti-industrial
culture" has been attacked by economic historians and historians of
technology. 10 This criticism of the 'cultural critique' has concentrated upon
the feasibility of placing economic performance in a cultural context.
Economic historians have explored the empirical evidence underpinning
8 Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power, London: Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd.,
1993 [1972], p.37; Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as
a Great Nation, London: MacMillan, 1986; Corelli Barnett, The Lost Victory: British
Dreams, British Realities, 1945-1950, London: MacMillan, 1995.
9 Ibid., pp.87-88.
10 David Edgerton, "Myths of Decline", Prospect, no. 11(1996), PP. 28-31, 29.
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the assertions that cultural assumptions influence entrepreneurial
behaviour to such an extent that they slowed British economic growth after
all other factors have been taken into account. Some have even
concluded the opposite:
What was wrong with British industry after (indeed, before)
1850 was not a poverty of entrepreneurial (or industrial)
spirit, but a surfeit. There were too many fiercely
independent, aggressively competitive firms coming into
existence... 11
But most agree that cultural explanations are insufficient to explain
comparative rates of economic performance, and that, "Such accounts as
those of Barnett or Wiener run the danger of using explanatory
sledgehammers to crack rather modest nuts".12
Those who do not completely disagree with cultural explanations of
economic behaviour have taken issue with the portrayal of English culture
and the public schools as detrimental to the process of modernisation.
Rubinstein has claimed that public schools might actually benefit business
through the contacts fostered by 'old boy' networks and that statistical
analysis of their alumni does not support the 'cultural critique'. 13 He also
argues more problematically that British elites were more rationalised and
more predisposed to scientific exploration than their counterparts on the
11 Peter L. Payne, "Entrepreneurship and British Economic Decline" in Peter Payne, W.
D. Rubinstein and Harold James, eds., British Culture and Economic Decline, London:
George Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1990, pp. 25-58, 33.
12 Harold James, "The German Experience and the Myth of British Cultural
Exceptionalism" in ibid., pp. 91-128, 124.
13 W. D. Rubinstein, op cit., p. 128.
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continent or in America. Questioning the 'cultural critique' has also been
stimulated by the empirical research of historians of technology. The
general conclusions of David Edgerton, who has popularised the
inadequacies of the declinists' "lurid historical fantasies", are that:
As the richest country in Europe until the 1960s, Britain
spent the most on invention, innovation and R & D. Its higher
education was peculiarly committed to science and
technology, and its businesses and government had a very
high representation of scientists and engineers.14
The 'cultural critique' has been consistently and emphatically rejected by
historians since empirical evidence has not supported its claims.
It is from the responses to the 'cultural critique' that a new picture of the
scientific profession in the twentieth century takes shape. Gary Werskey
has drawn the stereotype of a Cambridge 'pure' scientist: a member of an
aristocratic elite, imbued with pre-industrial and anti-modern values, but
competing with his peers in a high mathematical culture. 15 Werskey draws
a picture of the scientific elite at the Cavendish Laboratory similar to the
'cultural critique'. The elite's inbuilt preference for an aristocratic value-
system and ruralised life-style as opposed to the managerial ethos and the
urban world, was attributed to the educational system of the public
schools. This interpretation obscures the historical role of these
educational institutions and in order to analyse their role with greater
14 David Edgerton, "Myths of Decline", p. 31.
15 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and
Socialists of the 1930s, London: Free Association Books, 1988 [1978].
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clarity, one has to take on board the redefinition of the British gentleman
offered by new studies of British capitalism.
P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins have studied British imperialism over a
period of three centuries from its incipient expansion in the seventeenth
century to the Commonwealth. Following Rubinstein and drawing upon his
research, they conclude that the Industrial Revolution has dominated
interpretations of British and imperial history to the detriment of the role
played by the financiaf and service sectors of the economy. (n partl'cui'ar,
the City of London and its leaders have been a centre of economic
dynamism that grew into the Iinchpin of a global financial system during
the nineteenth century. 1 6 Their explanatory concept of 'gentlemanly
capitalism' was constructed to explain how dynamic capitalists could gain
from profitable opportun;ties yet retain high social status and links with the
political rulers in the aristocracy. This gentlemanly order exercised a
collective self-fashioning that combined the ideological components of
chivalrous behaviour and classical models to incorporate the Arthurian
knight within the ethos of public service derived from Athens and Rome.
This order derived its wealth from financial activities and disparaged the
provincial, manufacturing cultures of Britain's industrial economy. Its
disdain for 'trade' and promotion of the City's interests shaped the 'official
mind' of Parliament and Whitehall. With this concept they have outlined a
new history of the British elites, focused upon the public schools and the
professional classes of London's service economy.17
16 Peter Clarke, op cit., pp. 7-13.
17 P. J. Cain and A. C. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-
1990, London: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1993, pp. 298-300.
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The public schools were renewed by the reforms of the mid-Victorian
period. Most professionals, civil servants and City financiers shared a
public school education and were oriented by this towards "the security
offered by bureaucratic and professional employment". 1 8 This redefinition
of the gentleman originated from the changes in education at the public
schools. Pupils learned classical and chivalrous codes of behaviour in the
classroom and as part of the pupils' way of life, especially in the
constraints of the boarding school. The pupils imbibed the conservative,
monarchist and imperialist values that the public schools celebrated.
Moreover, they graduated with a sense of public service that could be
gratified in the pursuit of a higher duty. Alumni tended to work for the
Empire, for God, or for some professional ideal, which they had
constructed in personal terms from a combination of their educational
experiences and the requirements of their profession. This gentlemanly
order of professionals incorporated the vast majority of the middle classes,
but it did not include the rural lifestyle of the declining squirearchy or the
conspicuous consumption of cosmopolitan plutocracy.19
'Gentlemanly professionalism' was a corollary of 'gentlemanly capitalism'.
Its historian, Harold Perkin, also drew upon the work of W. D. Rubinstein
in his study of professionalisation within modern English society since
1880.20 Perkin concluded, like Cain and Hopkins, that the professions
shared the same characteristics as their financial counterparts: a public
school education, a metropolitan elite and an ethos of public service.
18 Ibid., p. 25.
19 David Cannadine, Aspects of Aristocracy: Grandeur and Decline in Modern Britain,
London: Yale University Press, 1994, pp. 37-54.
20 Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, London:
Routledge, 1980.
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However, Perkin had to explain why professionalisation grew in Britain and
how it became the motor of an expanding service economy. He argued
that British society was undergoing a historical transformation from a
tripartite class structure to one of competing professional hiearchies.
Every profession was vying with each other to increase their respective
income, status and power. The gentlemanly professional served the 'want'
for which he was trained and this was often cast in an idealistic mould. As
the twentieth century matured, the gentlemanly professional sought a
secure position in state employment rather than through the maintenance
of private clients. This reflected the increasing demands from the
professions for the state to employ their members because of the 'need'
that they served. An example of this process is the medical profession
which has changed from a community of gentlemanly practitioners with
private practices to salaried general practitioners dispensing universal
health care.
Locating science within the world of gentlemanly professionalism is
problematic because it is not a single field of knowledge like law or
soldiering that can be translated into a number of identifiable services
within familiar institutions. The solicitor and the barrister serve clients
within an institutionalised legal system through a defined body of
knowledge, law; the soldier, sailor or airman are identified through their
roles on land, sea or air to which they bring learned qualities of leadership
and strategy. Unlike other traditional professions, science is far more
diffuse in terms of knowledge or institutions but it does contain at least two
characteristics that mark it off as a twentieth-century profession. From the
Edwardian period, scientific publicists asserted that the application of
10
scientific knowledge was necessary for the country's future economic and
military wellbeing. Their call for state funding of scientific research and
pensions for researchers sits well with Perkin's system of professions
competing for income, status and power. 21 British science was also
characterised by a united, institutionalised profession at an elite level. The
Royal Society in London provided a reward system of honours for all
aspects of science through its positions, medals and lectures. Moreover,
the aristocratic roots of this institution fostered a long association with the
governing classes comparable with the elite structures of traditional
professions like the law or medicine. This historical antecedent provides
one explanation for the close identification between elite recognition
through a fellowship of the Royal Society and the resulting recognition
through the general honours system. Scientists competed for the rewards
that the elite of the professional classes hungered: membership of an
order, a knighthood or even a peerage as well as consideration for
positions of public service. The 'professionalsation' of the honours system
lends weight to the argument that competing professional hierarchies were
merging into a governing elite at the top, known after the Second World
War as the 'Great and the Good'.22
Scientists participated in the world of 'gentlemanly professionalism'. Were
they emissaries of Progress, forced to engage with political and financial
masters who lived in the past? Or, like Werskey argued, were they part of
that past - blind seekers of scientific truths who formed an aristocracy of
21 When applying Perkins model to the scientific 'profession', it could be examined as a
collectivity of underdeveloped professions in a multiplicity of disciplines who invest and
promote the shared cultural authority of science in return for gaining more professional
and financial security.
22 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990, pp. 540-541.
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knowledge and looked down upon the demands of 'trade' and the working
classes? These questions reflect the 'cultural critique' which utilises an
artificial dichotomy between the modern and the traditional to separate the
forces of continuity and change. Cain and Hopkins constructed their
concept of gentlemanly capitalism to bridge this divide:
We have used the term ['gentlemanly capitalism] to
represent a hitherto neglected theme in the historical
transformation of British society, a process which we regard
less as an exchange of 'tradition' for 'modernity' than as a
selective amalgamation of elements inherited from the past
with introductions from the continously evolving present.23
And within their approach, they detailed how gentlemen redefined
themselves:
But gentlemen looked forward as well as back. They invoked
the past to fashion a morality for the present, not only to
counter the encroachments of industry and democracy but
also to legitimise their own innovating activities.24
The demonstration of the principle that an adherence to gentlemanly
values involved a continual exercise in redefining and inventing traditions
in response to the demands of modernity is sound. This principle
represents an analytical advance upon the romanticised elite culture of
23 p . J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, op cit., p. 298.
24 Ibid., p. 25.
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Barnett and Wiener where ideals motivated the highminded behaviour of
the "latter-day White Knights riding out in wartime Britain to combat evil
with the flashing sword of moral indignation". 25 However, Cain and
Hopkins placed too much emphasis on the aristocratic antecedents of
gentlemanly values and exaggerated the ideological influence of the City.
Rubinstein's studies of public school alumni showed no bias against
business or manufacturing and suggested a shift of landowners' sons into
business and of businessmen's sons into the professions. 26 Instead of
following these historiographical examples and defining gentlemanly
values in terms of romanticism, chivalry or public service, it is better to
study these values and codes of conduct as cultural resources for
constructing a professional identity, governing professional interactions
and managing conflict within and between professional communities when
they arose. This still leaves the problem of defining gentlemanly values
and behaviour during the twentieth century.
Instead of retaining this aristocratic hangover when studying the
gentleman, Jeffrey Richards has persuasively argued that English society
has been dominated by a middle-class value-system derived from early
Victorian evangelicalism. 27 Central to this value-system was the elevation
of gentlemanly conduct to an ideal that governed the behaviour of all the
middle-class, especially professionals who relied upon this perceived
status to reinforce their cultivated representation of expertise. This value-
system, subject to permutations and social change, promoted conformity
amongst those who identified with the 'respectable' and the 'genteel' until
25 Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War, p. 15.
26 W. D. Rubinstein, op cit., pp. 12 1-127.
27 Jeffrey Richards, Visions of Yesterday, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973, pp 7-
15.
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the onset of the permissive society. The public schools became the
socializing institutions for an ethic that moulded the majority of all
professionals and dominated their elites. Moreover this ethic was diffused
through its reproduction in grammar schools and its articulation through
popular films, books and magazines. 28 These gentlemanly values and
attitudes are the entry point for examining the gentlemanly professional
and his position within the social structure.
The concept of 'gentlemanly professionalism' also allows greater
understanding of the curious mixture of traditionalism and the modern,
conservatism and radicalism that characterised the scientific profession
during this period. The drastic restructuring of many scientific disciplines
was accompanied by the incorporation of the majority of the profession
into the midde-cass. n the thrtes, Sw rnes eas 	 vx4i
more elderly gentleman of science who publicised progress in astronomy
as a form of educational service while living the life of a leisured private
researcher in deepest Surrey. Baron Rutherford of Nelson was the
dynamic peer who had presided over powerful advances in the knowledge
of physics and promoted science through his political and administrative
contacts but relaxed on driving holidays and reading dime-penny novels.
Or Sir Henry Tizard, doyen of the scientific civil service, who would go
fishing in his spare time and kept his family at arm's length in Fareham, a
small town on the south coast. All three examples demonstrate that
contextualising the life or the thought of a man of science during the era of
gentlemanly professionalism is far removed from the shared culture of the
mid-Victorian period. For every Joseph Needham or J.B.S. Haldane,
28 Jeffrey Richards, Happiest Days: The pub/ic schools in English fiction, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1988.
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combining high science with high culture, there were far more Rutherfords
and Tizards. To comprehend their culture, their values and their attitudes,
requires an understanding of the middle-class with its public schools. its
professional base, its morality and encoded snobbery. This also goes
some way towards explaining one of the most striking peculiarities of
twentieth century Britain: the incorporation of increasingly powerful
professions into the existing political and socio-economic structure. Men of
science were rewarded with honours from the Monarch as well from as the
Royal Society.
Connotations of professionalism and expertise were amenable to the
representations of effortlessness and natural authority that accompanied
the image of the gentleman. Acquiring specialised knowledge through a
long period of education or apprenticeship was conducive to the ideology
of 'character' - a diffuse set of values that conferred gentlemanly status
when inculcated but which could not be learned as a set of specific skills
or theories. As particular knowledge communities were transformed by the
processes of professionalisation during the late Victorian period, their
identities, roles and skills drew upon pre-existent representations of
gentlemanly professionalism in law, medicine or perhaps in science's
case, geology. Authority and status depended upon a mixture of acquired
professional knowledge and hierarchical deference. When a particular
profession gained greater power and income, it did so by becoming more
respectable and more middle-class in the identity of its practitioners and
the gentlemanly image these portrayed to a wider public. By conforming
their goals to the class structures and cultural uniformities of Britain's
stratified society, individual professionals found that career advancement
15
and upward social mobility were mutually reinforcing objectives.
An analysis of the relationship between the rules, values and codes that
embodied the professional gentleman and the historical evidence
organised and marshalled in narratives requires a return to the practices
disclosed by the texts. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the
constellation of gentlemanly values and codes of conduct as they existed
and changed during the period of the two World Wars and how they
helped the professional scientist in his dealings with his peers in the civil
service. In order to do this one must show that important members of the
scientific profession were inculcated with the values of the public schools,
the nurseries of the professional classes, during their period of
educational and professional socialization at school and university. Then
one must study the arenas in which gentlemanly values and practices
were most clearly and distinctly articulated. Given the complex links
between government and science, conflict within and between these
spheres forms the most favourable setting for studying scientists as
gentlemanly professionals.
The role of scientists within government during the interwar period was
complex and varied and their interaction with other professional
communities in Whitehall cannot be reduced to that mythical monolith of
the gentlemanly order, the 'Establishment'. Rubinstein describes it as a
"matrix" and as a "coherent system" that includes the Conservative Party,
the City, the Church of England, the professions and the universities,
harking back to the certainties of the nineteenth century. 29 However,
29 Ibid., p. 73.
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Anthony Sampson, the systematizer of British institutional power, rejected
the concept of the 'Establishment', arguing that, "The conspiratorial
notions of a single 'Establishment' which holds them [Britain's institutions]
all together is all too untrue".3°
An overall description of the interaction between scientists and Whitehall
was provided by Alexander King, who was the first secretary of the
Advisory Council on Scientific Policy during the 1940s. He described the
relationships between science and go'ecnnient as a &3 f 'ae
community comprised of face-to-face encounters. His text stated:
• . up to the Second World War, the size of the British science
system was small enough for internal adjustments and policy
direction to be in the hands of a few, outstanding
personalities belonging to the same coterie. Coherence and
mutual understanding were probably achieved rather
effectively, if utterly informally, through frequent, easy, but
often unplanned contacts between the leading figures of the
Royal Society, the research council secretaries, and senior
civil servants, all of whom were habitues of the Athenaeum
CIub.31
This picture is reinforced by episodes within the biographies of Baron
Rutherford of Nelson and Sir Henry Tizard, where the Athenaeum Club
30 Anthony Sampson, The Changing Anatomy of Britain, London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1982, P. 420. Peter Hennessy describes the term as "a fluid mercurial concept, infuriating
in its imprecision" and comments that every sport and profession has one. Peter
Hennessy, op cit., pp. 540-546, 541.
31 Alexander King, Science and Policy: The International Stimulus, London: Oxford
University Press, 1984, p. 11.
17
functions as a site for private lunches whose participants aimed to
influence the outcome of committee meetings or planned the agenda of a
scientific lobby. The Athenaeum Club was an important resource for this
'village community' of the interwar period.32
However, private lunches and clandestine meetings in a clubbable
atmosphere do not provide the sources for studying the scientific
professional in action. Codes of conduct and values are articulated more
clearly when they become issues themselves between scientific
professionals and other parties. Therefore, the proper arena involves
conflict and controversy. The two case-studies within this thesis involve
baffles within civil service committees between professional scientists and
their opponents who do not feel bound by codes of conduct because they
place a greater priority on their perceived interests above and beyond
conforming to expected standards of behaviour. The tacit standards that
govern the membership of these committees form focal points for wider
divisions between professions and political camps. In the first case-study
which examines the machinations leading up to the establishment of the
Radium Beam Therapy Research Board, Sir Walter Fletcher, Secretary of
the Research Council and Lord Dawson, President of the Royal College of
Physicians, baffle for professional control of the institutions supervising the
science of radium. Questions of conduct are contextualised in this wider
story of professional friction. The second case-study examines the work of
the Tizard Committee on radar and the discord between its members and
Frederick Lindemann over air defence. Both case-studies demonstrate
whether these rules of conduct aided or hindered a resolution to the
32 David Wilson, Rutherford: Simple Genius, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983, pp.
480-482; R. W. Clark, Tizard, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1985, pp. 116-118.
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conflict and allow the historian to clarify the role of the scientist as a
gentlemanly professional through his interaction with oppositional forces.
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Chapter Two
THE START OF THE GENTLEMANLY PROFESSIONAL: REFLECTIONS
ON PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND ENTRY INTO THE SCIENTIFIC WORLD
2.1 Introduction
There is one feature of Rutherford's life that appears completely
inexplicable: how did this brash, noisy, flamboyant, pure
scientist, hailing from the backwoods of New Zealand, mesh in
so perfectly with the quiet, unostentatious public-school men at
the Athenaeum and on the fringes of Whitehall who controlled
the first government support for science and who founded and
formed those institutions by which public money is still
channelled into research.l
Wilson answers this question by arguing that Rutherford was a capabe
committee member who, in his role as "a man you could do business with",
set the tone on committees and discreetly steered their discussions towards
his own conclusions by "the force of his argument."2 Wilson, as a biographer,
prefers the psychological conclusion that Rutherford's character was
sufficient to ensure his success in the 'politics of science'. An alternative
viewpoints asks whether these public-school men recognised Rutherford as
an embodiment of 'character', that moral internalisation of gentlemanly
values, and accepted him as a viable candidate for membership of their
1 David Wilson, Rutherford: Simple Genius, London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1983, p. 453.
2 Ibid.
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government committees on the grounds that he was one of their own, despite
his colonial background. With Rutherford and lizard as examples, the
biographical backgrounds of interwar scientists have concentrated upon their
scientific careers and achievements while merely recounting their education
as a series of anecdotes. 3 Principally, the influence of the public school
system on scientists has attracted no attention from historians, unlike studies
on the role of science in the public school. 4 To remedy that omission, this
chapter is focused upon the careers of three prominent scientists who
attended prestigious public schools, emphasising how their education
moulded their identity and shaped their subsequent vocation. The three
subjects are Lord Rutherford of Nelson, Sir Julian Huxley and Sir Henry
Thomas lizard.
The study of public schools and their pupils can founder on the mythical
representations of themselves that these institutions promoted. At the turn of
the century, many public schools invented traditions for themselves which
legitimated their authority and emphasised their longevity. They made the
same claims individually and collectively. Each school encouraged customs
and practices amongst its pupil population that emphasized the peculiar
identity of the school and expressed its historical character. The term, 'public
school spirit', especially, evoked a unifying mystique, bestowing educational
3 Ibid, pp. 13-49. Wilson concentrates on Rutherford's educational achievements, devoting
four pages to his time at Nelson College in New Zealand. R. W. Clark, Tizard, London:
Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965, pp. 7-9. The details of lizard's educational career at the school of
Westminster in this biography are derived from the unpublished and unfinished manuscript of
the scientist's autobiography.
4 A. J. Meadows and W. H. Brock,"Topics Fit For Gentlemen: The Problem of Science in the
Public School Curriculum" in Brian Simon and Ian Bradley, eds., The Victorian Public School:
Studies in the Development of an Educational Institution, A Symposium, Dublin: Gill and
MacMillan Ltd., 1975, pp. 95-114.
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superiority upon these schools because of their embodiment of indefinable
English qualities that were inculcated into their pupils and formed the
foundation for educating gentlemen. Defining themselves and their pupils as
a type, the public schools were taken at face value by left-wing polemicists
who utilised this simplistic description to construct an aristocratic bogeyman.
The public schools were fingered as one of the primary causes of Britain's
decline because they instilled into their pupils an antipathy for manufacturing
and technology that shaped their post-educational choices in career and
politics. The piffall for historians is the acceptance of these claims as fact
and, as a consequence, viewing the public school system as an educational
engine which mysteriously manufactured fantastic conspiracies of old-boy
networks -- all under the mask of the 'Establishment'.
Before examining the experiences of these three subjects, it is necessary to
recount what the public schools were and what their educational system
actually entailed. Public schools moulded their pupils on two levels, through
education and inculcation. Knowledge and codes of behaviour were learned
"either through the overt values taught in the classroom or through more
subtle factors of socialisation and peer group aftitude formation". 5 For
example, the jingoistic values that motivated public school alumni to
voluntarily enlist in Kitchener's army were learned through the teaching of
imperialism and nationalism by teachers in collective rituals like celebrating
the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria and in the more commonplace
routines of the classroom and the military corps. Underlying and reinforcing
5 W. D. Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain, 1750-1990, London:
Routledge, 1993, p. 111.
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the dominant value system acquired in the public schools before the First
World War were the attitudes and orientations that marked all of their alumni.
An old boy could be recognised by his speech patterns, by the expectations
of his status and by the codes of behaviour that had been inculcated through
playing games and living within a hierarchical and competitive community of
boys, divided amongst rival houses. This chapter outlines the educational
importance of the public school and then examines the subject scientists to
see how far they were shaped by their time within their respective institutions.
2.2 Education at the Public Schools
The gentleman functioned as an ideal in morality and action for the public
schools. Cardinal Newman, Thomas Arnold, Anthony Trollope and other
Victorian authors provided exemplars or rules for the behaviour of a
gentleman.6 Their criteria for the type included educational achievement,
sporting prowess, chivalric behaviour and moral action. This resulted in
contradictory stereotypes of the gentleman: the educated, philanthropic
clergyman as opposed to the plainspeaking huntsman who could ride all day
yet never read a book. These contradictions were unified by the
propagandists for the "public school spirit" who promoted education through
the classics, sport through the cult of athieticism, chivalric behaviour through
the general codes of conduct and moral action through chapel and
philanthropy.
It is notable that Arnold rejected chivalric imagery and the importance of
6 Philip Mason, The English Gentleman: The Rise and Fall of an Ideal, London: Andre
Deutsch, 1982, pp. 12-13.
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games in his reformation at Rugby. 7 Under his administration, this public
school was reoriented towards a new market, the middle classes. Their sons
would be assured of a Christian education and would learn to compete with
each other through the innovation of examinations, learn to emulate a moral
role-model, their housemaster, and enter a community of boys within the
school which would transmit the desired values and attitudes. Arnold wished
to educate his pupils and cure them of their tendency to sin. He therefore
intended to inculcate values of service through teaching the classics and the
Bible. Arnold recast the gentlemanly concepts of honour and courage within
an evangelical forge, creatfng a new tern p)ate that married the enfiernan to
respectability. Hard work, educational achievement and service to an ideal
were values that professionals, industrialists, merchants and other members
of the middle-classes demanded in the education of their children. 8 The
diffusion of Arnoldian ideas and the explosion of growth in the number of
public schools reflected the moral pressure o This new e-cs',
educational constituency.
The public schools were originally confined to the Clarendon Nine as defined
by the Public Schools Commission of 1868 which examined the chartered
and charitable foundations that provided secondary education in England.
Given the number of new foundations in mid-Victorian Britain the
headmasters of the more prominent schools met to establish the
Headmasters' Conference, an institution where inclusion was often the
7 T. W. Bamford, "Thomas Arnold and the Victorian Idea of a Public School" in Brian Simon
and Ian Bradley eds., The Victorian Public School, pp. 58-71.
8 J. R. de S. Honey, "Tom Brown's Universe: The Nature and Limits of the Viictorian Public
Schools Committee" in Ibid., pp. 19-33.
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defining criterion for a public school. The Public School Yearbook was also
published as a guide to the public schools and as a marketing tool to attract
the sons of increasingly wealthy professional parents. The public school was
promoted as a 'type', a description that concealed the differences between
each school. Oundle School, for instance, was an establishment that,
promoted the natural sciences and modern languages while Eton was noted
for its individualism and historical peculiarities.
The inculcation of public school attitudes was built into the social structure of
the school which promoted conformity to the pressures of the peer group.
Each school was a corporate institution and was divided into a number of
houses that would compete with each other academically and in games.
Pupils entered as boarders and the school exerted strong social pressure on
the pupil to conform to the rules and unwritten codes that governed the
communities of the school and the house. Each house was often
distinguished by a distinctive mode of dress, peculiar customs and a system
of colours awarded for sporting prowess. Each starting boy was assigned to a
house and had to learn its rituals and its practices as rapidly as possible in
order to demonstrate his loyalty to the group. Authority, on the other hand,
was delegated by the house-masters to a self-regulating system of prefects
who formed the plateau of a hierarchy of power, defined by age and ability,
that regulated all pupils from the Head Boy to the lowliest fag.9
9 Vivian Ogilvie, The English Public School, London: B. T. Batsford Ltd., 1957, PP. 180-192;
Ian Weinberg, The English Public Schools: The Sociology of Elite Education, New York:
Atherton Press, 1967, pp. 41-49.
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With the adoption of an Arnoldian system, the culture of each school was
soon oriented towards a new set of attitudes that guaranteed order. The rapid
turnover in generations of pupils allowed this culture to establish itself within a
decade at Rugby. This culture ensured that its inhabitants conformed to
unwritten codes of conduct and etiquette that would mark off each pupil, by
house and by school, from outsiders. Since power and responsibility had
been delegated to the prefects, there was a strong incentive for the senior
boys to keep order in the schools. Their personal power was reinforced by
the aesthetic and social pressure to conform. New aesthetic standards of
'good form', 'fair play' and 'the good loser' or displays of 'character' and
'manliness' took hold in the classroom and on the playing field. This etiquette
became instinctive and second nature for the pupils, as opposed to more
formal sets of values, and was inculcated during a process of socialisation.
This fostered a corporate loyalty towards the house and the school to which
the boy belonged:
All [of] these characteristics promoted a powerful esprit de
corps. Everything combined, by precept or example, to instil the
sense of belonging to a community and a pride in it. The school
songs which became another essential piece of equipment
voiced a romantic attachment to the "old place", a filial affection
that often lasted through Life.1O
In thought and deed the public schoolboy was recognisable by his speech
10 Vivian Ogilvie, op cit., p. 182.
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and his behaviour. These manners were the cues which allowed the public
schoolboy to play out his role and represent himself correctly in the company
of his social equals.11
The Arnoldian process had also recognised the moral potential of certain
facets of the pupils' culture such as games which were transformed from
anarchic displays of brutality into rule-bound displays of brutality. They were
no longer perceived as dangerous and immoral activities that ought to be
outlawed but as moral and healthy sports that deserved to be encouraged.
This Arnoldian mould was modified by the development of "muscular
Christianity" and its emphasis upon the cult of athleticism during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. The educational purpose of the schools
was modified "to train the body and will, as well as the mind". 12 Thus a "new
aristocracy" of gentlemen, speaking in a standard form of English, was
born. 13 These were not just Arnold's Chnstan geitemen, fed a diet of
classics "leavened by Christianity", but hardened individuals who had been
imbued with 'character'. 14 Public school education had become a form of
training: psychological, physical and moral.
The attitudes and etiquette of the public school boy included a conscious
awareness of his own social status as compared to individuals from other
11 Rupert Wilkinson, The Prefects: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition,
London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
12 Mark Girouard, The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman, London: Yale
University Press, 1981, P. 170.
13 J. R. de S. Honey, Tom Brown's Universe: The Development of the Victorian Public
School, London: Millinton Books, 1977, p. 229.
14 Ibid., p. 228. Philip Mason, op cit., p. 170. "Hardiness, self-composure, coolness in the face
of pain and danger, confidence in one's own decisions - these were qualities required by the
imperial class which a growing empire demanded."
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social groupings like servants and tradesmen. Yet social status was the one
feature of the public schools that their propagandists never recognised or
discussed. Their task was to portray and define the products of the public
schools within the traditional gentlemanly discourse, as modified by Arnold
and the movement for 'muscular Christianity'. J. E. C. Weildon, the
headmaster of Harrow, publicised the values of the public schools, both in
Britain and abroad. He emphasised the importance of obedience, the
overriding responsibilities that duty demanded, the requirements of honour
and truthfulness, the virtues of courage and the moral dignity of courtesy and
manners. Of all of these, Weildon wrote of the primacy of honour:
A man's sense of honour, the consciousness of his obligation to
do all and more than all that can be rightly expected of him, is a
conspicuous feature in noble English character. It is the
distinguishing mark of a gentleman. To violate it is in common
parlance, 'bad form'.15
The gentleman, for example, was expected to stand out from the rank and file
through "a dignified bearing and an aura of command." 16 All public
schoolboys would be able to lead their platoon, their company or their nation,
having imbibed the qualities of leadership from their experiences in the rugby
field or through service to their house. Welldon argued that local identification
with their house or their school would be widened upon maturity to take in the
15 J. E. C. Welldon, "The Training of an English Gentleman in the Public Schools", Nineteenth
Century arid After, vol.60(1906), pp. 396-413, p. 404.
16 Rupert Wilkinson, op cit., pp. 13-14.
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Empire through personal service within the army or the imperial civil service.
The public schools laid the educational foundations for a new elite that
governed Great Britain for the first half of the twentieth century. Members of
this elite were often called the "empire-builders", because of their
overwhelming representation as district officers, army officers and colonial
civil servants in films and fiction. With their "sort of slightly contemptuous, but
entirely friendly, kindness towards strange foreign people", they reinforced
assumptions of imperial superiority and were a strong cultural influence at
home and abroad. 17 Although the cultural critics of the Left polemicised and
satirised the public schools as the symbols of a class-ridden society on the
grounds of one education for the rich, another for the poor, the genre of
public school fiction dominated magazines for boys from the eighteen-
eighties onwards. The stories of Talbot Baines Reeds and Frank Richards in
The Boys' Own Paper and Magnet, provided role-models, inculcated these
values and moulded generations of schoolboys from all classes. This
literature was taken up by a newly literate audience who had attended the
schools provided by the Education Act of 1870 and read periodicals that
promoted the life and morals of the middle class. The eruption of patriotic
fervour and military voluntarism during the beginning of the Great War took
commentators by surprise after the industrial disputes of the Edwardian
period, but its enthusiasm can be partially explained by the consequences of
this literary phenomenon. 18 The value-system of the public schools,
17 Bernard Darwin, The English Public School, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929, p.
27.
18 M. Pugh, State and Society: British Political and Social History, 1870-1992, London:
Edward Arnold, 1994, pp. 146-147.
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standardised and popularised, was to retain its influence, unscathed by war
or depression, until the classless myths of the Second World War. In the
words of Jeffrey Richards, the influence of the public schools can be
analysed as:
the twin process of the maintenance of the existing hierarchy
and class system with everyone in his place, and the absorption
of a set of elite role models and values, which between them
ensured social cohesion and relative stability for a hundred
years.19
The existence of such a public school culture contributed to the culture of
gentlemanly professionalism during the interwar period. This interwar culture
was expressed through etiquette and behaviour amongst the professional
middle-classes and was primarily associated with the civii service and the
Empire. Conservative apologists would often invoke the public schoo's as a
defence for the existing social structure and elite against the dangers of
democracy or bolshevism but the professional and the commercial classes
were united by their mode of speech (the Queen's English), their need for
respectability and their codes of behaviour. Labour, Liberal and Conservative
frontbenchers, predominantly professional in their backgrounds, were loyal to
their party but united by their shared emphasis on gentlemanly behaviour. By
extension, professional scientists conformed to this gentlemanly role and
those who were educated at a public school practiced these manners from
19 Jeffrey Richards, Happiest Days: The public schools in English fiction, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1988, p. 20.
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their teenage years.
2.3 Scientists within the Public School
Ernest Rutherford was born to a large pioneer family at Nelson in New
Zealand in 1871 but this location did not appear conducive to imbibing the
culture of a public school. However he was awarded a scholarship to Nelson
College in 1886 and, since his family resided at Havelock, entered as a
boarder. Nelson College had been modelled on [ton when it was founded in
1856.20 The individualistic ethos that was associated with Eton was
accentuated in this school since the total of eighty pupils lacked the critical
mass to impose the same pressures for conformity that were institutionalised
in English public schools. Rutherford's headmaster was W. J. Ford, a
Cambridge M. A. who had taught classics at Marlborough and ran Nelson
along Arnoldian lines. 21 Nelson contained many of the features of the public
school including games, education in the classics and çrizes. Rutherford a'so
participated in the activtttes of the Officers Ttairn Cow, 	 to th
of sargeant. According to Wilson, he "received a sound and very broad
education" but "had at this stage shown no particular interest in science".22
However the mere presence of Rutherford at an antipodean descendant of
Eton is not sufficient evidence that he experienced the inculcation of public
school customs and manners like his contemporaries in England.
20 "Nelson College epitomised the high aims of the earliest New Zealand colonists in
education. It was founded in 1856, just fifteen years after they had arrived in the new country,
yet it was planned to be an imitation of Eton College both institutionally and architecturally."
Wilson, op cit., p. 32.( my italics)
21 Ibid., p. 34.
22 Ibid., p. 38. Nelson's science lessons were taught in a Chemistry Room converted from a
bathroom and a bootroom but a laboratory was not built until 1890, a year after Rutherford
had left.
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In his account of a weekend cricket match between a team of Nelson boys,
stiffened by the second master William Littlejohn, against Ford and his
English friend, written many years after the events as a memoir, Rutherford
revealed his utilisation of this public school culture and his nativist sympathy
for the Scot. Ford and his friend "plainly forgot all obligations of
sportsmanship towards their opponents" and tried to score as many runs as
possible. Rutherford, drawing upon the classical texts that also informed
gentlemanly behaviour in England, significantly identified Littlejohn, his
Scottish science master, as "the true hero of the occasion." Littlejohn bowled
for over an hour and "attacked with the light of battle in his eyes" although he
was "not much of a bowler." Rutherford as a spectator witnessed the defeat
of Littlejohn and his team and recalled that Littlejohn had left "an enduring
impression of high courage and resource under difficulties" but "in this case
virtue was not rewarded." Littlejohn embodied classical virtue, a concept that
was often utilised to articulate the principles of gentlemanly behaviour. His
role was that of the 'good loser', the man who tries his hardest to win the
game and never gives in despite the paucity of his bowling skills. Courage
and resource are often described as defining characteristics for the concepts
of 'manliness' and 'character'. By selecting these attributes in a teacher as
part of a game of cricket, Rutherford was clearly reconstructing his hero and
role-model from the cultural resources supplied by the public school.
Ironically, the dastardly opponent was a public school master and Oxbridge
classicist whilst the hero was a Scottish graduate and a science teacher.
Rutherford's sympathies were moulded by his awareness of his Scottish
ancestry and Ford's unsportsmanlike behaviour which did not live up to
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expected standards of 'fair play'.23
The other two members of this biographical study belonged to a later
generation. Huxley entered the College at Eton at the turn of the century after
passing the entrance examination while Tizard became a Queen's Scholar in
Westminster, in 1900. 24 The reforms at Eton under the new Governing Body
established in 1872 had initiated an entrance examination for the College that
embodied the Victorian enthusiasm for 'merit'. Subsequently, to become a
Colleger was a mark of educational excellence and academic promise. At
Westminster the reform movement was half-hearted and depended upon the
enthusiasm of a reforming headmaster, William Gunion Rutherford. His plan
to convert Westminster into a day school that would take in the sons of
metropolitan professionals was thwarted by the governing body. He broke the
monopoly of Queen's Scholars on the monitorial system and hoped to
destroy their corporate existence entirely by deriding their "ordinary ability that
the recognition of it as deserving of reward tends to lower the intellectual
ability of the whole school."25 However his own efforts in raising the
standards of teaching persuaded the Governing Body that the Queen's
Scholars were fulfilling expectations of intellectual promise. Both the College
at Eton and the Queen's Scholars at Westminster became a small body of
pupils of exceptional intellectual promise identified through winnowing
entrance examinations. Donning the identity of the Colleger or the Queen's
Scholar was an acceptance of membership in an educational elite. Both boys
23 Rutherford Papers PA3O5A, Notes on W. S. Littlejohn.
24 R. W. Clark, op cit., 1965, p. 7; Sir Henry Tizard, Autobiography, pp 17-32. Tizard Papers
HTT 713.
25 John Carleton, Westminster School: A History, London: John Carleton, 1965, p. 74.
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after preparatory schooling, were coached by their ambitious families for
entrance to these prestigious communities which guaranteed a good
education and a promising career. Both were recipients of the Arnoldian
reforms that had reshaped the public schools for a professional clientele by
emphasising education and examinations.
Both the Collegers and the Queen's Scholars were collective bodies, aware
of their own prestige within their respective school communities. Their identity
was based upon their historical role because their educational achievements
reflected the original function of the school. The Eton Colleger was aware
that his historical ancestors were the original recipients of Henry IV's charity
at the start of Eton's foundation in 1439. Such an identity was reinforced by
the privileges that their members enjoyed. Huxley joined the line of Collegers
that witnessed Queen Victoria's coffin as it was driven into St. George's
Chapel in Windsor Castle. 26 The Queen's Scholars (or King's Scholars as
they became on the accession to the throne of King Edward VIII) were
allowed to acclaim the monarch on his entry into Westminster Abbey.27
Huxley said farewell to one monarch and lizard greeted another.
Both were active participants in the rituals of royal culture and this bolstered
their acceptance of the monarch, the political culture and the social status
quo as the legitimate system. In his memoirs Huxley moved on from his own
reminiscence of Queen Victoria's funeral to an anecdote about the unveiling
of the T. H. Huxley statue in 1901 and the Duke of Edinburgh's opening of
26 Julian Huxley, Memories, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1970, p. 42.
27 John Carleton, op cit., pp. 108-109.
34
Huxley Wing in the late 50s. Whereas the Prince of Wales "regretfully
declined" to unveil this statue in 1901 because of T. H. Huxley's unorthodox
reputation even after death, the Duke of Edinburgh provided the required
royal seal of approval at this later display. 28 An earlier royal slight was
overturned by T. H. Huxley's induction into the 'architectural' establishment.
The King's Scholars enjoyed a number of ancient privileges concerning the
monarchy and Parliament. Tizard was one of the group that shouted "Vivat
Rex Edwardus" on the coronation of King Edward VII. He was also allowed to
visit Strangers Gallery at the House of Commons in the late afternoon if he
was wearing his school gowns. Tizard was affected as Clark records that he
"enjoyed this [coronation] as throughout his life he was to enjoy the splendour
and colour of materially useless but spiritually uplifting ceremonies"29 and the
scientist himself wrote that, "Westminster was a splendid school for boys of
sensibility. We had history all around us, history made and in the making."30
Such ceremonies allowed Huxley and Tizard to feel that they were part of
their collegiate bodies within the greater corpus of the nation and served as
part of their education in the legitimacy of monarchy and empire.
Public schools not only educated their pupils in the values of imperialism and
respectability, but also imparted the customs and etiquette that defined the
naturalised gentlemanly professional. Both collegiate bodies were structured
and hierarchical with a system of customs and rituals to define and place
28 Julian Huxley, op cit., p. 42.
29 Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 7.
30 Sir Henry Tizard, Autobiography, p. 30.
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each boy in the relationships of power within the school. Huxley had to begin
his school career in the Long Chamber where he acted as a fag to the sixth
form. As soon as he arrived, his inferior status was brought home to him by
his duties as a fag which included running errands, making toast or
completing any task that his fag-master desired. Moreover in Long Chamber
the junior boys had to close the curtains and fetch the water. The community
was presided over by a captain who could punish transgressors of the laws of
the Long Chamber with a syphon, an unusual type of cane. Huxley records
that his first year at Eton "wasn't very happy." 31 His contemporary in College
was Henry Moseley, a future physical chemist, who described the experience
in a letter to his mother as an "absurd fag plan" that involved responding to
any sixth-form boy who called 'Here'.32 After two terms the pupil was able to
move into his own room in Passages and leave this junior community behind.
Once in Passages the pupil entered the middle ranks of the school where
gradations of privilege marked out the senior from the more junior. Huxley
had no difficulty in adapting to the mores of the Collegers and directed his
loyalties towards the group. He became firm friends with Moseley, who
shared his interest in birdwatching and they would go on ornithological
expeditions together. 33 Both played in the games that allowed the houses
and the College to compete with each other and allowed each pupil to
demonstrate their sporting prowess. Amongst the Oppidans, the name for the
majority of Etonian pupils who did not belong to College, athletic ability was
31 Julian Huxley, op cit., p. 39.
32 J. L. Heilbron, H. G. J. Moseley: The Life and Letters of an English Physicist, 1887-19 15,
London: University of California Press, 1974, p. 15.
33 Ibid., pp. 14, 145.
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often the passport to securing popular status with one's peers since triumph
on the playing fields contributed to the reputation of one's house. 34 Huxley
was not immune to the 'fever' of athleticism. When he attained his College
Field (the Eton name for Colours) he "was so childishly proud of it" that he
wore the purple and white blazer, scarf and cap whilst out cycling during the
next Christmas holidays and practised hurdling and high-jumping in his
vacations.35 Moseley as a rower was quite anxious to gain his boats (the
college colours for the rowing teams) and made anxious references to this in
his letters before recounting that J. R. Somers-Smith, the captain of the
Boats, who was "generally considered to be quite unfit for his post" had finally
"woken up to a sense of his duties."36 Both were aware of the status that
accrued to those who gained their colours and systematically worked to
achieve this. Neither had any difficulty in conforming to the pressures that
College placed upon its pupils to assimilate.
Tizard's school career proceeded along similar lines at a different but equally
antiquarian institution. Indeed, he did not share the amenities that a reforming
Eton had placed at the disposal of its pupils. The King's Scholars were
divided into four elections and the Seniors. Each election was only allowed to
speak to other pupils in the same election or the elections above and below
them. The Junior had to learn the language of the Scholars within the first
fortnight and obey the "innumerable small rules" that governed the hierarchy
34 The Oppidans were the pupils who did not belong to Coflege. The name derived from their
original habitation within the town. There were over nine hundred Oppidans and approximately
seventy Collegers.
35 Julian Huxley, op cit., p. 47.
36j L. Heilbron, op cit., pp . 151, 160-161.
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of the elections. Fagging was accepted and the beatings by the monitors
were "frequent". The King's Scholars also maintained a more independent
existence from the life of Westminster than the Collegers did at Eton.
Whereas the headmaster of Eton, Edmond Warre, promoted athleticism and
encouraged the Volunteers, William Rutherford at Westminster tried to
prohibit the practice of rowing. Games and a cadet corps were only instituted
under Rutherford's successor, Dr. James Gow, after 1901. This cultural
invasion of athleticism and militarism did not impinge upon lizard's schooling
and he did not experience a competitive atmosphere similar to Eton.37
Unlike Huxley, Tizard had begun at Westminster as a normal fee-paying pupil
on a mathematical scholarship and had belonged to the house known as
Rigaud's. He had initially failed the entrance examination known as the
Challenge to become a King's Scholar and did not enter an election until
1900, a year after he entered the school. Compared with the Collegers, the
King's Scholars were far more exclusive, forming a "small and academically
aristocratic" world. The forty members regarded themselves as "the senior
branch of the school" and maintained their exclusivity through social distance
as well as superior examination results. They lived in a cold dormitory divided
into cubicles and all the boys had to share one cold shower or cold baths.
Like Huxley and Moseley, Tizard found his first two terms as a fag to be
"miserable" since they were treated as "the scum of the earth" and suffered
rituals of "mental cruelty". 38 His school life progressively became more
37 John Carleton, op cit., pp. 80-82.
38 Sir Henry Tizard, Autobiography, pp. 21-22. "Another custom was this. In Play term the
dormitory was half gutted to make room for a stage and auditorium. The juniors had to crawl
under the stage while the older boys waited with knotted towels to greet them as they
emerged."
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pleasant and accumulated more privileges as his career progressed but
because he entered in a mid-term election, he remained as a junior for one
year longer than normal and found this "very galling". 39 Tizard had conformed
to the culture of the King's Scholars by the time of his departure and meted
out the same pain to fags as he had endured as a junior.40
Huxley found the scientific facilities at Eton to be extensive. The school had
laboratories and employed three science masters in chemistry, physics and
biology. As a member of College, Huxley only took Biology as a school
subject because he did not expect to study it after he had left Eton since he
was preparing for a secure professional career in the Civil Service.41 He was
taught by M. D. "Piggy" Hill, and attributes his choice of career to this
biologist's "genius as a teacher" which resulted in the pupil's understanding of
"the excitement of Zoology". He was encouraged to pursue his interests in
biology and devoted much of his free time to bird watching or drawing and
dissecting in the laboratory. 42 Huxley's subsequent and eminent career as a
zoologist was triggered by the intellectual cradle of Eton's College and the
enthusiasm of his teacher. On the other hand, lizard's choice of science was
disapproved of at Westminster. At Rigaud's he had studied mathematics,
science and divinity, with sets for modern languages and Latin. Westminster
had only one science master, E. C. Sherwood, who specialised in chemistry,
and had arrived at the school in 1901. lizard recalled that his science
lessons involved "pouring the fluid of electricity from one tin can to another
39 Ibid., p. 23.
40 Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 7. Sir Henry Tizard, Autobiography, p. 22.
41 Julian Huxley, op cit., p. 45.
42 Ibid., pp. 45-46.
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"and that there "was no-one to give.. .any real inspiration" to study the subject.
To pursue his interest in physics, Tizard had to supplement his science
lessons by reading the Proceedings of the Royal Society. 43 The teachers
were unable to give lizard any advice about where to pursue university
education in physics whereas Huxley could use his family contacts to enter
the examination for a Magdalene scholarship at Balliol College, Oxford.
Tizard believed that he should have been directed to Cambridge, but the
housemaster of the King's Scholars, the Reverend A. G. S. Raynor, was a
classicist, who disliked the presence of boys studying a modern syllabus.
Tizard was the first of these and Raynor told him not to expect the usual
scholarship to Christchurch or Trinity because these were not available to
"scientists". These adverse conditions reinforced lizard's interest in science
and his self-identification as a scientist in a world of classicists.
2.4 Conclusion
These individual examples do not allow generalisations about the question of
whether a public school education aided or hindered those pupils who sought
a scientific career. It does not provide resources for Corelli Barnett or his
critics in their debates about the contribution of education to elite culture and
relative decline. This chapter demonstrates that if a scientist was educated at
a public school, he was marked by the experience. Such arguments are
confirmed if one looks at scientists who were educated at a public school but
who rebelled against the loyalties to King and Empire. Gary Werskey's
collective biography of scientific socialists includes three of this ilk and
43 Sir Henry Tizard, Autobiography, pp. 25-26.
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compares them with two other scientists of working class background.
Joseph Needham, J. D. Bernal and J. B. S. Haldane all attended public
school and Oxbridge. Haldane succeeded where Huxley and Moseley failed
in becoming Captain of the School and a member of the exclusive club, 'Pop'
at Eton.44 Their positions at Cambridge and their scientific reputations
assured them elite recognition through Fellowships of the Royal Society,
despite their membership or association with the Communist Party of Great
Britain. Hyman Levy and Lancelot Hogben never saw an opportunity in their
careers to ascend the ladder and join the scientific elite. Their bearing and
education did not mark them out as gentlemanly professionals. Even if
scientists adopted political ideologies opposed to the dominant socio-
economic system in Great Britain, their education at a public school and
Oxbridge was sufficient to assure their entrance into elite institutions within
the scientific world. The mannerisms and attitudes of an old boy marked him
for life, whatever his beliefs.
44 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and
Socialists of the 1930s, London: Free Association Books, 1988 [1978], p. 54.
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Chapter Three
GENTLEMANLY VALUES AND SCIENCE DURING THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
3.1 Introduction
The last chapter established that certain eminent scientists of the interwar
period had been educated at a public school and shaped by its values.
Although they had chosen their future careers in science by the time they
reached Oxbridge, the public school was far less important than the university
in the professional training and career orientation of the majority of scientists.
This chapter examines how the values and codes of conduct instilled by the
public school were reinforced by university education and utilised within
science. This is initially achieved by fo!lowing the careers of the three
subjects from the previous chapter into Edwardian academia. The focus of
this chapter is then widened by studying the death of Henry Moseley at
Gallipoli in 1915 and his posthumous transfiguration by eminent members of
the scientific profession into a symbol of waste for the war effort. His death
provides an appropriate chronological pause to analyse the disillusionment
with the Edwardian values of imperialism and chivalric duty as mediated
through the public school. The movement from the individual career to the
experience of the wider profession is completed by an analysis of the
articulated professional aims of men of science under the radicalising
pressures of the First World War which demonstrates how public school
values were both utilised, transformed and attacked in their campaign.
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3.2 The Gentlemanly Education of Scientists within the University
Jerome Ravetz was one of the first contemporary theorists to include
gentlemanly values within his historical sociology of science. He argued that
scientific work between 1789 and 1945 was debated amongst small networks
and autonomous communities of gentlemen located primarily in the
departments and laboratories of universities. 1 Apart from the implicit
assumption that the gentleman was a member of the aristocracy or upper
middle class who had devoted his career and substantial financial resources
towards science, Ravetz's concept of the academic gentleman was moulded
by traditional representations of gentlemanly behaviour:
Because of the nature of their work and its investigation, its
institutional context and the social basis of recruitment, most of
the members of such [scientific] communities would be
gentlemen, who could be motivated to act by goals more refined
than the mere acquisition of wealth or power.2
In an argument similar to Corelli Barnett's, Ravetz defined gentlemanly
behaviour as a form of idealistic action. His gentleman of science was
motivated by a moral ideal of pure science which was aesthetically more
pleasing than the pursuit of profits or political power and incorporated the
traditional gentlemanly myth of antipathy to 'trade' and industrialism in "the
mere acquisition of wealth".
I Jerome R. Ravetz, Scientific Knowledge and its Social Problems. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1972 [1971], p. 41.
2 Ibid., pp. 40-41. (The italics are mine).
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Yet Michael Sanderson's historical survey of the links between British
universities and industrial firms proved that academic science was
increasingly oriented to the needs of British industry and that a large
proportion of science graduates gained employment in the private sector after
the First World War.3 It is hard to reconcile his findings with Ravetz's
generalised picture of the academic scientist, working in his laboratory for an
ideal of pure science and limited to an audience of his professional peers.
Sanderson does not exaggerate the importance of science in British
universities and he argues that some, especially Oxbridge colleges, were
most effective in reorienting students from a commercial or industrial
background towards the professions. In this role, they were complementing
the institutional aims of the public school.4
Sanderson argues that one partial cause for this professional bias was the
representation of business and commerce as an unsuitable career by
academics and he quotes literary texts like Tom Brown's Schooldays as
evidence of a hostile attitude towards industry.5 However utilising hostile
images of the businessman in literature as effective proof of a cultural
hostility to modernisation and technology has been undermined by Harold
3 Michael Sanderson, The Universities and British Industry, 1850-1970, London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1972, PP. 243-313. Science graduates had to choose a career in industry,
teaching or academia which lent an air of insecurity to this choice of profession.
4 Ibid., pp. 54, 60.
5 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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James's comparison of literary Luddism in British and German fiction.6
Moreover Sanderson had shown, previous to this, that public school alumni
would fill science and engineering courses at Oxbridge if these were
available. When Oxford University established its engineering department in
1907, the thirty students who took its courses per annum were "mostly public
school boys". 7 Another Edwardian innovation was the Cambridge
Appointments Association which aimed to marry prospective commercial and
industrial employers with jobseeking graduates. The result was "a marked
improvement in channelling [graduates] into business careers around 1900
and up to the war" dispelling any argument of an anti-industrial bias in
attitudes or career choice amongst Cambridge academics and public school
alumni.
The motivation for the majority of graduates seeking a career in the
professions was not an engrained hostility to a commercial or a scientific life
but a search for security and stable employment. The traditional professions
guaranteed a prosperous income and middle-class status after further
education whereas employment in commerce or industry (where science
graduates were increasingly employed) did not contain similar incentives.8
One example is Julian Huxley who was originally preparing to enter the Civil
6 Harold James, 'The German Experience and the Myth of British Cultural Exceptionatism" in
Bruce Collins and Keith Robbins, eds., British Culture and Economic Decline, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990, pp.91-128; See also Neil McKendrick, "'Gentlemen and
Players' Revisited: the gentlemanly ideal, the business ideal and the professional ideal in
English literary culture" in N. McKendrick and R. B. Outhwaite, Business Life and Public
Policy: Essays in Honour of D. C. Coleman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986,
pp. 98-1 36.
7 Michael Sanderson, op cit., p. 39.
8 w• D. Rubinstein, Capitalism, Culture and Decline in Britain, 1750-1990, London:
Routledge, 1993, p. 125.
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Service at Eton and only took up zoology because of the influence of his
teacher. 9 Any interpretation of gentlemanly professionalism and science has
to include these arguments which indicate that the subject was greeted with
indifference rather than hostility. T. H. Huxley had written about this
indifference and Peter Alter, author of a general study on late -Victorain
British science, concluded that "appreciation of science and the social
standing of scientists were low in Britain". lO There was no cultural bias
against science except one of apathetic neglect.
This attitude of indifference to the choice of a scientific subject at university
can be tested by studying the experience of scientific students within the
context of the Oxford college and the Cavendish Laboratory. The scientific
students would find that the values and attitudes learned at public school
would be reinforced through life in the college and laboratory. Huxley,
Moseley and Tizard went up to Oxford as public school men who behaved
and expected to be acknowledged as gentlemen now that they had attained
their majority. Rutherford began work in the Cavendish Laboratory under the
tutelage of Professor "J. J." Thomson and adapted his colonial mores to
metropolitan needs.
The pupils had spent their entire education at public school being taught that
their loyalties were towards the communities within which they lived: the
intimate world of the College or the Queen's Scholars, the communal
9 Julian Huxley, Memories, London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1972 [1970], p. 45. "...the Civil
Service then appeard to be my future career."
10 Peter Alter, Translated by Angela Davis, The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State,
1850-1920, Oxford: Berg, 1987, p. 217.
46
universe of Eton and Winchester, the abstract cosmos of Britain and the
Empire. These interdependent rings formed the boundaries and building
blocks of their identity. As Rupert Wilkinson has argued:
...he [the public schoolboy] followed group opinion, but he did so
at least partly because group opinion and group taste
represented the community and its traditions. These traditions
he largely internalized: they became internal obligations. The
public schoolboy felt obliged to co-operate as an act of 'good
taste', just as he felt obliged to honour the community.11
Once they had left the school many public schoolboys maintained a sense of
belonging that was directed to new educational institutions like the Oxbridge
colleges. These tended to harden the values and manners that the public
schools had inculcated into their pupils:
Above all, the Trinity man, like the Etonian and most
undergraduates, took care to avoid 'bad form', 'snobbishness',
and excessive commitment of any kind; in a word, he strove to
conform. "Nothing astonished me more than the uniformity of
ideas and behaviour among my fellow undergraduates." Thus
the distinguished historian E. L. Woodward, who came up in
1908, writing about ordinary old school boys, "numb to all
intellectual interests", "bothered by public opinion [and]
11 Rupert Wilkinson, The Prefects: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition,
London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p.61. (My italics)
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frightened by originality"...12
The culture of the public school was reproduced amongst the undergraduates
of the university colleges who upheld the same standards of etiquette, played
the same competitive games in intercollegiate competitions and
demonstrated the same sensitivity to their reputation in the collegiate
community as they did in the public school.
Moseley was an excellent example of a scentfcc student confocnng to the
expectations of his peer group within his college. In a letter to his sister from
Balliol College in Odord, Moseley described his actMties in the Officer
Training Corps:
But of exercise I have had little lately, excepting such as my
military duties demand. I am an antimilitarist for myself at any
rate, by conviction, a soldier by necessity. I can find no sound
argument with which to confute the advocate of universal
service, and I am therefore forced either to appear military
myself or to argue on what seems to be a losing side.13
Moseley did not sympathise with the militaristic arguments put forward for
conscription but felt impelled to take up military training because his public
school education ensured a predisposition towards fulfilling the expectations
12 J. L. Heilbron, H. G. J. Moseley: The Life and Letters of an English Physicist, 1887-1915,
London: University of California Press, 1974, p. 28.
13 /bid., p. 167.
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demanded by his patriotic colleagues in his college. Such a response was by
no means inevitable since Huxley remembered his time at Oxford as an
opportunity for intellectual exploration and Tizard "held aloof" from the
Officers Training Corps since Westminster had not equipped him for
participation in these exercises. He preferred less militaristic activities.14
Huxley remembered his time at Balliol as one of intellectual exploration
marred only by the untimely death of his mother. He lost touch with former
school friends from Eton who joined "the smart and rather rowdy set" but
made up for this by participating in the Oxford Bach Choir and the weekly
debates of the Brackenbury Society. 1 5 Huxley's Balliol idyll was complete with
bicycling, punting and walking amongst his student peers whilst parental
contacts introduced him to "senior acquaintances" including the Haldanes.16
At night, the promising biology student would leave these respectable
activities behind him and indulge in "roof-climbing", clambering over the tops
of Oxford dwellings and colleges in the company of a friend and leaving
evidence of their path - they set the hands of Trinity College's clock in the
wrong position. 17 This dangerous leisure pursuit had to be undertaken "in
darkness and silence, for fear of the college authorities or the police", adding
to its challenging and competitive nature. Roof-climbing was an illicit
competition which Balliol students undertook to test their courage and
strength. Huxley's own admiration for his more courageous predecessors was
a testament to this:
14 R. W. Clark, Tizard, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965, p. 21.
15 Julian Huxley, op cit., p. 59.
16 Ibid., p. 60.
17 Ibid., p. 66.
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There was a particularly nasty bit at the back of Balliol Hall
where one had to put one's leg round a corner, trusting that the
foot would encounter a projecting water-spout. The man who
first surveyed this route must have been a cool and daring
fellow.18
While Huxley climbed on the roof of Magdalen College, Tizard slept
underneath, tired out from the games which he had studiously avoided at
Westminster. Tizard found that Magdalen was a college specializing for the
"idle rich", with cliques of Old Etonians and Old Wykehamists dominating the
social scene.19 Tizard was one of the poorest students in a college where
these cliques determined the standards of conspicuous consumption and a
social hierarchy based upon one's strength in rowing. Magdalen "was known
for its exploits on the river" and "Magdalen men themselves had an air of
conscious superiority over the other colleges". 20 In this athletic atmosphere,
Tizard tried to compete by taking up football, hockey and rowing but was
unable to make the college teams and gave up after becoming a symbol of
abuse for a rowing coach. He took up tennis, golf, bicycling, and walking
instead while condemning the air of sporting superiority affected by Magdalen
men as "superficial".21 Tizard was divided from many other members of his
college because he lacked the money and the talent to compete with their
sporting way of life. However he competed. failed, and then found other
social pursuits within this context of college life.
18 Ibid.




Tizard and Huxley encountered no hostility or adverse reaction to their
chosen academic subjects of science during their course of study. Both led a
normal life as students, participating fully in the facilities that collegial life
offered them and a public school education had prepared them for, but they
did not leave with a sense of loyalty to their former colleges or school. Huxley
became a Fellow of New College, Oxford after the First World War and did
not evince any special affection for his old college. 22 Tizard chose to promote
Imperial College where he was Rector during the nineteen-thirties. Moreover,
they did not consider a commercial career but aimed for a position within
academic science. Their professional career paths were oriented towards
research and an academic position complemented the professional bias of
their education at public school. Huxley and his Balliol contemporary, Henry
Moseley, concentrated on pure research in "scientific birdwatching" and
nuclear physics respectively. 23 Moseley could rely upon his inherited wealth
and detailed the formula known as Moseley's Law as an unofficial researcher
in Professor Townsend's laboratory at Oxford. Huxley quickly opted to move
from a poorly paid lectureship in Balliol to the far wealthier Chair of Biology at
the Rice Institute in Houston, Texas, when he was offered the post. Tizard
continued his scientific studies in physics at Berlin. All three were dedicated
to advancing their career within the scientific profession throv9h further
research and study.
This professional bias also affected Rutherford's choice of career and
research before and after his arrival in England. After passing his first degree
22 Juliari Huxley, op cit., pp. 114-147.
23 Ibid., p. 79.
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in New Zealand, Rutherford followed the popular route of science graduates
into teaching but found the job of teaching physics in a secondary school "a
very miserable occupation" and ventured into the insecure world of scientific
research overseas. He continued his research programme investigating radio
waves when he first came to the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge
University. 24 Rutherford's move into Roentgen rays (X-rays) after a few
months was partially determined by the failure of his research programme
into a radio wave detector although he had hoped to benefit financially from
its application. It was unable to provide him with a long-term series of
experiments in pure research and investigation into its applications was
undermined by the large amount of capital required. Lord Kelvin had advised
that one hundred thousand pounds was a reasonable sum. 25 Rutherford was
more successful in his initial research than Marconi but the only profitable
application he could imagine was:
If I could get an appreciable effect at ten miles, I would probably
be able to make a considerable amount of money out of it, for it
would be one of great service to connect lighthouses and
lightships to the shore so that signals would be sent at any
time.26
The contrast with the commercially minded Guglielmo Marconi is
enlightening. Rutherford did not have the commercial skills or the social
24 David Wilson, Rutherford: Simple Genius, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983, p. 61.
25 Ibid., p. 91.
26 Ibid., p. 95. (My italics)
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contacts necessary to raise the finance for the development of the wireless
telegraph. He did not patent his scientific research which was more advanced
than Marconi's efforts and chose to follow an experimental programme in X-
rays which incorporated the advantages of scientific fashionability and
conformed to the Cavendish 'school of research' under Thomson. Rutherford
had already dealt himself one favourable hand in leaving New Zealand and
chose to abandon a potentially profitable technology to secure his
professional position in the Cavendish.
3.3 Scientific Service during the Great War
The theory before the war started was that the UK wasn't going
to make the same mistake as in the First World War when some
of our most brilliant scientists went in and were shot almost
immediately.
Lord Penney27
The beginning of the First World War demonstrated that many scientists
subscribed to the values of patriotism and militarism that moulded the
concept of duty in the service of the country. The h(stor(an Trevor Wilson
stated that "budding men of science showed the same readiness for
combatant service as budding men of letters". Thirty-five Fellows of the Royal
Society and fifty-five members of the Royal Institute of Chemistry died in
27 P. Hennessy, Whitehall, London: Secker & Warburg, 1989, p. 88.
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active combat.28 Two of Huxley's biology teachers at Oxford, J. W. Jenkinson
and Geoffrey Smith, fell - the latter's "brilliant career was cut short when he
was killed on the Somme". 29 Huxley himself had returned to Texas in
September 1914 after the suicide of his brother Trev and embarked upon a
bout of soul-searching:
Meanwhile I did a lot of thinking, and decided that I ought to go
home next year and do something about the war. So long as I
was resident in the USA, I was not liable to be called up, but I
felt that to go on like this was shirking my duty.3°
Tizard and Moseley enthusiastically returned from their sojourns in Australia
to join up, cutting short their tour with the British Association for the
Advancement of Science. Tizard "was one of those who leapt to arms
unbidden". 31 Moseley was so enthusiastic about his forthcoming military
training that he read War Office manuals and practised the Morse code.32
Service to one's country was the culmination of the values and attitudes that
the public school had taught to its pupils. Their shared education led to a
zealous embrace of military service. Private obligations of duty were
combined with social pressure to join up. This expectation overrode the weak
28 Trevor Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914-1918,
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986, P. 632; M. Sanderson, op cit., p. 218. "The assumption
underlying this prodigal dissipation of university talent in the volunteering period before
conscription was clearly that the war was to be a short, sharp one and would not require the
careful husbanding of scientific talent for developments that would take years rather than
months."
29 Julian Huxley, op cit., p.115.
30/bid., p.101.
31 Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 23.
32 J. L. Helibron, op cit., p. 250.
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professional call of science. Moseley was unwilling to accept a scientific
appointment in the military. His concept of duty demanded active service at
the front and he did not believe that scientific research could contribute to the
war effort.33 Huxley, unfit for frontline service, eventually found a niche in the
Intelligence corps and Tizard gained a position as a scientific officer in the
Royal Flying Corps. Only Moseley was killed: as a radio officer in the
Dardanelles on 10th August 1915 when the Turks overran his position.
Moseley's death was not celebrated by those scientist-obituarists as an
example of their own willingness to sacrifice their lives for their country. It was
condemned as a waste:
It is a national tragedy that our military organisation at the start
was so inelastic as to be unable, with few exceptions, to utilise
the offers of services of our scientific men except as combatants
in the firing line. Our regret for the untimely end of Moseley is all
the more poignant that we cannot but recognise that his
services would have been far more useful to his country in one
of the numerous fields of scientific enquiry rendered necessary
by the war than by exposure to the chances of a Turkish
bu I let.34
Rutherford adopted a number of proteges in his long scientific career and
33 E. Ray Lankester, "Henry Gwyn Jeifries Moseley", Philosophical Magazine, Series 6, vol.
31(1916), pp. 173-1 76.
34 E. Rutherford, "Henry Gwyn Jeifries Moseley", Nature, vol. 96 (1915), p. 34.
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Moseley was one of the first to enjoy this close, personal tie. Moseley's death
coincided with a rising tide of protest in the scientific community at the
inability of the government to organise and marshal its scientific resources.35
Obituaries of his gallant sacrifice and role as a "brilliant physicist" appeared in
the national newspapers. The obituary in the Manchester Guardian, penned
by Rutherford, appeared on Wednesday, September 8th, 1915. This was the
day after the opening of the BAAS meeting in Manchester and the same
newspaper contained Professor Arthur Schuster's presidential speech and a
report on the wounding of Schuster's son. Readers of the newspaper read
the anxieties of the scientific community concerning the failure of the
authorities to apply science to problems raised by the war and the obituary of
Moseley. Whether any scentist had the connections to manipulate the
agenda of the Manchester Guardian is unknown, but this formed one of the
first articulated links between the late Moseley and the more general claims
of scientists.36
Moseley's death became emblematic of the 'lost generation' of scientists for
both the scientific and the historical communities. 37 This representation of
Moseley is hinted at in these obituaries but the process whereby it was
popularised, accepted and utilised within the scientific community remains a
problem that requires research. Rutherford's tentative patriotism in the
35 Ian Varcoe, "Scientists, Government, and Organised Research in Great Britain, 1914-
1916: The Early History of the DSIR", Minerva, vol. 8(1970), pp. 192-216.
36 [E. R.], "Lieut. H. G. J. Moseley: A Brilliant Physicist", Manchester Guardian, September
8th, 1915.
37 Reginald Pound, The Lost Generation, London: Constable & Co., 1964, p. 177; Michael
Sanderson, The Universities and British Industry, 1850-1970, London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1972, p. 218; Arthur Marwick, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War,
London: The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1965, p. 228; J. D. Bernal, The Social Function ci
Science, London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd., 1939, p. 171; M. Sanderson, op cit., p. 218.
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obituary he wrote on Moseley for Nature was the only articulation of the
public school values in the whole episode and the message concerning waste
was also included:
Scientific men of this country have viewed with mingled feelings
of pride and apprehension the enlistment in the new armies of
so many of our most promising young men of science - with
pride for their ready and ungrudging response to their country's
call, and with apprehension of irreparable losses to science.38
This continued emphasis upon science and the narratives of Moseley's
brilliance in his experimental results formed part of a process of myth
construction. Moseley's choice of dying for his country as a higher duty than
working in the application of scientific knowledge to the war effort was
neglected and ironically reversed after his death to strengthen the
professional ideals of science and its claims for political and cultural
importance. The potential of Moseley and the 'career cut short' became
components of this new myth. If he was to discover Moseley's Law in his
short research career then think about what he might have achieved. "The
premature death of a young man of such brilliant promise was everywhere
recognised as an irreparable loss to science."3 The theme of scientific
sacrifice pervaded this myth and formed part of a wider campaign within the
scientific community to gain recognition from the government.
38 E. Rutherford, op cit., p. 33.
39 Sir Ernest Rutherford, "Henry Gwyn Jeifries Moseley (1887-1915)", Dictionary of National
Biography (1912-1921), London: Oxford University Press, 1927, p. 390.
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The choice of Moseley as scientific hero reflected the personal relationships
he cultivated with the small 'village community' that formed the scientific elite
in England and the position of most scientists away from the Front. His father
had been a close friend of E. Ray Lankester and his mother maintained a
cultured social round of dinner parties and gatherings that included many of
the leading scientific lights at Oxford. By moving to Manchester and taking a
position under Rutherford, he was adopting as a patron one of the leading
physicists in England whose star was rapidly ascending into the firmament.
Moseley had been friendly with Huxley at Eton and Oxford but the trip to
attend the British Association meeting being held in Australia during the
summer of 1914 introduced him to Tizard and the elite, lizard was lucky to
sail on the prearranged boat from Britain via Cape Town where he met Sir
James Jeans, Sir Thomas Holland, Sir Oliver Lodge and, most importantly of
all, Rutherford. This latter friendship was cemented by the adhesive qualities
of the game of deck-tennis where Tizard served as Rutherford's 9actnec4O
Moseley sailed via Canada and joined up with this social gathering in
Australia itself. There is no record that lizard and Moseley knew each other
at Oxford, but given the small number of academic scientists there, it is
unlikely that they had never met previous to this. However Tizard's new
friendship with Rutherford was a link with the 'scientific establishment' and by
the end of the trip, he returned to England with Moseley and shared a cabin
with him. Both joined forces in attempting to lobby the War Office to gain their
preferred positions. 4 l After this BAAS meeting, lizard and Rutherford
40 Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 21.
41 J. L. Heilbron, op cit., pp. 115-116; Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 23. Sir Henry Tizard,
Autobiography, pp. 73-77.
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maintained their close friendship for twenty-three years until the latter's
death.42
The First World War triggered a profound disillusionment with the values of
athleticism and militarism amongst the junior officers recruited from public
school alumni and this combined with a more general backlash against the
promises of the war, following the lowering of political expectations during the
mass unemployment of the nineteen-twenties. A rash of memoirs in 1928
denounced the idealism of the Edwardian period and argued that the
government had not played fair with the veterans. However, many scientists
held positions within the institutions that coordinated and conducted research
for the armed forces. The common feature of the careers of such individuals
as Tizard, Professor A. V. Hill, Sir Alexander Watson-Watt and P. M. S.
Blackett was their shared military experience as officers and researchers.
They did not share this disillusionment with those junior officers who had
served at the Front and felt no compunction in progressive research towards
their country's defence. Nor did this disillusionment divide them along
political lines since Tizard had no difficulty with working under a Labour
government while Blackett was a noted socialist when he served on the
Tizard Committee supervising radar for the Chamberlain administration. For
the scientists employed by the armed forces, duty transcended formal
political beliefs.
42 David Wilson, op cit., pp. 341, 489.
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3.4 The "Classics-Science" Controversy
The laissez-faire approach of the British government to science proved
inadequate to the scientific demands of the First World War.43 The
organisation of science undertook a "quantitative leap" as the resources of
the universities were devoted to the war effort 44 Complementing this infusion
of state funds and rise in status was the "arousal of science" - organised
demands for greater recognition of science as a profession. Intimations of a
greater desire for professional recognition had already been demonstrated in
the programme of 'Science and the State' in the pages of Scientific
Progress. This called for greater financial assistance from the state, salaries
(euphemistically called pensions) for scientists and a National Union of
Scientific Workers.45 Such programmes formed part of a wider
professionalising movement amongst scientists to correct their lower status in
the wider community:
Their pursuit of social legitimation and acceptance as a
profession with economic and social privileges was expressed
most clearly in the creation of large professional associations,
encompassing all scientists, which functioned as pressure
groups 46
The British Science Guild, founded by Sir Norman Lockyer in 1903, was the
first of these but the First World War added to the list, including the Institution
43 Peter Alter, op cit., pp. 246-248.
44 Ibid., p. 250; M. Sanderson, op cit., pp. 214-242.
45 'Science and the State', Scientific Progress, vol. ix (1914-1915), pp. 197-208.
46 Peter Alter, op cit., p.231.
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of Professional Civil Servants, the National Union of Scientific Workers and
the British Association of Chemists.
This professionalising agenda was taken up by spokesmen from all parts of
the scientific community after the outbreak of war ranging from obscure
engineers to the most famous fictional promoter of science, H. G. Wells.
Their aim was widened from lobbying the government to raising the political
and cultural island of science from the Sargasso sea of indifference affecting
the state and populace. L. A. Legros, President of the Institution of
Automobile Engineers, hammered home this message in his address which
was sympathetically reproduced in the columns of Nature:
Never.. .in the history of engineering has the ignorance of
science by the politicians, the military and the other authorities,
been so openly displayed as in the early stages of the war and
never has it proved so costly in time, in life and in substance.47
Scientists and their propagandists insisted that the poor conduct of the war
could be blamed upon the scientific ignorance of the governing elite: the
politicians, the civil servants and the 9enerals. H. G. Weiis was at the
forefront of this charge: "Our lawyers and politicians had failed lamentably
from want of scientific and practical knowledge, but they could not be
exterminated."48 Wells was gracious enough to concede that his favoured
solution for social problems, the complete eradication of the irrational and
47 "University and Educational Intelligence", Nature, vol. 98 (1916), p. 182.
48 "Science in Education and the Civil Service", Nature, vol. 97(1916), pp. 230-231, 231.
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degenerate peoples who stood in the way of progress, might be too extreme
in this particular instance.49
Their concept of science and its application in the political sphere was drawn
up in Social Darwinist terms. This complex of biological and progressivist
ideas had influenced intellectuals across the whole political spectrum for over
thirty years. The war added a sense of urgency. Although eminent men of
science like Sir Norman Lockyer had argued that science was essential to the
continued prosperity and well-being of the Empire, they had tended to
perceive the process of competition between nations in terms of economics
rather than war. But as Sir E. A. Schafer declared, "it [science] is necessary
for our prosperity - nay, for the continuance of our very existence".50
However, their claims for science were soctally universal rather than limited to
any specific facet of society. Science was of "ail-per'ading existence" and
"the very warp and woof of the web of human existence'. Sl Integral to every
aspect of human life, science was the motor of progress in advancing
civilisation and human knowledge.
This was not the cosmopolitan and rational project of progress that the
Enlightenment and its nineteenth century liberal descendants had subscribed
to. Competition between nations and cultures was the driving force of
competition and the development of scientific research and its application to
49 John Carey, The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice among the Literary
Intelligentsia, 1880-1939, London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1992, pp. 118-1 34.
50 Sir Edward Schafer, "Science and Classics in Modern Education", Nature vol. 97 (1916),
pp. 251-252, 252.
51 Professor D. Fraser Harris, "The Man of Science in the Community of To-day", Nature, vol.
99 (1917), pp. 236-238, 237.
62
industrial, commercial and martial problems. Some included moral and
cultural progress in this programme. The Great War was legitimated in
scientific terms as a moral crusade as well as a biological struggle. These
ideas developed during wartime and bound science into a nationalist
straitjacket. Science in Germany was "science prostituted" and "malevolent
only when divorced from common sense and common morality by the
obsessions of self-hypnotised Prussians". At the same time the cultural
neutrality of science was maintained. It was misused in Germany because of
"Teutonic brutality". 52 The traits of the race concerned determined the use of
science. Most of these scientists subscribed to an anthropological
conceptualisation of science and traced the roots of natural philosophy back
to the primitive yearnings of individual men to explore and control their
environment. Thus science became a fundamental part of human culture and
the dynamo of progress due to its force as a biologcal urge. Accusations of
science as inhumane and artificial could be counterattacked by claims of
science's cultural primacy.
This anthropological conceptualisation of science translated into political
flexibility. Men of science could cite this concept to legitimate their
interference and concern with any aspect of public life. However the danger
of dissipating their energies by invoking the name of science at every political
campaign was avoided. Their political agenda crystallised around their
professional concerns of finance, state recognition and education. The
process of radicalisation, whereby frustration and grievances started to fuel
52 Ibid.
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political action, was accelerated by the war. The Association of Public School
Science Masters (APSSM), the British Science Guild and prominent
individuals formed the "Neglect of Science" Committee which considered the
case for educational reform. Their radicalisation meant reformation, not
revolution, and they used their claims about science to demand state
recognition and finance. Radicals like Professor H. H. Turner, in his
Presidential address to the APSSM at Eton on January 3rd 1917 proposed a
Research Civil Service to provide careers for investigators. It would establish
a structure parallel to the existing Civil Service and initiate much needed
scientific surveys throughout the Empire.53 Professor D. Fraser Harris, a
supporter of nationalistic science, suggested a Ministry of Science in his
address to the Nova Scotian Institute of Science. This would have "just as
much prestige accorded it as the War Office, the Foreign Office or the Home
Office". Its purpose was to promote and administer the interests of science
and ensure that "scientific men would be known, encouraged, subsidised,
promoted, rewarded and pensioned".54
Like many other professional groups at this time, scientists perceived the
State to be the financial and institutional guarantor of their professional
status. The state would secure their positions, their research and their public
prestige. Their utterances concerning the relationship between the state and
science dovetail with Perkin's social ideal of professionalism. In his model the
professional must "live by persuasion and propaganda by claiming that their
53 C. L. Bryant, "The Association of Public School Science Masters", Science Progress, vol.
11(1916-1917), pp. 657-663; "Science in Public Schools", Nature, vol. 98(1917), p. 400.
54 Professor D. Fraser Harris, op cit., p. 237.
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particular service is indispensible to the client or employer and to society or
the state."55 There were continual demands by men of science for state
funding in order to safeguard the future of the nation. As Harris declaimed,
"For why should State recognition, promotion and rewarding be reserved for
sailors, soldiers, diplomatists and lawyers?"56 Implicit within this question was
his belief that "State recognition" guaranteed professional status. He
optimistically declared that science "is within a very little of even being a
profession".57
Harris and Turner represented, in an extreme form, the concerns of the
"Neglect of Science" Comrnittee. 8 This body recognised the isolated and
marginalised position of their disciplines in the culture and educational
system of the nation. Its perception of the political system was sociological
and educational which explained the commitment to long-term and gradualist
reform. Their goal was to ensure that the admini 4rative, political and military
elites inclined towards the sciences rather than the classics. To this end, the
Committee wished to replace classical studies with scientific studies in the
public schools and reform entrance examinations into universities and the
civil service so that science students could receive marks equal to the
classicists. Its long-term aims were gradual because it wished to increase the
55 Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, London: Routledge,
1989, p.6.
56 Professor D. Fraser Harris, op cit., p. 237.
57 Ibid.
58 Even more extreme was Professor Frederick Soddy who declared, "We seek at this
supreme crisis of our national history a man of clear vision and firm purpose who, taking all
branches of knowledge for his province, will assign to each its true place and function in the
education and training of all classes of the people. Such a man and such a purpose have yet
to be achieved." This Bonapartist view of science was propagated in "Science as
'Cinderella", Nature, vol. 97 (1916), p. 475; M. Sanderson, op cit., pp. 234-235.
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influence and diffusion of science which would eventually create a
sympathetic constituency amongst politicians and the civil service. It was
politically astute in marrying the universal claims of science to the single
issue of elite education which could form a focus for its lobbying.
This educational "reformation" required the formulation of certain arguments,
derived from earlier incarnations of the same argument which compared
science favourably with the classics and which were acquired from earlier
Victorian incarnations of the debate in William Whewell's work and the
debates on liberal education. The positions within this debate had been
sketched out and reinforced since the 1860s when scientists first campaigned
to place science on the curriculum of the pub c schools. J. E. C. Welldon
summed up the drawbacks of a scientific educat on from a classical point of
view in his Edwardian writings. In doing so he summarised the common
arguments and themes that had characterised the whole debate from its
inception. His main claim for the classics was grounded in the primacy of
language.
The reason why language is perhaps the supreme instrument of
culture, why it disciplines the mind, like nothing else can, for the
purposes of life, is that, as being itself a human product, it offers
problems which are not absolutely determinable, but evoke and
exercise the same balanced judgment as is needed in the daily
affairs of life.59
59 J. E. C. Weildon, "The Training of an English Gentlemen in the Public Schools", Nineteenth
Century andAfter, vol.60(1906), pp. 396-413, 397.
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The classicists believed that their subject inculcated humanistic values. For
Weildon, the advantages of the classics were educational and utilitarian. It
was the best subject for teaching self-discipline, one of the foundational
values of the public school. It also provided the best framework for
understanding and applying common sense since the problems of language
and the problems of life were bound together by their humanist qualities.
They were both cultural, indeterminable and required some form of value-
judgement as a solution. The exercise of some form of aesthetic criteria in a
value-judgement was the human element that distinguished language
(including the classics) from the sciences. Science, on the other hand:
if, indeed, science be taken to mean not only the so-called
natural sciences, or the investigation of the properties and
resources of the physical world, but as it strictly should mean,
all forms of exact observation and reflection..., but the fault of
exact science as an educational instrument is that it is exact; it
largely deals with certainties rather than probabilities, it can
establish its results beyond dispute.... but human life is not
made up of certainties. Such questions as arise in it can
seldom, if ever, be settled absolutely; they demand the balance
of opposing considerations, and if the balance on the whole
inclines one way, it might easily, in the majority of cases, incline
the other.60
60 Ibid., pp. 406-407.
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Scientists were unwilling to ignore the well-argued opposition of the
classicists and felt it necessary to respond to these claims. The implication
was that the sciences were educationally inferior, separated and isolated
from human culture. Scientific educationalists like Arthur Smithells and
Richard Gregory argued for the humanisation of science as part of
mainstream culture which involved the reform of science education itself.61
The "Neglect of Science" Commiftee published a memorandum establishing
a general framework for science education in February 1916 and held a
meeting at Burlington House on May 4th with leading luminaries from art,
literature, commerce and science to construct an agenda for action. This
memorandum included a syllabus entitled 'Science For All' which wished to
place the sciences within a general curriculum, without displacing the
"humanistic' studies". The relationship between the two areas of study would
be "complementary". 62 When individual members addressed more practical
issues they were less compromising and more disparaging. Lord Rayleigh,
the President of the meeting at Burlington House, began by calling the
system, whereby most schoolboys were taught the classics "an absurdity".63
It was Schafer however who articulated the agenda of the scientist and set
out arguments against the classics in his speech for the first resolution at the
meeting.
Schafer demanded that the sciences should replace the classics in the
61 Science in Public Schools", p. 400.
62 C. L. Bryant, "The Association of Public School Science Masters", p. 659.
63 "Science in Education and the Civil Service", p. 230.
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preparatory and public schools. His speech was a point-by-point refutation of
arguments that the classicists had made against the scientific reformers. For
instance, he used Shakespeare as an example to prove that a classical
education was unnecessary for expressing oneself clearly and artistically.
What Schafer did do was retranslate the accusations that the classicists had
made into counter-accusations that employed broadly similar arguments and
threw it back at them. For example, classicists accused scientists of being
specialists and thus unable to appreciate the broad expanse of culture,
divorced from their human roots because of the narrowness of their
expertise. Schafer, in turn, argued that classical learning should be regarded
as a specialism and studied in higher education through scientific methods.
He denied the advantages of the classics as a generalist education and
articulated the advantages of science as such. Schafer's style of argument
stemmed from two interdependent needs. Scientists had to argue on the
same grounds on the classicists if they were to win over the audiences who
had the power to initiate educational reform. Schafer therefore had to argue
that science could contribute more to the educational system of the public
school than the classics had •64
This was done through the process of character formation. The classics
inculcated clear and precise diction in speech and writing according to its
teachers. The morals and exemplars of the texts provided gentlemanly role-
models for the pupils. The classics therefore claimed some role in the class
distinctions and gentlemanly values that the public schools provided. Schafer
64 Sir Edward Schafer, "Science and Classics in Modern Education", p. 237.
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had to articulate a concept of science that encapsulated these moral
advantages. Harking back to the universalist concept of science explored
earlier, scientists attributed its unity to the scientific method. It was the
attributes of the scientific method that guaranteed character. In 'Science For
All', the "imaginative power" that required continuous "accurate observation,
with constant recourse to nature for observation" in experimentation was
motivated by a love of and search for truth. Science education had three
utilitarian advantages. It allowed men:
(a) to understand how the forces of nature may be employed for
the benefit of mankind, (b) to appreciate the sequence of cause
and effect in governing their own lives and (c) to see things as
they really are and not to distort them into what they may wish
them to be.65
These three advantages were complementary to education at the public
school. Learning science imbued the pupil with a sense of mission. Science
"for the benefit of mankind" was the type of idealistic concept of service that
appealed to the moralistic foundations of the public school. As a keynote of
science education, it set a moral tone and provided a justification for the
choice of science. Appreciating the sequence of cause and effect in
governing one's own life implied the teaching of self-discipline, self-reliance
and responsibility. The ability of science education to inculcate a sense of
manliness was completed by the exhortation that the pupil would see things
as they really are, not as they wish to be. The rational objectivity of science
65 C.L. Bryant, "The Association of Public School Science Masters", p. 659.
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and its attachment to the truth was harnessed to the honour of the schoolboy
where "If a boy says that a thing is so; it is So". 66 Science would never teach
a schoolboy to lie or act deceitfully since its primary goal was to serve the
truth.
The syllabus of the "Neglect of Science" Committee claimed that the virtues
of science ensured that public schoolboys would continue to be taught the
values and the bearing of a gentleman. The reformers did not hide their wish
to reform the educational system of the elite but, due to their universalist
conception of science and their need to change all schools, both independent
and state financed, were unwilling to develop and articulate class distinctions
in their syllabus. 'Science For All' was an agenda for a democracy and the
moral advantages of science education accrued as much to the pupil at the
public school as at the local elementary or village school. This agenda was
shaped by the discourse on public school education because this set the
terms in which arguments concerning the wider aims of education were
discussed.
The "classics-science controversy" provides an excellent window into the
strategies men of science used to promote their interests by incorporating the
concepts and values of the public school into their addresses for a wider
audience. Yet the public school discourse haunted the language that men of
science used and shaped the institutions that they worked in. Another
example during wartime was the speech of Richard Gregory, the assistant
66 J. E. C. Welldon, "The Training of an English Gentleman in the Public Schools", p. 402.
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editor of Nature, entitled 'Science for the Rank and File' in his address to the
APSSM at Eton. He drew a distinction between the majority of pupils, the
"rank and file" who should be taught science as part of a liberal education,
and those destined for "scientific or industrial careers" who should learn
science as a vocation.67 This title was coined during a time of war when the
military machine was perceived to be divided between a gentlemanly officer
class and the working class "rank and file". Applying this division to science
education implied that men of science were gentlemenly professionals,
comparable to officers because of their education and occupying the same
social position above the masses.
The themes which stoked the ire of the scientific community continued to
exercise a hold in peacetime. Their political agenda had been met by a
Commission on Scientific Education under Sir J. J. Thomson, a Machinery of
Government Commission under Lord Haldane and the establishment of the
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in 1916. Although their
expectations were not fully met, the stimulus of war fell away and the
scientific community did not make a concerted effort to establish an effective
lobbying system. However, their professional concerns were repeatedly
voiced during the nineteen-twenties even in minor debates.
During 1924, the correspondence columns of Nature became a curious
battleground over the use of the word scientist under the heading 'The Word
67 "Science in Public Schools", p.400.
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"Scientist" or its Substitute'.68 The majority of the correspondents discussed
the etymological qualities of the word, holding forth that it was a viable hybrid
or an unnatural combination. They were also divided over the common or
rare usage of the word. The usefulness of this debate for the historian lies in
the opportunity it gave for men of science to air their prejudices. The older
generation like E. Ray Lankester, Sir D'Arcy W. Thompson and Oliver Lodge
opposed the word on the grounds that it was "a charlatan's device"69 , " has
been in low-born company"7° and had "an alien significance". 71 All three
were aware of the public impact that a change of nomenclature might entail
and were decidedly unsympathetic. All three believed that this word
undermined the public status of their role in terms of their knowledge and
gentlemanly position. A scientist was neither a gentleman nor an expert,
whereas a man of science was. On the other hand, those who promoted the
new/old word viewed it as an additional tool to present a united culture of
science to the public and enforce its claim of professiona'I status. CIffOTd
Allbutt argued that historically "in England there has been a certain prejudice
against science as a profession".72 Those who opposed it like J. H. Fowler
granted that the word had "a professional air, as if the man who so described
himself were claiming as an ex cathedra authority for his utterances".73
However the professional connotation was "not always complimentary". R. A.
68 These letters are not included in Sydney Ross, "Scientist: The Story of a Word", Annals ol
Science, vol. 18 (1962), PP. 65-85. He argues that the term scientist remained a colloquialism
until 1910 and that the phrase man of science' was used in formal discourse. This series of
letters seems to indicate the word's colloquial use survived the First World war and that its
switch to formal discourse involved a generational change in the scientific community.
69 "The Word 'Scientist' or its Substitute", Nature, vol. 114 (1924), pp. 823-825, 823.
70 Ibid., p. 824.
71 Ibid.
72 "The Word 'Scientist' and its Substitute", Nature, vol. 114 (1924), pp . 897-898, 897.
73 "The Word 'Scientist' and its Substitute", p. 824.
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S. Paget linked the suffix -ist with "one who is an expert on the theory as well
as the practice of the art which he practices". 74 This division lay between the
older and the younger generation of scientists, the gentlemen of the late
Victorian periods and the rise of the more specialized professional in
Edwardian England. It was not a firm division but telling enough to
demonstrate generational differences on the role of the man of science. On a
final note, the debate left an echo of the continual striving by men of science
to displace the classics from their superior position in the curriculum. The
word scientist was never used because men of science:
feared to offend classical taste. No scientist ever puts his pen to
paper without casting a fearful glance over his shoulder to see
whether a classic should be looking on.... But to suggest to a
scientist that he is guilty of a classical lapse is more mortifying to
him than to teti him that he shouki ha'ie sa i d "cack'c" ihcste.act c
"serviette".75
The author of this letter could only compare the behaviour of a scientist with
the social distinctions that divided the middle classes through tacit codes of
conduct like manners. The inferiority of science to the classics was linked to
the differences in the social graces that divided the lower middle class from
the middle class. For many, the scientist was the black-coated worker of the
professional world.
74 "The Word 'Scientist' and its Substitute", p. 897.
75 "The Word 'Scientist' or its Substitute", Nature, vol. 115 (1925), p. 85. Class distwiction was




Socialization through the public schools and at Oxford had prepared
Rutherford, Tizard and Huxley for a professional or an academic career. They
had learned the values of the professional middle-classes and fulfilled their
sense of duty through service during the First World War. 76 Their subsequent
careers reflected the additional avenues for career advancement that the
War opened up for the scientific community, especially in government itself.
Rutherford was appointed Cavendish Professor of Physics in 1918 and had
already led the Anglo-French expedition to the United States of America in
1917 to share the results of wartime research. 77 This expedition was a
precursor of Rutherford's interwar role as an unofficial scientific adviser to the
British government.78 Major Henry Tizard was involved with aeronautical
research at Martlesham and applied the organisational skills acquired there
on a larger scale as Controller, Research and Experiments in the newly
formed Air Ministry. His immediate postwar career combined academic
research with a consultancy from the Asiatic Petroleum Company
investigating the internal combustion engine, mirroring the wartime links
between the universities and industry. 79 When he was asked by Sir Frank
Heath to join the DSIR in 1920, Tizard began a career with the civil service
that would survive for thirty years and a rectorship of Imperial College.80
Huxley did not enter the civil service but plyed his trade as a scientific
popularist to good effect in his alliance with H. G. Wells and Gip Wells on the
76 Rutherford was involved on sonar research with the Admiralty. David Wilson, op cit., pp.
372-376.
77 Ibid., pp. 376-382.
78 Ibid., pp. 453-495.
79 Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 53.
8 Ibid., pp. 55-57.
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book, "The Science of Life". In 1927, confronted with a choice between his
academic position and the demands of this project, Huxley resigned his chair
at King's College, London. Even Huxley, whose work entailed no contact with
industry, felt confident enough to resign his academic position without
jeopardising his future career or potential earnings. From then on, he earned
his money through articles, lectures and books, serving science through his
popularisations.8l
This conservative, professional world was defined by those who had
inhabited its boundaries and then departed. The most unorthodox example
was the figure of J. B. S. Haldane within the spires of Cambridge. His
behaviour had never marked him out as a gentleman since he delighted in
uttering shocking statements at dinner parties or other gatherings of "polite
society". 82 In the twenties Haldane was associated with the radical
intellectuals who opposed the political, moral and sexual status quo. His
victory in maintaining his academic post in the face of dismissal for gross
immorality became a cause celebre for young intellectuals. He became the
centre of a circle of unorthodox dons and students, a subculture set apart
from the norm of stifling and stuffy Cambridge conformity. Even scientists
who were isolated from the circles of power like Haldane established or
entered organisations to push forward their political agenda. Haldane had
advanced his scientific career during the nineteen-thirties but in his
disillusionment with the political and scientific 'establishments', eventually
moved left to support the Communist Party.
81 Julian Huxley, op cit., pp. 149, 191.
82 Gary Werskey, op cit., p. 82.
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The themes of public school values, gentlemanly professionalism and the rise
of professional society have all contributed to the argument that science was
not a monstrous sport of modernity but a typical profession that was moulded
by the forces playing out across British society during this period. Because of
its low status, the rhetoric of "public science" was always one of justification
to attract potential patrons. It demonstrated that science supported accepted
values and lobbied government to gain socio-economic or educational
functions which the professional knowledge of scientists could explain whilst
defining their social role and status against other cultural elites. 83 Frank
Turner's model of "public science" corresponds closely with the actions of
scientists in the "classics-science" controversy where they shaped accepted
values of the public school to the ends of a science education and defined
their own preferred cultural and educational role against the dominance of the
classicists. If a scientist was educated at public school or Oxbridge, he would
enter a conservative profession that ar1icuated many ot the va)ues and
attitudes he had learned in house and college.
83Frank M. Turner, "Public Science in Britain, 1880-191 9", Isis, vol.71(1980), pp. 589-608.
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Chapter Four
SCIENTISTS AS INSIDERS: GENTLEMANLY SCIENCE AND THE
ATHENAEUM CLUB
4.1 Introduction
Scientists learned the values and obligations of gentlemanly professionalism
within the competitive environment of school and university. These ties and
manners became increasingly important to the scientist during the interwar
period as the industrial and state research structures of the First World War
acquired permanence and compelled the scientist to interact more frequently
with other professionals. First of all, this chapter examines the role of the elite
scientist within the worlds of government and science through one of the
institutions that facilitated their mutual exchanges and communications within
the world of gentlemanly professionalism - the Athenaeum Club. Known as
the "Valhalla for the eminent", this club acted as a symbol of professional
meritocracy and functioned as a private space for negotiations between
professional representatives.1 When scientists reached the pinnacle of their
career, recognition of their eminence beyond the scientific world was often
symbolised through membership of the Athenaeum Club. Their public
identification as a scholar and a gentleman was achieved through the symbol
of a prestigious club with distinguished membership, bringing to fruition the
years of training in education and the profession.
The more subjective studies of individual scientists in earlier chapters have
1 David Anderson, "Club of the British Immortals", New York Times Magazine, 2 August 1944.
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shown the importance of the values and culture imbibed at the public school.
Did these examples typify the educational experience and career structure of
an elite scientist or was their public school and Oxbridge education
exceptional? A prosopographical study in the second half of the chapter
examines this question by studying those members of the Royal Society of
London who declared their membership of the Athenaeum Club. This sample
does not attempt to draw a complete picture of the metropolitan scientific elite
but merely to provide a more general background within which the structural
elements that indicate the strength of gentlemanly professionalism within the
scientific profession can be examined more rigorously.
4.2 The Political World of Gentlemanly Professionalism
Post-Edwardian British society included an inbuilt 'corporate bias' that
restructured politics, professions and institutions into organised bodies that
could represent their interests more effectively within a democratic state.2
Between, beyond and within these formal structures of the democratic state
were the networks, the committees, the negotiations and the shadowy
lobbying campaigns that provided the lubricating grease for the dynamic
operations of this system. The result was the "informal involvement of
powerful interest groups in government decision making".3 In order to bring
pressure to bear on the state, actors within this machine had to represent an
organisation of some description. For example, in the corporate economy
trade unions and employers associations were represented collectively with
2 Keith Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The British Experience since 1911, London,
Deutsch, 1979; Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London: Fontana Press, 1990 [1989], p. 80.
3 Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, London: Routledge,
1989, p. 290.
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the government acting as arbiter and judge on their disputes. Professions
who also wished to make their voice heard came under the same pressure to
combine.
Industrial relations was the sphere where this 'corporate bias' was visibly
evident for science. At the National Physical Laboratory in 1917, the scientific
workers organised themselves and signed a petition to demand better
working conditions and a rise in wages which their director, Sir Richard
Glazebrook, supported. However Sir Frank Heath:
the D.S.l.R.'s top man.....claimed in 1917 that his hands were
tied - unless the N.P.L. scientists were prepared to form
themselves into a trade union. Then, Heath explained, it would
be perfectly appropriate for his department to set up the
appropriate machinery and get down to the serious business of
negotiation .4
The government constructed channels of negotiation that required the
scientific workers to organise themselves into a trade union or a professional
association and appoint or elect a negotiator. One should differentiate
between this type of structured negotiation amongst separate interests and
the elite processes of policy making that combined the structures of an
informal corporatism with the utilisation of more fluid networks. Scientific
policy and the research within its confines was a patchwork quilt of
4 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and British
Socialists, London: Free Association Books, 1988 [1978], p. 51.
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government bodies, intermediary associations, universities and interested
outside parties that all competed for finance and power in promoting their
projects, their disciplines and their political agendas.5
The lifestyle of the professionals who sat on government commiffees and
established these networks included clubs, dinners, sports and associations
which provided space and codes of conduct where all manner of business
could be negotiated under the cloak of leisure. Membership of that more
peculiar grouping, the "great and the good", was established by expert
service on the various government bodies that dealt with technical issues.6
Eminent scientists were always in demand to sit on a Commission in their
realm of speciality. For example, Sir William Dampier acted as a member of
the departmental commiftee of the Home Office on the Lighting of Factories
and Workshops, chairmen of the two Commiftees on Agricultural Machinery,
a nominated member of the Agricultural Wages Board and Secretary of the
Agricultural Research Council. Only at the last appointment in 1931 did he
become a "temporary civil servant" at the age of 63 and gained a knighthood
for his "official agricultural work".7
The geographical and institutional centre of these political and professional
networks was 'clubland', the colloquial term for St. James's parish in
Westminster. 'Clubland' was located within a 'circle of power' that
5 lan Varcoe, Organizing for Science in Britain: A case-study, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1974 provides a general overview of the DSIR after the First World War and the
diversity of institutions under its wings.
6 Peter Hennessy, op cit., pp. 546-574.
7 Sir William Dampier, Cambridge and Elsewhere: The Memories of Sir William Cecil
Dampier, Sc.D., F.R.S., formerly Whetham, London: John Murray, 1950, p. 108.
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encompassed Buckingham Palace, the Houses of Parliament and Whitehall.
This spatial grouping incorporated the monarchy, the administrative centres
of Whitehall and the political heart of the state, comprising the Houses of
Parliament and Downing Street. As the informal corporatisation of the state
proceeded, the centralised 'corridors of power' began to resemble a village
community where an elite of civil servants and politicians shared a common
educational and social background of upper-middle-class or aristocratic
origins, attendance at a revered public school and graduation from the
universities of Oxford or Cambridge.8
'Clubland' constituted an 'informal annexe' to this central structure where the
political and administrative elites could meet their counterparts from the
separate social worlds of the universities, literature and science. The informal
and private setting of the club, shielded from the eyes of the public domain,
was a primary factor in the association of the 'Establishment' with secrecy. By
the eighteen-eighties, 'clubland' was recognised in the media as a separate
and demarcated region with the invention of words like 'clubdom' to denote
the domain of the clubs and 'clubocracy' to describe "the class who are
members of a club."9 The Athenaeum Club was the most eminent and
respectable of this group, providing a home for the elites of the old and new
professions.
The growth of 'clubland' ended with the outbreak of the First World War. This
8 Harold Perkin, op cit., pp.71-72, 84.
9 "Club", The Oxford English Dictionaty, Second Edition, Vol. III, Edited by R.W.Burchfield,
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 370; R. Nevill, London Clubs: Their History and Treasures,
London: Chatto & Windus, 1911, pp. 1-2.
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precipitate halt led contemporaries to emphasize the War as the cause of the
decline of 'clubland' in the nineteen-twenties. The War destroyed many
potential club members, but for the club secretaries, its most insidious effect
was the alterations it made to the patterns of leisure amongst the middle
class. As metropolitan communities were disrupted, individuals tended to
retreat into their suburban homes and domestic atmosphere. This 'suburban
retreat' was continually reinforced during the interwar period by the arrival of
a mass society and a mass media. The cinema, the radio, and eventually
television encouraged new patterns of leisure and consumption based upon
the home or the immediate locality. 1 0 These changes can be charted through
the fortunes of the 'clubland' evening newspapers, which had a circulation of
between 20,000 and 30,000, but wielded "a quite disproportionate political
influence" as "organs of opinion".11 The Westminster Gazette stopped in
1921 and the Pall Mall Gazette in 1923. 12 These developments were not
expected after the conflict as the club secretaries had looked forward to a
period of renewed growth.
The most important of the gentlemen's clubs in this era of decline was the
Athenaeum. In Victorian London it was "the haven for London's literati" and
the social arena for the metropolitan intelligentsia, bestowing gentlemanly
status and character upon its members. 13 These Victorian intellectuals were
10 Martin Pugh, State and Society: British Political and Social Histoiy, 1870-1992, London:
Edward Arnold, 1994, pp. 194-204.
11 Cohn Seymour-Ure, "The Press and the Party System between the Wars" in Gillian Peele
and Chris Cook eds., The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918-1 939, London: The MacMillan Press
Ltd., 1975, pp. 232-257, 238.
12 Ibid., p. 234.
13 Adrian Desmond, Huxley: The Devil's Disciple, London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1994, p.
226.
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a "self-described meritocracy", kept at arm's length from the social elites, but
inclusive enough to incorporate Bishops and secular radicals in their
preferred club through the processes of "ruling-class egalitarianism".14
Natural philosophy formed an important part of this group and the club played
an important role for Charles Darwin and Thomas Huxley in their attempts to
raise the influence of the 'scientific priesthood'. Darwin entered under the
patronage of Charles Lyell and, in turn, sponsored the candidacies of Joseph
Hooker and Huxley. lS They, in similar fashion, utilised the club for their own
coterie, the X-Club. Francis Galton, Herbert Spencer, Hooker, Huxley and
William Spottiswoode were all members of the Athenaeum. The club's
usefulness for the X-Club was enhanced by its location just around the
corner from the Royal Society which was housed in Burlington House. These
scientific publicists were advancing a professional campaign that would
enhance their role in the Royal Society and the British Association for the
Advancement of Science whilst simultaneously confirming the advantages of
Athenaeum membership for politicking scientists.6
The small, educated community of the Victorian intellectual was gradually
undermined by the expansion of cultural professions like the schoolteacher,
14 Stefan Collini, Pub/ic Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, pp.15-16.
15 Adrian Desmond and James Moore, Datwin, London: Penguin Books, 1992, PP. 253-254,
260, 664-6.
16 R. M. MacLeod, "The X Club: A Social Network of Science in Late-Victorian England",
Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, vol. 24 (1970), pp. 305-322; J. V. Jensen,
"The X Club: Fraternity of Victorian Scientists", British Journal of the Histoiy of Science, vol. 5
(1970), pp. 63-72; R. Barton, "An Influential Set of Chaps': The X-Club and Royal Society
Politics, 1864-85", British Journal of the History of Science, vol.23(1990), pp. 53-81.
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and the academic till it lost its cohesiveness, its authority and its audience.17
This community had provided the base of the Athenaeum's membership but
the club survived its dissolution. The continued existence of the Athenaeum
depended upon the broadly based constituencies from which it recruited its
members. "Every Prime Minister down to Mr. Baldwin (with the exception of
Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bonar Law), all the Lord Chancellors, all the
Archbishops, and most of the Judges and Bishops have thus joined the
club."18 Many were elected under Rule XII which allowed the executive
committee to elect as extraordinary members Princes of the Blood Royal,
Cabinet Ministers, Bishops, the Speaker of the House of Commons and
Judges. Twelve members were also annually elected under Rule II for
achieving eminence in the arts, the sciences, literature or administration.19
From 1832, when Rule II was first instituted, the committee of the Athenaeum
intended to police entrance into their club and ensure that the leaders of
culture, politics and the professions in their metropolis were not excluded.
With these rules, the Athenaeum guaranteed the renewal of its membership
and never became the prisoner of one cultural clique, one political party or
17 T. W. Heyck, The Transformation of Intellectual Life in Victorian England, London: Croom
Helm, 1982; John Baxandale and Christopher Pawling, Narrating the Thirties: A Decade in the
Making: 1930 to the Present, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996, pp. 4-5.
18 Henry R. Tedder, "The Athenaeum: A Centenary Record", The Times, 16 February 1924.
The Reverend F.G. Waugh summarised the number of members and their professions in
1884 as follows:- "Law: Judges, 58; Q.C.'s, 35; barristers, 215 - total, 308. Divinity: Bishops,
36; clergy (including 19 dignitaries), 112 - total, 148. Medicine; M.D.'s and surgeons, 82.
Making a total for the three professions 538. Universities: Oxford 382; Cambridge, 339;
Scotch, 65; Dublin, 49; London, 35 - total, 870. Professors, 74; Societies, Fellows of (chiefly
F.R.S.) 269; Royal Academicians, 32; civil engineers, 39; librarians 5; naval officers, 10;
military officers, 67; peers, 82; lords (sons of peers), 11; Privy Councillors, 110; honourables
31; baronets, 59; knights, titular, 131; M.P.'s, 59; esquires including those without sffix
indicative of degrees, societies, etc.) 760 - total number 1364. The maximum of ordinary
members is 1200."; N. Cowell, The Athenaeum: 1824-1974, London: Heinemann Educational
Books Ltd., 1975, p. 47.
19 Humphry Ward, History of The Athenaeum: 1824-1925, London: The Athenaeum, 1925,
pp. 115-116; N. Cowell, op cit., pp. 165-169.
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representative of one profession.
This was a direct consequence of the aim of the club to incorporate 'the
Great and the Good' within its walls. The leaders of most of the professions
within the capital perceived membership of the club as a public recognition of
their status by their professional peers. Therefore, the increasing
specialisation of professions and the prestige of the club formed a virtuous
circle of mutual reinforcement. As an example, one can cite the colonisation
of the Athenaeum by the X-CIub as part of the latter's strategy to increase
their perceived influence and prowess amongst the scientific community.
Since the club included the elite of the old professions and the leaders of the
new, the official 'Establishment' and its opposing intellectual authorities, it
functioned as an arena where conflicts and disagreements, negotiations and
contests could take place without the knowledge of the press. Since all the
professions and the literary coteries found the club indispensable as a space
where all sides could meet as equals under the mask of club etiquette, the
existence of the Athenaeum was guaranteed.
The Athenaeum responded to the demands of its members for changes that
would reflect their wish to use the club as a networking environment with a
number of incremental steps. Entrance to the club had always been restricted
to members except for special occasions like a conversazione when the rules
governing entry were relaxed. Proposals to allow strangers to dine in the
Coffee-Room were defeated on three occasions in 1892, 1902 and 1908 with
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declining majorities.20 This grassroots pressure was finally achieved in 1914,
with 'strangers' allowed entry for lunch and dinner, probably because
members found the club indispensable for entertaining their guests during
wartime.21 This weakening of the strict rules governing entry was never
reversed. By 1926, guests were also being admitted for tea in the Coffee-
Room. These small changes were effectively transforming the role of the
club. Instead of acting as a social centre for its members, the club was
becoming a space which members could utilise. They could display their
membership to guests, increasing their prestige, and use the privacy that the
club provided to conduct business.
There was a continual demand amongst members for accommodation as an
increasing number lived outside London and viewed the club as a resort for
sleep when business kept them late in the capital. The Attic Storey was built
in 1898 and contained rooms for the Secretary and the Librarian plus ten
bedrooms for the women servants. Maids now lived in the club in a restricted
upper storey where they could not disturb the activities of the members. The
demand for bedrooms led to the establishment of a special Committee which
recommended an additional storey, paid for by an increase in the annual
subscription to fifteen guineas in its report of 1927. To accomplish this, the
club was closed for six months while the staff bedrooms were converted for
the use of members.22 Even this proved insufficient to satisfy the pent-up
20 N. Cowell, op cit., pp. 97-98. Members had been allowed to bring a male guest everi
Monday evening meeting under a resolution passed on 22 November 1825 but this was
revoked on 12 March 1833. p. 117.
21 Ibid., p. 118.
22 Ibid., pp. 30-31, 133.
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demand. Number 6, Carlton Gardens was acquired in 1936 and was partially
used as a Ladies Annexe.23 This "provided five reception rooms, four
Members' bedrooms, ten maid-servants' bedrooms [accommodating two
maids in each room].. .spacious dining-room.. .and large comfortable drawing-
room. "24 Sometimes these facilities could be "occasionally overtaxed."25
Formal identification with the club, reaffirmed through collective participation
in annual rituals like the elections, were no longer important to the
membership. However the facilities which eased the discomforts of
metropolitan life retained a hold:
The utility of the merely physical advantages that a Club can
make available in rest, food, drink, facilities for entertaining and
so forth, can easily be indicated. 'So forth' includes the Club's
barber and the bedrooms on the top floor, the telephone, the
possibility of cashing a cheque, and of writing and receiving
letters which will be forwarded to absent members.26
These facilities allowed the member to retain an address in the capital
without having to maintain a flat since the expenses of a stay in London were
defrayed by the members' bedrooms in the club.
23 This was a male-dominated world and women were barred from entering the club or
becoming members. When the admission of females to the Athenaeum was allowed, the
committee decided that a separate space was required so that the rules maintaining the
traditional rooms of the club as a male preserve were not undermined. This change was also
accorded a lower priority than the need for additional bedrooms for the membership and
residential staff.
24 Ibjd., pp. 120-121.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 35.
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The local practices of the Athenaeum incorporated the norms and values of
gentlemanly behaviour mediated through a distorting lens of puritanical
respectability. The members maintained a formal and correct atmosphere in
the club except in the rooms set aside for cards and billiards. Members
retained their privacy, talking only to those whom they counted as friends or
reading the newspapers. In order to talk to a member it was customary to
send a servant with his card on a tray, "asking if he might have the privilege,
and refusals were not unknown". 27 The privacy of the individual was
paramount and conversations were conducted in hushed tones outside of the
Coffee-room and other social areas. When members took lunch, dinner or
tea they were accustomed to sit in their familiar cliques. As the author of the
Nature review commented:
One knows where among the many tables one's friends are
likely to be found - where men of science mostly sit, or where
the artists or the critics; or the august corner where statesman
consort together, and eat and drink like common men.28
Reflecting the professional society within which it was situated, the club
adhered to the wishes of that profession most concerned with morality, the
Lords Spiritual. The Athenaeum Sabbath demanded the removal of all
games, including chessmen, so that no labour would be undertaken by the
members on the seventh day. Sunday billiards was "tolerated" from 1927
after the Archbishop of Canterbury, a member of the General Committee,
27 Ibid., p. 54.
28 [D.W.T.], "The Centenary of the Athenaeum", Nature, vol. 117 (1926), pp. 814-81 8, 818.
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queried the resolution removing the prohibition before assenting to the
relaxation. 29 The Athenaeum remained a bastion of Victorian traditionalism in
its rules throughout the interwar period.
Like the public school, the club incorporated obligatory practices that
governed the internal relationships amongst its members and recognised an
overt value system of conservatism, which all members had to respect. This
conservatism expressed itself in an allegiance to the dominant morals of
family values, patriotism and imperialism. The large number of bishops and
clergy who were members guaranteed that those regarded as deviants would
not be considered suitable for entry. The career of Bertrand Russell acted as
a barometer for this value system and demonstrated a definite parallel
between his membership of the Athenaeum and his acceptability to the
government and the authorities of Cambridge University. His expulsion and
reinstatement at the Athenaeum effectively highlighted its role as a retreat for
the officially recognised professional and cultural elite and how entrance to
the club was a recognition by one's peers that 'eminence' had been
achieved. It either preceded or followed on from professional approval, a
perquisite for membership of the club since it was these networks that
assured entry.
In 1908, Russell was elected to the Royal Society through the efforts of Alfred
North Whitehead, for "his contribution to logic and mathematics". 3° In the
spring of 1909 he was elected to the Athenaeum and, in the following year,
29 N. Cowell, op cit., p. 35.
30 Caroline Moorhead, Bertrand Russell: A Life, London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1992, p. 153.
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was appointed Lecturer in Logic and Principles of Mathematics at Trinity
College, Cambridge. As Russell's profile increased in his particular discipline,
he was serially rewarded over three years, with membership of the
institutions from which the 'intellectual establishment' was constituted. His
adulterous affair with Lady Ottoline Morrell which began in 1911 was treated
as a minor indiscretion but did not impede the course of his career since he
became a Fellow of Trinity in 1915.
As a left-liberal, Russell took a principled stand against the War as president
of the Cambridge branch of the Union of Democratic Control and, after 1916,
by joining the No Conscription Fellowship. His stance alienated the
conservative Fellows of Trinity. After declaring that he had written an
anonymous pamphlet calling for the release of Ernest Everett, a teacher and
conscientious objector from Liverpool, through a letter in The Times, he was
charged under the Defence of the Realm Act by the authorities who were
wary of his influence. He stood trial on 5 June 1916 and faced a period of
sixty-one days in jail until his supporters paid the fine of one hundred pounds.
This public display of opposition to the War moved the Master, Vice-Master
and eight Fellows to vote for his expulsion from the College and, in turn, a
Special Meeting of the General Committee of the Athenaeum expelled him
on 18 July 1916. 31 Private indiscretions like adultery and homosexuality
were apt to go unnoticed if discreet, but Russell's blatant opposition to war
and accepted patriotism led his enemies to campaign for his removal from all
positions of authority.
31 N. Cowell, op cit., pp. 137-138; Caroline Moorhead, op cit., pp. 253-256: Ronald Clark,
Bertrand Russell and his world, London: Thames and Hudson, 1981, pp. 51-53.
91
Just as Russell was removed from the club as his acceptability to his
intellectual peers plummetted, so his reinstatement followed on from his
rehabilitation. He became a Fellow of Trinity in 1944 and a regular
broadcaster for the public face of the government, the B.B.C..32 Recognition
of his cultural authority came with his appointment as Reith Lecturer in 1948
and, abetted by his anti-communism, he was crowned with the Order of Merit
in 1949. 33 He was re-elected under Rule II in 1952 by the General Committee
of the Athenaeum who seemed to be unaware of his earlier expulsion.34
Russell's career was one of violent swings out of and into intellectual
respectability. This particular case was peculiar because of the heightened
air of repression under wartime conditions and Russell's courting of publicity
in order to further the cause of conscientious objection. It did indicate that the
Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, had sufficient political capital to
engineer Russell's expulsion from the club and suggested that the links
between Cambridge and the Athenaeum were far stronger than has
previously been realised.
The official recognition of the increasing importance of the professions and
their colonisation of the Athenaeum was celebrated by the establishment of a
new honour, the Order of Merit. The Order had only one rank - Member, and
was "awarded in recognition of eminent services rendered in the armed
forces, or towards the advancement of art, literature and science".35
Entrance to the Order was "a personal award from the sovereign" and
32 Caroline Moorhead, op cit., pp. 448, 456-457; Ronald Clark, op cit., pp. 90, 93.
33 Caroline Moorhead, op cit., p. 466; Ronald Clark, op cit., p. 96.
34 N. Cowell, op cit., pp. 137-1 38.
35 Honours and Titles, London: HMSO, 1992, p. 73.
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remained distinct from the politicised bias of all other honours. 36 Edward VII
specifically created the Order to distinguish the style of his reign from that of
his mother, Queen Victoria, and inject professional values into the honours
system. The Order was based on meritocratic values. It bestowed no title and
all members were equal in rank.37 Kings and Queens would often use it to
honour unorthodox individuals including Alfred Russel Wallace in 1908, Lord
Haldane in 1915 after he was ostracised in the anti-German campaigns and
George Bernard Shaw, who declined the trophy. 38 The importance and
power of these professional elites was visible to the King by the turn of the
century. The Athenaeum was chosen as the suitable site to celebrate this
meritocratic order. It was founded in July 26, 1902 and as eleven of the
twelve founding members were members of the club, the Committee invited
all of those honoured to a celebratory dinner on July 25. The dinner included
the Lords Lister, Kelvin, Rayleigh, Kitchener and Roberts, the President of
the Royal Society, Sir William Huggins and was presided over by the senior
trustee of the club, Lord Avebury.3 9 One hundred and fifty members of the
club joined the dinner and reception, rendering the occasion an
unprecedented collection of 'the great and the good'. As A.J. Balfour
commented, "never in the history of the great metropolis - probably never in
the history of this country - had there been gathered in the room of that size
such a body of undiluted distinction."40 The scientific community was well
36 Michael De-La-Noy, The Honours System, London: Allison & Busby, 1985, p. 76.
37 Ibid., p.11.
38 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
39 Other eminences grises at the dinner included Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener,Admiral
Keppel, Admiral Seymour, John Morley, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Goschen and the Prime
Minister, A. J. Balfour.
40 Humphry Ward, op cit., pp. 92-93; N. Cowell, op cit., pp. 133, 155.
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represented with the peers of natural philosophy and the President of the
Royal Society, a position permanently represented in the Order. Given this
mingling of the political and professional elites, the dinner can be viewed as a
symbol of the unspoken compact between the governors and the leaders of
the professional classes. Edward VIl's proposal was enthusiastically taken
up by the professional elites as an opportunity to cement their ties with the
monarchy and the establishment. This marriage of a modernising monarch
and professionals thirsty for tradition shows that the Athenaeum played a
crucial role as the site for the consummation of their ties.
4.3 A Prosopographical Study of Scientific Clubmen
Prosopography or collective biography has as "its aim. ..[the] study [of] the
features of a group by means of a comparative analysis of their lives".41 This
methodology has been a model for historians of science ever since Robert
Merton republished his ground-breaking study, Science, Technology and
Society in Seventeenth-Century England in 1970.42 Recent works that
incorporate or base their conclusions upon this approach include Steven
Shapin's study of phrenology in Edinburgh and Arnold Thackray's analysis of
the coterie that established the British Association for the Advancement of
Science.43 In their joint article on the subject, both historians argued that
41 J. E. McGuire, "Newton and the Demonic Furies: Some Current Problems and Approaches
in the History of Science", History of Science, vol. 11(1973), pp. 21-48, 23; Lewis Pyenson,
"'Who were the Guys': Prosopography in the History of Science", History of Science, vol. 15
(1977), pp. 155-188; Jack Morrell and Arnold Thackray, Gentlemen of Science: Early Years ol
the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
42 R. K. Merton, Science Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, New
York: Harper and Row, 1970 [1938].
43 Steven Shapin and Arnold Thackray, "Prosopography as a Research Tool in History of
Science: The British Scientific Community, 1700-1 900", History of Science, vol. 12(1974), pp.
1-28; Steven Shapin, "Phrenological Knowledge and the Social Structure of Early Nineteenth-
Century Edinburgh", Annals of Science, vol.32(1975), pp. 219-243.
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prosopography, if it was open to a sophisticated, contextual model that posed
narrow and clear questions, could establish lines of causation "between
action and context". In this argument, the advantages of prosopography are
fairly clear. Whether the subject is a small elite like the Gentlemen of Science
or a large body like Lewis Namier's study of the parties in the House of
Commons during the eighteenth century, the methods involved are liable to
emphasize prickly particularities as exceptions to the more general features
of the sample. Examining a scientist through a prosopographical model
enables the historian to work with a greater awareness of individual agency
and social structure which, in turn, opens up the 'cluster of influences' that
mould an individual throughout his or her life and allows the observer to study
how the individual utilised these to further his or her interests.45
There were three criteria which determined the inclusion of a particular
individual within this prosopographical sample. First of all, they were Fellows
of the Royal Society of London, a traditional signifier of elite status and
respectability within the scientific community. The Royal Society was
"peculiarly responsible for acting as an intermediary between the Government
and science" and its Fellows formed a scientific contingent within the 'Great
and the Good'. 46 Secondly, they declared their membership of the
Ibid., p. 3.
45 Lawrence Stone, "Prosopography", Daedalus, vol. 100 (1971), pp. 46-80, 65; 5. Lukes,
"Power and Structure" in Steven Lukes, Essays in Social Theory, London: The MacMillan
Press Ltd., 1977, pp. 3-29.
46 Marie Boas Hall, All Scientists Now: The Royal Society in the Nineteenth Century,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.165; Dorothy Stimson, Scientists and
Amateurs: A History of the Royal Society, New York: Henry Schuman Inc., 1948, p. 246. "For
in the interim between the two Wars, relations between the [Royal] Society and the
government had been steadily growing closer as the Society gained in strength and as it
developed its main function, the furtherance of science".
95
Athenaeum in the Royal Society Yearbook. The Athenaeum's dual role as a
gentleman's club and as a backroom for civil service lobbying demonstrated
that membership could be an indicator of allegiance to the values of
gentlemanly professionalism and an informal involvement with governmental
machinery. Thirdly, all biographical details were taken from the Dictionary ol
National Biography. All individuals in this collection are listed in a standard
format that details their origins and their careers, simplifying the task of the
collective biographer and diminishing the danger of misinterpreting individual
features despite the particular emphases of the obituarist. One hundred and
ninety-eight Fellows of the Royal Society fit these criteria in the period, 1915
to 1950, and their membership of these two associations suggested a greater
probability of their participation in the complex politics of science and
government.
Five characteristics were chosen to categorise the individuals within this
group. These were the schooling of the individual, their university education,
their career, the honours they received, and their father's occupation. Each of
these characteristics is in turn broken down into categories. Each
characteristic is defined and reasons are given for its utilisation. The results
of the prosopographical analysis are displayed and discussed with reference
to the themes of this thesis.
SCHOOLING
Schooling gives an indication of an individual's socioeconomic background
and the culture into which he was educated. The public school system
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educated a large proportion of middle class children and the model was
widely copied amongst the grammar schools and minor independents. The
general categories of independent and local schools masked a wide range of
diversity following the powers granted to counties and boroughs by the
Education Act of 1870. Local schools were partially financed by the state or
the local authority and they provided a gateway of opportunity which children
of the skilled working class could enter. However the educational systems of
Great Britain were divided along class boundaries with opportunities for
advancement rapidly vanishing down the social scale. Analysis of the
educational experiences within this sample would provide indicators on their
social origins and their career structure comparative to other professions.
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Public and grammar schools, the training grounds of the professional
classes, educated 58% of this sample and combined with the Scottish
Academies (5%), the fee-paying Independents (18%) and the rare Tutor
(1%), indicated that the middle-class families provided the dominant number
of these scientists. The large number of public and grammar schools also
suggested that the inculcation of public school values dominated the
educational experience of a large proportion of this sample.47 Scotland
provided a special case because one single school, the Edinburgh Academy,
educated 3% of the entire group, a record that only University College School
in London rivalled.48 The claims by Martin Wiener and Corelli Barnett that
public schools were hostile environments for the education of science were
not substantiated in this sample.
UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
The characteristic of university education reflected the traditional and central
dominance of Oxbridge. Professional training in science and engineering
required a university degree before further research could be undertaken.
Each individual's first degree in science was the only educational qualification
measured because British universities rarely offered postgraduate degrees
until after World War I leaving the first degree as a reliable indicator of where
an individual undertook his initial scientific training. The categories included
47 The definition of the public school that is used here is wider than the narrow label that was
often only applied to independent boarding schools and my definition includes day schools like
University College School. Graham Kalton, Appendix A' in The Public Schools: A Factua)
Survey, London: Longmans Green and Co. Ltd., 1966, pp. 143-145.
48 Eight members of this group (Sir John Rose Bradford, Baron Lindley, Sir G.l. Taylor, Sir
Walter Morley Fletcher, Sir Edward Albert Sharpey-Schafer, Herbert John Gough, Sir Edward
James Salisbury and Sir Francis Martin Rouse Walshe) were educated at University College
School.
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Oxbridge (which was undifferentiated), the Scottish universities, the provincial
universities, military institutions, universities in the dominions and all
institutions of further education in the metropolis. This inbuilt geographical
bias reflected the spatial hierarchy of status amongst universities in Great
Britain and the separate system of Scottish universities. Apart from London
and Oxbridge, the category of provincial universities included all universities
in England, Wales and Ireland.
TYPE OF	 NUMBER AT PROPORTION







The military category includes the Royal Military Academy and the Royal
Naval College at Devonport.
The importance of further education in the process of training which
transformed a student into a scientist is confirmed by the 94% who were
educated after school. The predominance of the elite universities was
obvious and the comfortable fit between the 45% who went to Oxbridge and
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the 40% who went to public schools supported the argument that the
socialisation process of the elite involved these two systems. The
percentages of the rest buttress the metropolitan and English bias within this
sample. However, in order to stress the ascendancy of Oxbridge, it was only
necessary to note that the twenty-six students or 13% of the sample who
attended Trinity College, Cambridge were more than all the students who
attended the Scottish universities or the provincial universities.
CAREER
The careers of these scientists were fragmented by the lack of a single
career path as employment opportunities encompassed the separate spheres
of government, the universities and industry. While academic posts as
Professors and Lecturers combining research and teaching were the model
of a scientific career, government service and industry allowed scientists in
the appropriate disciplines to combine posts or reorient their careers as
appropriate. This reflected the increasing financial and institutional
involvement of the state and industry in science especially after the First
World War. 49 This characteristic included all paid positions that each
individual scientist undertook during their entire career. The academic sector
was defined as a post in any university and government service as a post
within the civil service or within an institution financed by the state directly or
indirectly through a mediating body like the research councils. An industrial
post was self-employment or any salaried position within a company. If an
49 Peter Alter, Translated by Angela Davis, The Reluctant Patron: Science and the State in
Britain, 1850-1920, Oxford: Berg,1987; Michael Sanderson, The Universities and British
lndustty, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972, pp. 243-275.
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individual were to hold a post in more than one of these categories
consecutively or in combination, then they were entered in a composite
category reflecting the meanderings of their career.
TYPE OF	 NUMBER IN PROPORTION
CAREER	 THIS CAREER OF SAMPLE
Academic	 64	 32%







The tripartite model of involvement within the worlds of academe, industry or
government service accounted for 89% of the sample and validated its
potential for analysing the careers of scientists during this period. The sample
was predominantly employed in the universities or government with only two
private researchers amongst this group. 50 The importance of universities as
institutions for secure employment and research in the scientific profession
50 Sir James Jeans and Redcliffe Nathan Salaman were private researchers and Sir Thomas
Ralph Merton maintained a private physical laboratory while Professor of Spectroscopy at




was recognised by this sample since over three-quarters (76%) held an
academic post at some point during their career. The importance of
government service was highlighted by the 45% who entered this sector
whilst commerce came a poor third at 17%. While the boundary between
academe and government service was extremely permeable, that between
academe and commerce only accounted for 6% of this group and the
boundary between government service and commerce seems to have been
even more insurmountable with only 2% of this group spanning both worlds.
Individuals who worked in all three worlds were rare. The preponderance of
academe in partnership with the state could reflect an academic and
administrative bias built into the sample through the utilisation of an
Athenaeum membership biased towards the professions. The sample was
too small to construct any arguments concerning the attitudes of scientists to
industry and did not substantiate the traditional 'big picture' of pure science
untainted by industrial work.
HONOURS
The characteristic of 'Honours' described the recognition of the elite status of
men of science by themselves and in the wider community. This was the only
characteristic which provided a measurable indication of the political and
cultural acceptability of science. Honours external to the scientific community
during the interwar period meant the honours system, those distinctions
bestowed by the monarch. For the purposes of this group, three were
chosen: the knighthood, the hereditary peerage and the Order of Merit. The
knighthood signified membership of a recognised gentlemanly elite and the
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peerage conferred ascension into the traditional hereditary ruling class. A
hereditary peerage far surpassed a knighthood in formal and informal status.
The Order of Merit was an innovative honour, limited to a small number of
men and women and bestowed personally by the monarch on elitist and
meritocratic grounds.
Within the scientific community, honouring professional advancement took
two forms. Medals were rewarded for outstanding scientific work or in
recognition of a distinguished career. Professional leadership and eminence
was more often recognised by appointment or election to a leading post in
scientific societies and professional associations. Examples of the diversity
amongst the scientific organisations incorporated into this study include the
obscure Association of Economic Biologists, the local South-Eastern Union of
Scientific Societies and the respectable Royal Astronomical Society. The
British Association for the Advancement of Science and its constituent
sections were excluded on the grounds that it was a unique body
representative of the whole of the scientific community rather than specific
professions. Medals of the Royal Society were generally rewarded to its own
membership and the bias towards this organisation was partially rectified by
analysing medals from all other organisations in one category. The honour of
"Scientific Presidency" included all scientific organisations listed except for
the Royal Society in order to give an accurate measure of honours received
outside of the elite scientific institution.
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TYPE OF	 HONOURS PROPORTION
HONOURS	 REWARDED OF SAMPLE
Knighthood	 133	 67%
Peerage	 9	 5%
Royal Society Medal	 75	 38%
Scientific Presidency	 122	 62%
Other Medals	 65	 33%
Order of Merit	 13	 7%
Baronetcy	 8	 4%
None	 12	 6%
The high proportion of knighthoods amongst this group demonstrated that
this sample did not go unrecorded or unrecognised. However the low status
of science was inferred since few of the sample received the highest honours
as only 5% became peers and 4% gained a baronetcy. The proviso that
these honours might not have been rewarded for contributions to science
must also be taken into account. With their links to industry and government
service, scientists could have been rewarded for their services in their areas
and 20% had served in some capacity during both World Wars. Only 7%
received the Order of Merit and this was always awarded to the Presidency of
the Royal Society. For honours internal to the scientific community, most
members of this sample (62%) had been honoured with a leading post in a
scientific organisation. The diversity of the organisations to which these
individuals belonged demonstrated the diverse and fractured nature of the
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scientific empire. The number of medals awarded by the Royal Society (38%)
outweighed the number of medals from other organisations confirming that
the reward of Royal Society medals was heavily biased toward Fellows of the
Royal Society. These scientists did not suffer from a signal lack of honours
and only 6% within this sample were rewarded with nothing but few received
the highest honours which the nation could confer.
FATHER'S OCCUPATION
The final characteristic was the profession or the occupation of the father.
This characteristic was an indication of the socioeconomic status of the
individual's family background and provided a useful guide to their social
location. This sample cannot answer the general questions posed by Wiener
and Barnett but it can provide an indication of the social backgrounds for a
sample of elite scientists. Were they scions of the professions or of
businessmen? Was science a vehicle of social mobility or the pampered




























The second category includes all self-employed or salaried positions in
commerce, retail, industry and general management. The Skilled
Worker/Clerk category includes small retailers.




Lower Middle/Skilled Working Class
Rest
NUMBER	 PROPORTION







Nearly three-quarters of this sample were from a middle class background
and the majority of these hailed from the professions. Science was an
occupation which the sons of professionals, industrialists and merchants
chose as a secure career. Part of this stemmed from their ability to draw on
inherited capital.5l It is impossible from this sample to draw the conclusion
that science was an attractive escalator for upward social mobility, but during
a time of incipient class war and great social inequality, the fact that nearly a
fifth of this particular segment of the scientific elite came from the poorer and
disadvantaged sections of society speaks for itself.
4.4 Conclusion
The outstanding feature of this group in the composite picture drawn up by
this prosopographical analysis was the predominance of middle class
professionalism. Most members of this group came from middle class
backgrounds, were educated at public schools or grammar schools, attended
university to pass a degree in a scientific subject and finally filled an
academic post of some description. This small elite sample followed the
norms of a professional career and this was indicated through comparison
with Harold Perkin's analysis. He analysed the permanent secretaries of the
Civil Service, the Presidents of Professional Institutions, Senior Judges and
the Editors of national newspapers and periodicals. This analysis covered the
late Victorian and the Edwardian periods rather than the interwar period and
although the comparison was not like for like, the characteristics of public
schools and Oxbridge that were utilised, were either the same or broadly
51 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and
Socialists of the 1930s, London: Free Association Press, 1988 [19781, p. 22.
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similar.52 The results were grouped into four tables dealing with the Senior
Judges, the Professional Presidents, the National Newspaper! Periodical
Editors and the Civil Service Permanent Heads and these tables were
conventionally arranged into three columns: the relevant category, and the








































52 Harold Perkin, The Rise of Professional Society: England since 1880, London: Routledge,
1989, PP. 87-91; Other comparable statistics in reference to the entrance examinations for the
civil service can be found in J. Wertheimer, 'Science and Modern Languages in Civil Service
Examinations', Nature, vol. 99 (1917), p. 74.
53 The associations or institutions involved included the Institute of Chartered Accountants,
the Royal College of Physicians, the Royal College of Surgeons, the Institute of Civil












































These results demonstrated the predominance of the Oxbridge universities
and the public schools. Their influence reached its greatest extent in the Civil
Service where the upper class dominated and the public schools educated a
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staggering 87% of the permanent heads between 1880 and 1899. In
comparison to these professional groups, the proportion of scientists who
were educated at public or grammar school was almost the same at 63% as
the professional presidents and the editors. The middle class backgrounds of
the professional presidents and the editors at 56% and 55% respectively was
less than the sample where two-thirds grew up in the professional and
commercial middle classes. With these illustrated correspondences, the
sample stood out from other professions because of its social background
which was predominantly middle class or working class, but did not draw
upon the aristocracy. The educational experience of a public or grammar
school was supplemented by a far greater emphasis on university education
and science, unlike these other professions, provided some meritocratic
opportunities for upward social mobility.
Many individual members of this sample, including Lord Rutherford and Sir
Henry Tizard, were 'insiders' who worked within the civil service and
understood its needs and systems. Their training through school and
university entailed the inculcation of gentlemanly codes of conduct and
imperialist values that facilitated their entry as advisors and administrators
into these administrative and social circles. The majority of scientists
remained 'outsiders' who organised themselves into lobbying groups and
professional associations in order to attack their low status in the civil service
and raise their political profile. 54 Two of the most prominent were Hyman
54 Gary Werskey, "British Scientists and 'Outsider' Politics, 1931-1945", Science Studies,
vol.1 (1971), pp. 67-83; Gary Werskey, "Nature and Politics between the Wars", Nature, voL
224 (1969), pp. 462-472.
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Levy and Lancelot Hogben, communist scientists of working class
background, whose careers suffered or stood still as they promoted scientific
socialism during the interwar period.55 Their campaigns culminated in the
movement for the 'social relations of science', institutionalised as the British
Association's Division for the Social and International Relations of Science in
1937. This movement encompassed Werskey's socialists 'outsiders' and
moderate scientific liberals like Julian Huxley, Sydney Chapman and Sir
Richard Gregory who were all included in the prosopographical sample.
Beyond the insiders in government, many scientists were politicised into
liberal or socialist groupings which voiced their demand for a more scientific
society.56
55 Gary Werskey, The Visible College, pp. 101-131.
56 Robert E. Elmer, "The roots of political activism in British science", Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, vol. 32 (1976), pp. 25-29; P. G. Werskey, "The Perennial Dilemma of Science
Policy", Nature, vol. 233 (1971), pp. 529-532; M. D. King, "Science and the Professional
Dilemma" in Julius Gould, ed., Penguin Social Services Survey 1968, London: Penguin, 1968,
pp. 34-73; R. MacLeod and K. MacLeod, "The Social Relations of Science and Technology
1914-1 939" in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe. Volume 5: The
Twentieth Century-I, Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977, pp. 301-363; Neal
Wood, Communism and British Intellectuals, London: Victor Gollancz, 1959, pp. 121-151;
William McGucken, Scientists, Society and State: The Social Relations of Science Movement
in Britain, 1931-1947, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1984.
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Chapter Five
"A QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE": PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND
THE 'RADIUM PROBLEM' IN THE 1920S
5.1 Introduction
The supply and utilisation of radium was forcefully contested amongst
scientists, physicians and surgeons during the interwar period, especially
between the Medical Research Council (MRC) and the professional
practitioners of the Royal Colleges. This case-study examines the conflict
between the Presidents of the Royal Colleges, Lords Dawson and
Moynihan, and Sir Walter Fletcher, Secretary of the MRC, in order to draw
out the gentlemanly obligations and cultural assumptions that precipitated
their vitriolic exchange. Their hostility involved 'insider' scientists and
shaped two important discussions on radium policy in the civil service: the
establishment of the subcommittee on radium supply in 1928 and the
unofficial flurry of meetings at the Athenaeum Club in 1933 which were
instrumental in establishing the Radium Beam Therapy Research Board.1
Both episodes have been analysed in passing as parts of larger studies
on the role of Lord Rutherford in politics and the development of radiology
during the interwar period.2
The history of interwar medicine has concentrated upon the fractious and
1 "National Radium: The Annual Reports", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [October 21,
1933], pp. 746-748, 748.
2 David Wilson, Rutherford: Simple Genius, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1983, pp. 480-
482; David Cantor, "The MRC's support for experimental radiology during the interwar
years" in Joan Austoker and Linda Bryder, eds., Historical Perspectives on the Role of the
MRC: Essays in the Histoiy of the Medical Research Council of the United Kingdom and
its predecessor, the Medical Research Committee, 1913-1953, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989, pp. 181-204.
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complex relationships between clinicians and men of science, clinical
practice and laboratory research, the Royal Colleges and the universities
or the MRC. "Revisionist historians" who have examined the "peculiarly
difficult passage of continental experimental science, notably physiology,
into the British medical curriculum" have portrayed a conflict between
clinicians and scientists over the field of education:
Anti-vivisectionist sentiments, the natural theological
tradition, and a long-established preference for anatomy over
physiology, meant that many British clinicians snubbed the
aftempt to introduce the experimental sciences to medical
students and denied the claim that these disciplines had
relevance to the practice of med icine.3
David Cantor, the historian of radiology during the intertsar çeriod, fits into
the schematic of the revisionists with his description of the conflicts
between the investigators of the MRC and the clinicians of the Royal
Colleges.4
5.2 The 'Radium Problem' in the 1920s
Radium was first revealed to the world in 1898 by Henri Becquerel and
Pierre and Marie Curie as part of their researches into the phenomenon of
radioactivity. It was identified as one of the substances that imparted
3 Christopher Lawrence, "Incommunicable Knowledge: Science, Technology and the
Clinical Art in Britain 1850-1914", Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 20 (1985), pp.
503-520, 504.
4 David Cantor, The definition of radiobiology: The Medical Research Council's support for
research into the biological effects of rediation in Britain, 19 19-1939, Unpublished PhD
thesis. Lancaster University, 1987.
113
radioactivity to Czechoslovakian pitchblende, the other being polonium.5
After Roentgen's announcement, X-rays were applied to medical problems
and interested parties soon extended the exploration of these therapeutic
possibilities to radioactive substances so that by the turn of the century,
radium "was already being used for the treatment of superficial malignant
growths". 6 The story of radium's medical application is described as one of
gradual extension and "disrepute". Its lack of use in the last few years
preceding the Great War was attributed in 1928 by Professor G. E. Gask,
Director of the Surgical Unit at Saint Bartholomew's Hospital, to a failure
by practitioners to apply the practices of clinical science. "For the most
part accurate details of the exact nature of the disease treated, the
method of application, and the dosage were lacking." 7 Gask was reading
the standards of interwar radium therapy back into the period before the
War.
Radium had been acquired for military purposes and was released to the
Medical Research Committee in 1919. As a radioactive substance with a
half-life of over one thousand years, radium was the only element which
disintegrated over a long period. The gamma rays that radium emitted had
a greater penetrating power than X-rays due to their shorter wavelength
and this property was considered to hold great promise for the treatment
of deep-seated tumours untreatable by the surface application of rays.8
The gas radon, a byproduct of radium emission, was also useful as a
5 Professor Sidney Russ, "The Experimental Basis of Radium Therapy in Cancer", British
Medical Journal, vol. i [May 5, 1928], pp. 903-904, 903.
6 Ibid.
7 C. E. Cask, "An Address on Radium in the Treatment of Malignant Disease", British
Medical Journal, vol. i [April 28, 1928], pp. 843-847, 843.
8 "The Value of Massive Radiation: Final Report of the Conference on Radium", The
Lancet, vol. 224 [January 7, 1933], pp. 44-47, 44.
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shortlived and more portable tool for the treatment of malignant disease, a
medical term to describe the diverse forms of cancer. The five grammes
available were concentrated at the Middlesex Hospital in order to establish
the usefulness of radium in combating cancer. Radium was scarce and
expensive but five grammes, nine percent of the country's total supply in
1922, demanded strong justification for its concentration in one
experimental programme. 9 This justification was not forthcoming and
dispersal amongst metropolitan and regional hospitals followed. This
radium was supervised by the MRC's Radiology Committee which wished
to pursue the effectiveness of radium in curing tumours.
Cancer was increasingly invading the public realm. There were reports of
a rising mortality rate and the establishment of the British Empire Cancer
Campaign in 1923 as a rival to the Imperial Cancer Research Fund
propelled public awareness. 10 Funding required a greater public profile
and the reported increase in the mortality rate of cancer by twenty percent
since 1901 led to the raising of questions in Parliament. 11 The elevation of
cancer to the level of a 'problem' had repercussions for the status of
radium in the clinical sphere. The use of radium had been opposed by
some surgeons who attacked its effectiveness as a therapeutic agent.l2
However public anxiety and pressure from other constituencies of
9 David Cantor, "The MRC's support for experimental radiology during the interwar
period", p. 184. The five grammes of radium cost £72500 at £14500 per gram. Prices of
radium had fallen from £36 per milligram in 1914 to £22 per milligram in 1922. However,
"the huge cost of radium ensured supplies were limited. Indeed, so scarce was radium
that no other comparable quantity of it was available for purely research purposes."
10 Joan Austoker, A History of the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 1902-1986, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 78-90.
11 David Cantor, "The MRC's support for experimental radiology during the interwar
period", p. 185.
12 "The Demand For Radium", The Lancet, vol. 215 [July 21, 1928], pp. 127-128. "Indeed
it may be said that for ten years after the introduction of the treatment the large majority of
the medical profession was sceptical of the value of radium in malignant treatment."
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clinicians had directed the MRC's research programme with radium
towards clinical rather than experimental research. Therefore radium
therapy became the dominant area of clinical research in cancer during
the nineteen-twenties and a contested area within the community of
surgeons. 13
Traditional methods for the palliation and cure of cancer had been
predominantly surgical. Success depended upon the operability of the
tumour and if this did not meet the criteria of the surgeon, his diagnosis
and inability to act was usually a death sentence for the patient. Radium
was considered to be a promising therapeutic approach because it could
be applied to inoperable tumours and shrink them down to managable
size. It also reduced the need for traditional surgical methods with some
cancers. Surgeons who cooperated with the MRC like H. S. Souttar or G.
E. Gask devised new methods of utilising radium or imported techniques
from long-standing centres on the continent. By the late nineteen-twenties
the accepted methods were the surface application of the substance or its
insertion into needles which were then placed around an internal tumour
through a technique known as the 'surgery of access' in order to bathe it in
a uniform radiation. 14 Carcinomas of the tongue, breast and rectum were
accessible to this form of treatment whereas brain tumours, cancer of the
oesophagus and other internal organs remained inaccessible. Such
techniques required the combined skills of physics and surgery since
13 David Cantor, 'The MRC's support for experimental radiology during the interwar
period", pp. 185-1 89.
14 C. E. Gask, "An Address on Radium in the Treatment of Malignant Disease", p. 844.
"The needle consists of a sealed glass tube in which is placed the required amount of
radium, the tube is inserted into a container made of some metal, such as platinum, silver
or aluminium." J. Joly of Trinity College, Dublin did write to claim priority on the use of
needles in radium therapy, stating that the technique had been used in Ireland since 1914.
J. Joly, "Radium and Cancer", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [December 29, 1928], p.
1367.
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surgeons had to calculate the dosage of radium required as well as
placing the needles in the correct position to ensure that the tumour
received a uniform radiation. Its advocates were quick to compare the
success of these new techniques with the traditional operations. "If,
therefore, a method other than operation is adopted, it will not find itself in
competition with any very efficient means of treatment, and the results will
be bad indeed if they are worse than those of operation."l5 The MRC had
to popularise the effectiveness of radium amongst a sceptical audience of
surgeons whilst policing the boundaries of radium units to promote
expertise in its use.16 This campaign was successful as an increasing
number of surgeons adopted the techniques of radium therapy leading to
greater pressure on resources and increasing controversy about claims to
expertise by many of these converts.17
This pressure upon such scarce resources led to demands for
rationalisation in the supply of radium. From 1928, concerned clinicians
were including plans for the national supply and distribution of radium in
their articles. 18 The Lancet publicised this concern: "Taking our own
country as an example, there is no doubt that we are under-supplied with
radium for medical purposes..." The cause was due to "the increased
confidence now being placed in radium, and [the Ministry of Health] are
also aware that in the not very distant future pressure may be put upon
15 Geoffrey Keynes, Radium Treatment of Primary carcinoma of the Breast", British
Medical Journal, vol. ii [July21, 19281, PP. 108-111, 111.
16 Such fears were not unwarranted since rare and dangerous scientific machinery like X-
ray equipment had been supervised by, amongst others, an honorary dentist and a theatre
beadle. Christopher Lawrence, op cit., 514.
17 'Radium For Cancer", The Lancet, vol. 214 [May 12, 1928], pp. 973-974.
18 G. E. Gask, "An Address on Radium in the Malignant Treatment of Cancer", p. 847;
"League of Nations: An Inquiry into the Radiotherapy of Cancer", The Lancet, vol. 215
[July 7, 1928], pp. 34-35; Spencer Mort, "Radiotherapy of Cancer", The Lancet, vol. 215
[July 21, 1928], p.147; "The Demand For Radium", p.128.
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those in authority to assist in procuring it in response to urgent requiral."19
The Government was viewed as the only authority that could resolve the
problem of supply. The radium lobby began by targeting the duty payable
on imported radium through parliamentary questions and public articles.
After an article in The Lancet the Treasury waived the tariff payable on
radium imports for six months and this waiver remained intact until the
establishment of the National Radium Trust. 2° The subject was prioritised
by the Ministry of Health in May 1928 and after consultation with
interested departments, a solution to departmental overlapping was found
through the establishment of a Committee on Radium as a Sub-
Committee of the Committee on Civil Research. 21 The Committee's report
led directly to the foundation of the National Radium Fund where any
money raised through public funding would be matched pound-for-pound
by a contribution from the Government up to a maximum of one hundred
thousand pounds.
The year 1928 could be highlighted as an 'annus mirabilis' for all forms of
radiotherapy since the scattered local centres experimenting with radium
and X-rays were replaced by a national system of supply and records,
whilst the amount of radium held in the country soared overnight. This
encouragement for the foundation of new institutions was sponsored by
the Government, responding to public demands. Not only was the money
raised supplemented by the Government, but the resulting bodies which
held and dispensed this resource were set up by Royal Charter as the
19 "The Demand Of Radium", p. 127.
20 "Radium for Cancer", p. 973; "Annotations", The Lancet, vol. 214 [May 19, 1928], p.
1028; "Import Duty on Radium compounds", The Lancet, vol. 216 [February 16, 1929], p.
369; "Duties on Radium Compounds", The Lancet, vol. 216 [Feb ruary 23, 1929], p. 421.
21 The correspondence concerning the establishment of the Radium Sub-Committee can
be found in PRO FD 1/4454 marked "British Radium Supply".
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National Radium Trust and the Radium Commission. 22 The Mount Vernon
Hospital, which specialised in the care of patients suffering from
tuberculosis, was allowed by Act of Parliament, to change its terms of
reference, to the care of patients suffering from malignant disease. This
hospital became a centre for radiotherapy and combined with the Radium
Institute to form the National Post-Graduate School of Radiotherapy. 23 By
1930, the Radium Commission had identified and loaned radium to a
number of centres covering a large proportion of the British Isles. Its
conditions for the loan were determined by the desire to promote expertise
in the use of radium and the need for a standardised statistical collection
of all cases treated. All centres had to employ a Radium Officer to
supervise radiotherapy and had to use summary cards of all cases with an
efficient follow-up system in order to determine the efficacy of radium
therapy.24 This system continued to expand during the five years of this
study, establishing both natonaI and regona centres for the deo')rrsnt
of radium therapy and playing a central role in the development of radium
beam therapy.
All actions concerning radium took place within a public domain. The
subject was discussed amongst interested actors within their various
institutional and professional fora: the Medical Research Council, the
interinstitutional conferences, the hospitals and the professional journals
22 The body was called the National Radium Trust rather than the Royal Radium Trust
because the Government wished to emphasise the national and popular contribution to
this appeal which would be used for the welfare of the entire country. For this reason the
body was placed under a Royal Charter, signifying 'establishment' approval whilst
guaranteeing independence from the Government.
23 "The Mount Vernon Hospital", The Lancet, vol. 223, [July 16, 1932], p. 143; "The
Teaching of Radium Therapy: The Mount Vernon and Radium Institute", The Lancet, vol.
218 [April 5, 1930], p. 783; "A Course in Radium", The Lancet, vol. 218, [June 28, 1930],
pp. 1413-1414.
24 F. G. Spear and K. Griffiths, The Radium Commission: A Short History of its Origin and
Work, 1929-1948, London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1951, pp. 40-43, 48-52.
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of The Lancet, the British Medical Journal and the Journal of Radiology.
That the issue burst the boundaries of professional interest and attracted
greater prominence was demonstrated by the attention of The Times and
the regularity which parliamentary questions on radium were tabled.
Medical journalists were already writing newspaper articles on radium as a
new cure for cancer that rendered surgery obsolescent and that
thousands of people were dying because there were insufficient stocks of
the element to treat those suffering from malignant disease. 25 These
"propagandists" excited concern amongst cautious experts who responded
through letters and articles. These claims were described as "mischievous
claptrap" and as a "fog of misrepresentation".26
The representation and reception of the knowledge of radium within the
public realm is beyond the scope of this case-study. The importance of the
public pressure upon the actors involved is a factor that needs to be borne
in mind. That a large part of the literate public was aware of the c'Iaims
made for radium in the treatment of malignant disease is without question.
Public awareness was raised by the fundraising drives for the purchase of
radium by hospitals and charities. 27 The bequests of money for the
purchase of radium were publicised, especially if the donation came from
a reputable source. 28 The public donations to the appeal for the National
Radium Trust overran the government target of £100,000 by some
25 Malcolm Donaldson, "Radium and Cancer", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [December 1,
1928], p. 1008.
26 "Radium, Cancer, and the Public", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [December 1, 1928],
pp. 999-1000.
27 "Increasing Demand for Radium Treatment", The Lancet, vol. 215 [Dec.ember 1,
1928], p.1122.
28 "Gift for the Purchase of Radium", The Lancet, vol. 215 [December 1, 1928], p. 1114;
"Gifts for the Purchase of Radium", The Lancet, vol. 215 [December 29, 1928], p. 1369;
"Gifts of Radium to Hospitals", The Lancet, vol. 217 [August 17, 1929], p. 359; "Gift of
£50,000 for Radium for Hospitals in London", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [December 8,
1928], p. 1063. The last donation was offered by Sir Otto Beit.
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£50,000. The status of the Radium Appeal was enhanced through its link
with the King Edward Hospital Fund and by representing the donation as a
thanksgiving for King George V's recovery from a serious illness. Public
concern over malignant disease was expressed through the press and
through their charitable gifts. The respectability of radium as a subject
worthy of concern was guaranteed by the linkage of the cause with the
leadership role of the monarchy in the charitable sphere. As such it was a
subject worthy of The Times, the voice of the upper middle class.
5.3 The Royal Colleges and the Medical Research Council
This section examines the Royal Colleges of London and the 'inner world'
of the research agencies. Through a series of articles on the role of
laboratories, one can analyse their differing conceptions of science and
how this affected the relationship between the Royal Colleges and the
MRC. Finally, by studying the establishment of the Radium Committee as
a subcommittee of the Committee of Civil Research, one can view how the
government machinery dealt with a problem, rendered urgent by public
pressure, that required the importation of experts.
According to Gerald Geison, the Royal College of Physicians and the
Royal College of Surgeons were dominated by an Oxbridge elite. These
licensing bodies ensured that their elites would conform to the ideal
gentlemanly type, distinguishable by background, education, wealth,
bearing and character:
Although the ultimate motive was scarcely less pragmatic,
medical education of the ancient universities was
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distinguished by its classical emphasis. Among the Anglican
elite, it was a self-serving article of faith that only a classical
education guaranteed learning, culture and character; and it
was largely because they satisfied this condition that Oxford
and Cambridge men enjoyed their special privileges in the
Royal College of Physicians.. 29
The medical professions were subjected to the same process of
gentlemanly professionalisation that transformed all the other ancient
professions during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Examinations
and educational standards were instituted to quantify and improve
standards of medical practice. The establishment of such reforms is
comprehensible when "considered in terms of their [the doctors']
cultivation of respectability and intellectuality, their professional
organisation, their praise of meritocracy and their apparent aloofness from
the struggle for income". 30 Christopher Lawrence has identified a strand of
the metropolitan medical profession who incorporated and maintained the
gentlemanly values of the Oxbridge medical elite of the nineteenth century
in their practices. They worked in the voluntary hospitals of London but
moved in the social circles of 'society' which provided their fee-paying
clients. These clients chose their doctors on the criteria of gentlemanly
suitability rather than professional expertise. Such doctors disparaged
specialisation and expertise while praising a classical and generalist
education that imbued character. Their profession was an art. Clinical skill
was an indefinable quality, imparted by experience and only available to
29 Gerald L. Geison, Michael Foster and the Cambridge School of Physiology: The
Scientific Enterprise in Late Victorian Society, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Unversity
Press, 1978, p. 28.
30 christopher Lawrence, op cit., p. 503.
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available to those who could fill the role of the gentleman. "It [clinical skilil
was used to show that only the gentleman, broadly educated, and soundly
read in the classics, could be equipped for the practice of medicine. The
equation almost ran: perfect gentlemen alone made great clinicians."31
Such attitudes were considered old-fashioned by the interwar period
although many older practitioners were still capable of articulating such
statements.
The domination of Cambridge amongst the medical elite was waning by
the turn of the century. The Presidents of the Royal Colleges, with whom
Sir Walter Fletcher had to negotiate, did not belong to the dreaming
spires. For example, Baron Moynihan of Leeds, President of the Royal
College of Surgeons, whose father was a decorated army captain, was
educated at Christ's Hospital and the Royal Naval School in New Cross.
From these minor public schools, he graduated to the Leeds Medical
School, hoping to become an army doctor. He undertook professional
training within hospitals and followed a career as a registrar and
researcher before gaining a more prestigious position in Edwardian
England as professor of clinical surgery at the University of Leeds. Keen
to advance his profession. Moynihan established the British Journal ol
Surgery and founded the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and
Ireland in 1920. These professionals spoke with a gentlemanly voice; their
identities conforming to the Oxbridge archetype. Moynihan viewed his
medical skills as an art as well as a science, utilising the same discourse
as his predecessors. His immodest ideal surgeon, possibly based upon
himself, was "a handsome man of distinguished presence, a man of wide
31 /bid., p. 505.
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knowledge and general culture, a man of great technical skill and sound
judgement, and a man of compassionate heart". 32 The gentleman-
surgeon would embody the qualities of dignity and character, a lack of
specialisation and a chivalrous nature. Even during the interwar period,
the medical elite subscribed to the professional values of the Victorians,
denigrating newly established specialisms and the notion of the expert.
The civil service was far more variegated and plural than the medical
profession. The First World War had vastly expanded its institutional
watch over the country, so that individuals would now encounter the 'state'
in a greater variety of forms (in both senses of the word), agencies,
regulations and officials. As the upper reaches of the civil service were
transformed from departmental clerks into a mandarin caste, so the
permeable and porous membrane that allowed entrance to promising
outsiders like William Beveridge or Walter Morley Fletcher sealed itself up
after the war. The permanent secretaries, of a classical, generalist bent
and public school, Oxbridge background ensured that the system would
reproduce such a civil servant while downgrading the expert or scientific
officer to a subordinate, or even better, advisory role. Such views on the
superiority of the administrative class to the scientific officer remained
extant even after the invasion of specialists during the Second World War.
This is vividly depicted by the note, 'Points in favour of the Administrator,
as contrasted with the Specialist', which was described by Peter
Hennessy as the "one [file] that takes the prize for smugness, narrowness,
32 w. R. Le Fanu, "Berkeley George Andrew Moynihan", The Dictionary of National
Biography, 1931-1940, London: Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 633-635, 635.
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arrogance and restrictive practice". 33 Its listing of the advantages of
generalism vis-a-vis expertise was an amalgamation of the contributions
of a majority of the permanent secretaries.
What distinguished minor departments and agencies like the Department
of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) or the Medical Research
Council was their peculiar detachment from the heartlands of Whitehall
geography. Neither body, nor their later companion, the Agricultural
Research Council (ARC), were under the direct supervision of a
Government Minister or the administrative class. All three were placed
under the supervision of the Privy Council. Committees, chaired by the
Lord President, maintained a watchful but intermittent eye over their
activities. The DSIR was the most similar in structure to a government
department. Its Secretary was appointed by the Lord President and,
instead of functioning merely as a grant-making body, the department
maintained a number of scientific establishments including the National
Physical Laboratory. The Medical Research Council, on the other hand,
administered far more grants and maintained far fewer permanent
facilities. Its Secretary was not appointed by the Lord President and,
because it was not a government department, it hired staff who were not
civil servants. As an institution, it maintained close ties with the
universities and hospitals which held its research units, infiltrating by
33 The note reads: " 'Wider viewpoints. Duty to keep in mind greater variety of
considerations. The specialist's contribution to policy (if any) is confined to specialist
considerations: administrator must take account of these and others too.'
'Greater versatility: must be capable of being switched from one job to another with quite
different content.'
'More wear and tear. Takes main impact of Ministerial, Parliamentary and PAC [Public
Accounts Committee] requirements. 'Cushions' and 'carries the can for' the specialists.'
'Recruitment is much more selective: the average AP entrant is a superior article to the
average SO [Scientific Officer] entrant." Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London: Fontana
Press, 1990 [1989], p. 159.
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stealth the existing framework of academic and clinical research.
The role of the expert within the civil service had been studied by the wide
ranging review under Richard Burdon Haldane whose report was passed
onto David Lloyd-George's office the week before Christmas in 1918. The
Haldane Committee, otherwise known as the machinery-of-government
inquiry, had recommended amongst its other radical changes, that the
expert should have a voice in every Ministry through a centralised Ministry
of Research. The general principle, upon which these proposals were built
up, was the independence of specialists to administer their own affairs
and to implement policy as and when it was required. Instead of Whitehall
taming the lions of the professions, Haldane advocated Daniel entering
the lions' den. 34 However these proposals were not taken up. The
scientific research that government financed remained piecemeal but
these research bodies gave the scientific and medical professions a
unique voice in determining the flow of government funds for civil
research. It was this voice that the scientific lobby had campaigned for
before the First World War. In practice, the Lord President rarely chaired
these committees and these research bodies were given a unique
independence in policy terms. 35 Financially, of course, they danced to the
tune of the stringent Treasury. Scientists always called for more money
but, through their strategy of concentrating upon civil research while
making little or no effort to demand a greater input into policy-making, they
did little to elevate the role of the specialist and effectively guaranteed
34 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, London: Fontana Press, 1990, PP. 292-299; Philip J.
Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980, pp. 24-
27.
35 The committee of the Privy Council that supervised the work of the MRC met once
during the interwar period.
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their marginalisation from the mainstream in Whitehall.36
The civil servants of the MRC and DSIR could not participate in the
accepted career structure of the government ministries. The hegemony of
the administrative class and their generalist ideology effectively left these
two bodies as isolated institutions. The secretaries of the Medical
Research Council, Sir Walter Morley Fletcher and Sir Edward Mellanby
were specialists brought in from outside because of their reputations for
combining research expertise with managerial capability. The same is true
for their counterpart at the DSIR. Sir Henry Tizard returned to the civil
service after a short time as a consultant in the petroleum industry. 37 This
bureaucratic marginalisation was not recognised by these actors as such.
They had no wish to invade the citadels of Whitehall, nor were they
sympathetic to the calls for a rational and scientific civil service. These
echoes of the pie-war mania for 'national efficiency' were continued by the
scientific network in which Sir Richard Gregory played a key role. 38 This
network spanned the lobbies of the British Science Guild and the
Association of Scientific Workers for whom the staff of the MRC and DSIR
was stony ground. The civil servants were more concerned with the need
to build up a programme of research in their respective medical and
scientific spheres. The leading civil servants in these government bodies
had a wide latitude of action without the pressure of ministerial need or
36 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, pp. 291-299; Philip J. Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall,
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980, pp. 22-28
37 Tizard's successor, Sir Frank Smith, could be described as a scientific civil servant
since his career involved the supervision of government research as an Assistant at the
National Physical Laboratory (1900-1920), as a Director of the Scientific Research and
Experimental Department at the Admiralty (1920-1 929) and as the Secretary of the DSIR
(1929-1939). He then acted as a scientific advisor to Anglo-Iranian Oil and as a Director of
the Birmingham Small Arms Company Ltd..
38 G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political
Thought, 1899-1914, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981.
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parliamentary accountability and their expectation of a knighthood was a
one-to-one bet.
These bodies can be viewed through Jennifer Beinart's concept of an
'inner world' which she used to analyse the problem-area of imperial
sickness. The succession of committees, dealing with issues in this field,
was her focus of study. Their day-to-day functioning was "an inner world,
often remote from the realities of life and disease among millions of
Britain's colonial subjects." 39 In the same vein, the MRC and its
constituent committees would examine a programme of research, an
issue or a problem without reference to "the social, economic and political
problems."40 The concept has two senses which are useful here. The first
is the world of the civil service committee which abstracted a problem or a
subject as a special area upon which it built its own expertise and raison
d'etre. The committee drew its members into a temporary community that
would meet at a designated time and place in order to change the world
from behind closed doors. Its recommendations or decisions would have
some consequence. The committee was not only focussed upon the 'inner
world' as a subject but could also become an 'inner world' socially, with an
internal existence that was no longer immediate to the context upon which
it depended. Beinart's concept captures the institutional and social
boundaries that gave a committee and its members freedom of action and
additionally extends itself to a second sense specific to the interwar
period. A committee of specialists would draw upon scientific and medical
ideologies that purposefully excluded political, economic or social
39 Jennifer Beinart, "The inner world of imperial sickness: the MRC and research in
tropical medicine" in Joan Austoker and Linda Bryder, eds., Historical Perspectives on the
Role of the MRC, p.110.
40 Ibid.
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perspectives. This 'inner world' was ideological as well as institutional,
since the remit of the research committee was focussed upon the
development and application of scientific and medical knowledge.
The committee was a closed body with strict criteria for entry whose
existence depended upon the administrative machinery that found it
useful as a tool to explore an unknown, solve a problem or delay a
decision. To study a committee therefore demands knowledge of the
context which provided its justification, of the interests and strategies
which it served and as a bureaucratic device which functioned as a space
where groups could contest and cooperate before coming to some degree
of resolution. One should differentiate between the shades of committee,
from the temporary working body limited to the management of a
department to the sometimes permanent and always prestigious Royal
Commission.
Our concern is with the MRC committee of which three types can be
discerned. The first was the interdepartmental committee, where the
problem-area required the cooperation of two or more government
departments. An example is the Colonial Medical Research Committee,
sponsored by the Colonial Office and the MRC, which foundered due to
the development of rival committees that included its remit. 41 The second
was the standing specialist committee that drafted recommendations for a
particular field of research and coopted specialists as members in order to
ensure a dialogue between the government agency and the specialists
within this concern. Such a committee could defuse potentially explosive
41 /bid., pp. 114-115.
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areas of conflict between the MRC and a particular profession. The
MRC's Radiology Committee is a good example of this type. The third
type was the external committee where the MRC was represented so that
the originating group or groups could ensure a response to their proposals
by the MRC in private. Examples include the Radium Beam Therapy
Research Board and the Radium Conference of 1931-1933. All such
committees could develop a corporate existence, with their own language
and perspective that separated members from their respective groups and
fostered a certain identification with the aims and proposals of the
committee. Such an identification would depend upon the commitment of
the member to the committee and its goals.
The 'inner world' of the MRC committee was bounded by the scientific
policies put forward by the Secretary of the MRC, Sir Walter Morley
Fletcher. Fletcher held decided views on the primacy of experimenaJ
science that directed his policies on medical research and brought him
into disagreement and, on occasion, open conflict with the Royal
Colleges. He wished to give the MRC a dominant role in coordinating
medical research throughout the United Kingdom under his guiding hand.
This reflected his own central position among "government, medical,
academic and scientific circles" that had developed during the
extraordinary situation of the First World War.42 He was alert to the
encroachment of government and private bodies onto the playing fields of
medical research and argued that such enterprises should be channelled
through the MRC. This led him into departmental battles with the Ministry
42 Joan Austoker, "Walter Morley Fletcher and the origins of a basic biomedical research
policy" in Joan Austoker and Linda Bryder, eds., Historical Perspectives on the Role of the
MRC, pp. 23-24.
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of Health and stormy relations with the British Empire Cancer
Campaign.43 Such hostilities were often initiated over Fletcher's
unwillingness to consider clinicians as proper supervisors for research
projects. "His views on medical research differed radically from the
opinions of those in the daily routine of clinical medicine and the care of
patients, and his vigorous criticisms and intolerance of medical practice
did not endear him to many in Harley Street."44
His conception of science conformed to the professional ideal of
mainstream science and indicated his membership of the scientific
establishment. While attending the opening of the [Sir Patrick] Manson
Lecture Theatre on November 20th 1930, Fletcher "spoke on the
inspiration of Sir Patrick Manson" and on his position in "that wonderful
galaxy" to which all eminent Victorian men of science eventually ascended
to.45 He carefully separated Manson's role as clinician from his role as
man of science and implied that a clinical scientist was a contradiction in
terms:
He [Manson] showed that the clinician dealing with disease
must be prepared himself, if he is to advance knowledge, to
give his own time and to acquire his own skill in pursuing his
observations by the technical methods of the laboratory and
in testing his results by the method of experiment.
Fletcher clearly indicated that medical science was a moral enterprise that
43 Ibid., pp. 25, 28-29.
44 Ibid., p. 24.
45 "The Hospital for Tropical Diseases. Opening of New Wards, Laboratories, and
Manson Lecture Theatre", The Lancet, vol. 219, [November 29, 19301, pp. 927-928, 927.
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could only produce knowledge through laboratory experiments. Manson
was commemorated as a man of science because he embodied the
values of science. He sacrificed his professional life, "giving up time from
work of immediate profit in order to read and think, observe, describe, and
experiment in his own laboratory." Near the end of his address, Fletcher
clearly summed up these values as a "burning zeal and self-sacrificing
altruism" that "made their professional practice the servant of their
scientific work."46 This address clarified his own allegiance to the idealistic
rhetoric of pure science that represented professional scientific work as a
moral service to expand the corpus of mankind's knowledge. Particular to
Fletcher's own articulation of this professional ideology was an emphasis
upon the importance of the laboratory and a moral privileging of scientific
work over the quotidian practice of clinicians.
Fletcher was facing oppositional currents to his ambitions amongst the
clinical community. Lord Moynihan, President of the Royal College of
Surgeons was one of many amongst the community of eminent clinicians,
both surgeons and physicians, who attacked Fletcher's aims and methods
both directly and obliquely. One of the most successful strategies of these
like-minded clinicians was the establishment of the British Empire Cancer
Campaign in 1923 to solicit donations for scientific research into cancer
under their direction rather than under the men of science (mainly
physiologists) who dominated the halls of the MRC and the laboratories of
the Imperial Cancer Research Fund. 47 This was made clear by the
purposefully controversial speech of Moynihan while opening the Banting
46 Ibid.
47 Joan Austoker, Histotyof the Imperial Cancer Research Fund, 1902-1986, pp. 80-83.
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Research Institute at the University of Toronto. 48 Through a historical and
philosophical account of scientific methods, he asserted that Medicine
was the "parent of all sciences" and that clinical science had greater
status than laboratory experiments.49 His philosophical justification,
seeded with references to Poincare and Mach, depended upon a
distinction between two types of scientific method, the inductive
Hippocratic and the deductive Galenic. The Hippocratic method was one
of observation and formed the basis of diagnosis, the art at the heart of
the role of the physician. Moynihan articulated the procedures of
diagnosis in a philosophical dissection of the medical profession while
presenting an ideal archetype that could undertake this "scientific
procedure of the most austere and arduous kind". 50 Diagnosis had to take
account of the complexities of a medical case where the physician could
not control the natural phenomena and had to weigh up a large number of
factors in coming to a conclusion. From such arguments was he able to
detail a clinical science based on the Hippocratic method and its
methodological and practical superiority to Galenic experiments.
Observation is, indeed, the first act in scientific procedure
and the last act also. Experiment plays its most necessary
part in intermediate stages, but is throughout subject both to
initial direction and to final control, either to renunciation and
acceptance.51
48 Lord Moynihan, 'The Work of Laboratories", The Lancet, vol. 219, [December 27,
1930], pp. 1103-1104, 1104. Lord Moynihan wrote, "to produce such an effect on him
[Fletcher] and those like-minded with him was indeed my hope and firm intention, and I
rejoice greatly at his unsolicited testimony to my success."
49 Lord Moynihan, "The Science of Medicine", The Lancet, vol. 219, [October 11, 1930],
pp. 779-785.,779
50 Ibid., p. 782.
51 Ibid., pp. 781-782.
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Surgeons and their science were accorded a philosophical primacy and an
educational status that experimental investigators did not have "owing to
the comparative simplicity of the arranged enquiry [the experiment]".52
This philosophical exposition was merely the foundation for Moynihan's
controversial attack on the physiological community. He drew a distinction
between experiments on humans and animals; one was an expression of
clinical science, the other of physiology. He considered every operation to
be an experiment and the observant surgeon could find some new
anatomical phenomenon or improve a technique in even the simplest
cases if he was sufficiently keen to utilise the Hippocratic method.
Whereas the concentration of physiologists upon animal experiments had
left a wide gulf between their research and the problems that the clinicians
faced. Moynihan pessimistically argued that surgical progress was
impeded by their lack of knowledge on anatomical functions as opposed
to structures which Lord Lister had comprehensively opened up. For
neglecting the needs of the surgeons, the physiologists were accused of
"remoteness", "playing truant", of being "aloof", "laggard" and suffering
from "somnolence". 53 Moynihan's remedies to this situation included
Chairs of Human Physiology, new research institutes where clinicians and
laboratory workers could labour together and a reform of the MRC. The
MRC would be reorientated away from the biomedical sciences to the
clinical sciences through increased clinical representation on the Council.
Such utterances were designed to antagonise Fletcher.
Fletcher's relations with the clinical community were poor and veered
52 Ibid., p. 780.
53 Ibid., pp. 782-784.
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between the hot wars of angry correspondence and the low intensity
conflicts of mutual antagonism throughout the nineteen-twenties. This
hostility provided part of the framework within which the developments of
radium policy were mapped out. The cause lay in the different and
irreconciliable goals of the College Presidents, Lords Dawson and
Moynihan, and the Secretary of the MRC. The College Presidents sought
a consultative role on the direction of scientific research in medicine
equivalent to that of the Royal Society of London and the MRC.54
Moreover, Moynihan "deeply resented" the lack of recognition of his
research by the scientific community since he was never considered for
membership of the Royal Society.55 Such demands were anathema to
Fletcher who would only support those clinicians, like Manson, who
pursued orthodox research in laboratories in cooperation with a
respectable institution like the Royal Society or the MRC. He had no
difficulty in supporting such clinicians like Sir Thomas Lewis or the
surgeons working with radium under the aegis of the MRC since they
conformed to his definition of scientific practice.
This conflict was reflected in the concepts of science employed by these
different professional communities to justify their practices. As explored
above, Fletcher advocated a role for the clinician where normal science,
viewed as laboratory experiments, was separated from professional
practice. This was very different from Moynihan's definition which
privileged practical surgery and diagnosis above experiment. Moynihan's
definition fits the pattern of medical practitioners who wished to utilise
54 Christopher C. Booth, "Clinical Research", in Joan Austoker and Linda Bryder, eds.,
Historical Perspectives on the Role of the MRC, pp. 205-241 216.
55 Ibid., p. 214.
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'science' as a vehicle for professional recognition and status amongst
both the public and their academic peers. 56 Such rhetoric was bound to
clash with the less elastic usage of the term by Fletcher and his
supporters amongst the clinical community. Furthermore, both Moynihan
and Fletcher incorporated their definitions into idealistic expressions of
professional enterprises. Attacks on the central core of their professional
identities would often result in personal hurt and hostility, especially for the
more insecure Moynihan who was promoting his profession against a
dominant scientific hegemony. This was reflected in the correspondence
between the two, published in the pages of The Lancet, on Fletcher's
reference to Moynihan's speech at the Manson opening as "that Irish
mode of encouragement!"57 This sparked a public spat that was
characterised by Fletcher's attempt to defuse the conflict through wit and
Moynihan's continual accusations of "misquotation", "irrelevancy" and
Fletcher's temerity at excusing "himself as a humorist!"58 The MRC and
the Royal Colleges were contesting institutional powers, the development
of the medical profession and the very definition of science as applied to
medicine.
5.4 Dawson vs. Fletcher: The Professional Politics of Radium
The Conservative administration came under increasing public pressure to
take steps to increase the stocks of radium in the country. During 1928
56 Christopher Lawrence, op cit., pp. 504-505.
57 "The Hospital for Tropical Diseases", p. 928. Fletcher's use of the phrase "Irish mode
of encouragement" is a humorous aside to demonstrate that Moynihan was actually
hindering science.
58 The correspondence is found in "The Work of Laboratories", The Lancet, vol. 219
[December 6, 1930], p. 979; "The Work of Laboratories", The Lancet, vol. 219 [December
13, 1930], pp. 1022-1023; "The Work of Laboratories", The Lancet, vol. 219 [December
27, 1930], pp. 1103-1104. Quotations are from the last of these.
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the Minister of Health, Neville Chamberlain, directed his Assistant
Secretary, Michael Heseltine, to write to the MRC and relevant
departments to test the waters concerning the establishment of an
Interdepartmental Conference exploring the concept of a "national
reserve" of radium.59 Fletcher was enthusiastic and wrote back a fortnight
later, stating that the idea had been discussed with the Lord President of
the Council, Lord Balfour, and that this Conference should meet under the
umbrella of the Committee of Civil Research. This would allow greater
cooperation with the "Fighting Services" through the discussion of salient
points with the Committee of Imperial Defence. 60 Fletcher's letter
emphasized the problems of supply as the main reason for this
committee, arguing that the British Empire had to find alternate suppliers
within its own territories in order to end its reliance upon the Belgian
Congo. Having consulted Lord Balfour, Tizard at the DSIR, the fourth Lord
Rayleigh and Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, Fletcher was
convinced that his proposal could effectively answer Chamberlain's query
whilst bringing the question under the purview of the MRC and allied men
of science.61 The formal proposal for a sub-committee on radium came
from the Ministry of Health but it originated with Fletcher whose own role
was not publicised. No link could therefore be drawn between the MRC
and this new sub-committee. Further evidence of Fletcher's influence is
given in his chance meeting with Lord Rayleigh and conversation on
radium supply (probably at the Athenaeum or Royal Society) followed by
Rayleigh's importation as an eminent and independent expert to chair the
59 W. A. Robinson to Sir Walter Fletcher, May 2, 1928. PRO FD1/4454. Michael Heseltine
was a "senior civil servant", who served as the Secretary of the Haldane Committee and
stayed at the Ministry of Health "for the bulk of his career". Hennessy, op cit., p. 294.
60 Sir Walter Fletcher toW. A. Robinson, May 16, 1928. PRO FD 1/4454.
61 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Balfour, May 16, 1928; W. A. Robinson to Sir Walter
Fletcher, May 23, 1928; Sir Walter Fletcher to W. A. Robinson, May 24, 1928; W. A.
Robinson to Sir Walter Fletcher, June 6, 1928. PRO FD 1/4454.
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subcommittee.62
The Committee of Civil Research had been set up by Stanley Baldwin to
investigate specialised problems. 63 By deploying the mask of research,
this body could effectively depoliticise potential problems by removing the
issue from the authority of a Ministry into the hands of experts and
fostered cooperation between departments on certain matters. It had little
power and was used as a vehicle to answer critics by indicating that
something was being done while removing interested agencies from
public view. Fletcher, Tizard, Sir Ernest Rutherford, President of the Royal
Society and Lord Rayleigh in the Chair provided a strong contingent of
men of science in this sub-committee with four out of the ten members.
The Ministry of Health was only represented by Michael Heseltine and Sir
George Newman, the Chief Medical Officer. Fletcher was assured of
support in this venture.
The creation of this sub-committee allowed Ministers in the House of
Commons to retreat behind a standard declaration that the matter had
been referred to this committee and remained in abeyance until it
reported.64 The sub-committee sat for nine-and-a-half months from July
1928 to March 1929, and their report was published by the government
after the Easter Recess in April 1929. The report considered the present
situation concerning stocks of radium to be "quite inadequate even to
62 Sir Walter Fletcher to W. A. Robinson, May 24, 1928.
63 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall, p. 82; Roy M. MacLeod and E. Kay Andrews, "The
Committee of Civil Research: Scientific Advice for Economic Development, 1925-1930",
Minerva, vol. 7 (1968-69), pp. 680-705.
64 "Supply of Radium", The Lancet, vol. 216 [February 2, 1929], p. 261; "The Purchase of
Radium", The Lancet, vol. 216 [February 16 1929], p. 369.
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cope with the most pressing needs."65 In order to remove this inadequacy,
the sub-committee proposed that additional stocks of radium should be
purchased through funds provided by the government or from other
sources. The radium purchased would be distributed and regulated by the
Radium Commission while the money allocated or raised to purchase
radium would be held by the National Radium Trust.
The conventions and etiquette that permeated the culture of the civil
service remains underexplored. However, given the nature of these
communications, it seems that they fell into a standard practice whereby
reports could be informally circulated to chosen individuals whose
discretion was relied upon to ensure that the contents remained
'confidential'. Lord Dawson had amicable relations with Fletcher and
trusted him enough to send a copy of his report (the Dawson Report),
which he wrote as chairman of the consultative council on medical and
allied services in 1920. When he sent the report he made it quite clear
that the report was "confidential" and "for your [Fletcher's] perusal." 66 The
letter was marked in ink and underlined "Private". Fletcher acted
according to Dawson's wishes and read the report privately before
returning the document to its author because he was short of copies.67
This favour was reciprocated by Fletcher's own letter to Dawson,
enclosing the report of the sub-committee. Sir Humphrey Rolleston, a
former President of the Royal College of Physicians stated that he had
65 "Radium", The Times, April 17, 1929.
66 Lord Dawson to Sir Walter Fletcher. May 17, 1920. PRO ED 1/3357.
67 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. May 28, 1920. PRO ED 1/3357. One could
speculate that this was a polite strategy for explaining that the report was a loan rather
than a gift.
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also seen the report through another source. 68 Fletcher had to obtain
"special permission" from Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary for
this "act of personal friendship" and had telephoned Dawson previous to
this letter to ensure that Dawson would discuss the contents of the report
with him "privately". 69 Before Fletcher could sanction this action, he had to
believe that Dawson and he "had the same interests at heart", were bound
by ties of friendship and could trust one another to treat the report in
confidence, a euphemism for excluding all other individuals.
Dawson read the report and found that Fletcher's interests and his own
were not the "same... at heart". Having seen that the report did not detail
the ways of funding the purchase of radium, Dawson saw that the medical
profession could mould a role for themselves on the radium bandwagon
by taking a leading position in the organisation of funding. He was
particularly concerned about two issues: the lack of consultation with the
associations of the clinical professions and the failure to guarantee clinical
representation on the governing bodies of the National Radium Trust and
the Radium Commission. Instead of replying to Fletcher, Dawson used his
position as President of the Royal Society of Medicine to show the report
to eminent physicians in order to gain support. The result of this was a
letter to the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin. The letter was circulated
amongst physicians around the country garnering some twenty
signatories. 70 Dawson, in his accompanying letter to Baldwin, warned of
68 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. March 26, 1929. PRO ED 1/4454; Sir Walter
Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 10, 1929. PRO ED 1/4454.
69 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 10, 1929. PRO FD 1/4454.
70 The signatures included those of Dawson, Moynihan, John Rose Bradford, President of
the Royal College of Physicians, Ewan J. Maclean, President of the British Medical
Association, E. Farquhar Buzzard, Regius Professor of Physic, Oxford, and Humphry
Rolleston, Regius Professor of Physic, Cambridge. Three taught clinical medicine and
four worked in Belfast! None of the physicians working with radium therapy who had
written research articles signed this letter.
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"an atmosphere of suspicion that could easily be converted into
antagonism" for which he blamed the "permanent officials" whilst excusing
Neville Chamberlain from any culpability.71 Dawson had already
conversed with Baldwin, presumably to explain the situation and explore
the ramifications of sending such a letter. 72 The strategem of dividing
politician from permanent official was intended to remove the problem
from the sphere of ministerial accountability and spare the Conservative
administration political embarrassment. Given this approach, Baldwin
could afford to take a supportive or, more likely, a neutral line. The letter
politely requested that copies of the report should be sent to the corporate
representatives of the "medical profession". The reason given was that no
member of the sub-committee had "experience of medical practice or of
the use of radium" and therefore the medical profession needed to be
consulted. This was necessary to avoid "public controversy" and "the
grave risk of losing the support and co-operation of those who are
essential to the successful issue of any plan for extending the benefits of
radium therapy". 73 This mobilisation of the medical profession reflected
the watchfulness of their elite, alert to any trampling of their professional
prerogatives and aware that the young Ministry of Health required
constant lobbying to circumscribe its more radical proposals.
Fletcher discussed this development on the telephone with Michael
Heseltine whilst routinely asking for some documentation. 74 The
telephone was used for simple requests and also to confer in a private
and informal conversation between two close colleagues when the
71 Lord Dawson to Stanley Baldwin. April 9, 1929. PRO FD 1/4454.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., [Enclosed letter].
'4 Michael Heseltine to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 11 1929. PRO FD 1/4454.
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developments required an urgent response. Heseltine had worked with
Fletcher on the sub-committee and his personal addendum on "D's antics"
contemptuously derided Dawson's description of "difficult" civil servants as
"a horrid piece of journalese!"75 Dawson's actions were frostily received at
the Ministry of Health and Heseltine noted that Chamberlain was very
unhappy with him. Fletcher came to the conclusion that he himself was
included amongst the "difficult" and vigorously responded, beginning a run
of letters between himself and Dawson that provide a window upon the
gentlemanly values of professional and civil servants during this five year
period.
As discussed earlier in the informal circulation of reports, relationships
depended upon 'trust' and 'confidence'. As soon as Fletcher had read the
letters, he wrote to Dawson, accusing him of "a personal breach of faith"
but was willing to allow that his action was down to some
"misunderstanding".76 Dawson had already written to Fletcher on the
same day, explaining the situation, and trying to persuade him that he had
not overstepped the bounds of 'confidence'. According to Dawson, the
report was only shown to the leaders of the medical profession
(presumably Moynihan and Bradford, since Rolleston had already read it)
who needed to be aware of the situation in order to sign a letter appealing
for funds to purchase radium and the accompanying letter to the Prime
Minister did not require any knowledge of the report. 77 Once he had read
75 Ibid. Higher civil servants drafted official letters and then wrote privately on the
typescript in ink, more informal and friendly notes. One can surmise that officials wished
to keep their friendships and favours private while also maintaining an information gap
between themselves and the ordinary clerical stratum. In practical terms, such tactics kept
information out of the gossip of the secretaries and clerks, reducing the potential for public
leakages.
76 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 10, 1929. PRO FD114454.
77 Lord Dawson to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 10, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
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Fletcher's letter, Dawson was quick to define 'confidence' and the
practices which it allowed.
I have seen many such reports before and have been shown
them by Cabinet Ministers in confidence. The word
'Confidential' on Government Reports is not meant to be as
rigid as you seek to indicate. The word 'Confidential' is
meant to avoid general knowledge, access to the Press
etc.78
Dawson's definition was political. In his claim, the main source for reports
in the past had been politicians who disseminated information privately
which could be used and acted upon by individuals so long as it did not
enter the public domain. This was a flexible approach that allowed
informal linkages between the government and other groups. Fletcher's
definition was based upon 'trust'. As he wrote to Buzzard later, Fletcher
was very much an advocate of 'my word is my bond':
But in official and in private life in this country a great deal of
business is done, so to speak, 'on the nod', because white
men trust each other, take a word for a bond, and assume
that a warning will always be given before friendly relations
and good faith are ruptured.79
Fletcher did not view 'confidence' as a standalone practice but as part of
the general ties of trust that defined a gentleman.
78 Lord Dawson to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 11, 1929. PRO FDI/4454.
79 Sir Walter Fletcher to E. Farquhar Buzzard. May 15, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
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It is quite clear that Fletcher believed officials, politicians, peers, men of
science, other professionals and businessmen all acted according to
certain rules. These rules, that an individual's word could be trusted or
that friendship should be perceived as a moral bond as well as a meeting
of mutual interests, derived from the public school and other collective
institutions that inculcated gentlemanly behaviour. Such rules were
bounded by the world within which Fletcher moved and worked. They
applied to his equals and his peers, but not to the lower classes. Fletcher
belonged to the upper reaches of the civil service and his social world
included professors, the elite of the medical and scientific professions,
and the higher administrative class of civil servants. They met at dinner
parties and club luncheons, committee meetings and social occasions 80 --
the natural spaces of the upper middle class.
However these rules, if they can be called rules, were not overt constraints
upon behaviour or regulations upon dress and speech (though such
regulations were drafted and partially derived from expectations
concerning gentlemanly behaviour), but tacit assumptions, often
unconscious, that provided the base for a common subculture. Pierre
Bourdieu warns the social scientist not to fall into the pitfall of constructing
a rational model composed of rules:
The language of rules and models, which seems tolerable
when applied to 'alien' practices, ceases to convince as soon
as one considers the practical mastery of the symboUsm of
80 'Social occasions' include a variety of public events like the opening of the Manson
Laboratory (mentioned earlier), commemorative affairs, funerals, meetings of professional
bodies like the British Association for the Advancement of Science or the British Medical
Association and so on.
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social interaction - tact, dexterity, or savoir-faire -
presupposed by the most everyday games of sociability and
accompanied by the application of a spontaneous semiology,
i.e. a mass of precepts, formulae, and codified cues.81
As Steven Woolgar and others have argued in the construction and
promotion of scientific methods and rules, it is the case that the principles
articulated by the protagonists are usually constructed as statements of
justification to vindicate actions that have already been taken. Applied to
this particular situation, one could argue that the letters (particularly
Dawson's) are utilising gentlemanly principles as legitimating devices for
their particular course of action. 82 'Trust' and 'confidence' were not
principles which guided behaviour but rationalised concepts that justified
certain reactions when particular expectations had not been met.83
When Dawson came to justify his circulation of the report, he was quick to
indicate in the opening lines that he did not let "differences of opinion"
colour his friendships. 84 He then proceeded to argue that the need to draft
the letter to The Times on fundraising for radium required knowledge
amongst the signatories that could only be acquired through reading the
report. His justification was that the medical profession had not been
consulted in the writing of the report and implied that Fletcher was guilty of
81 Pierre Bourdieu, trans. by Richard Nice, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1977 [1972], P. 10.
82 Steven Woolgar, Science, the very idea, London: Tavistock Publications Ltd, 1988, p.
17. Rules are a "post-hoc rationalization of scientific practice".
83 Even here, one could argue that, although Fletcher expected his report to be returned,
a different course of sction by Dawson such as forgetting to return the report, would have
demanded a different response and/or accusation. An expectation allows a very wide
range of responses.
84 Lord Dawson to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 11, 1929. PRO FD114454.
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a breach of trust. This lack of consultation was "contrary to the public
interest and a slur upon a learned profession". 85 Dawson had written to
Fletcher in November 1928, asking for consultation and Fletcher had
returned with "the fait accom pli" of the report.86 As soon as either
protagonist had accused the other of breaching an unspoken trust and
riding roughshod over the obligations of friendship, there began a spiral of
accusation and counteraccusation designed to demonstrate that the
blame lay with the other individual and the author was not guilty of such
ungentlemanly conduct. Dawson was careful to avoid breaking his
friendship with Fletcher, believing that their professional interests were the
same. He downgraded the dispute. "No - we need not have differences on
questions of honour - Our differences are differences of policy."8 7 The
central dispute between the two lay in the lack of consultation over the
writing of the report.
Two aspects of this exchange of letters are of special interest. One is the
perception of a profession through a gentlemanly patina. Both Dawson
and Fletcher referred to the 'honour' of the medical profession. This term
encompassed the prestige, status and continued independence of the
profession. It was also Dawson's explanation for his actions. Fletcher
wrote that the report concentrated upon the supply of radium to Great
Britain and its distribution therein, but made no attempt to control how
radium was used by the medical profession in clinical treatment. Jt was a
research report, with six Fellows of the Royal Society, and the interests of
research and treatment were the same given the remit of the sub-
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid. (Underlining in original).
87 Ibid.
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committee. Moreover the profession was consulted through the MRC's
Radiology Committee. 88 However, Dawson embodied the fears of many
in the medical profession who feared state control and the end of their
professional independence. He viewed medicine as an art that could only
be exercised by free physicians, beholden only to their professional ideals
and independent of any other interest. State control was an immoral
device that would corrupt the profession and destroy its honour. Dawson
transformed the subcommittee into a conspiracy. "Is it likely that a great
profession will consent to be treated like so many schoolboys? And this
Radium happening is only part of an increasing tendency to try and get the
control of the medical profession into the hands of a narrow
bureaucracy."89 Dawson was wary of the Ministry of Health following the
failure of the consultative committee that he chaired during the first half of
the decade.90 Fletcher dismissed this "tendency" as a "bogey" and a
"fantasy". He explained to Dawson that he was just as anxious to protect
the "honour" of the medical profession. Of course, Fletcher's "honour" was
directed towards different ideals since he gave an explicit role to the "light
of science". However, the term conveys a sense of status and influence.
Fletcher defined his role at the MRC as one of increasing the influence of
medicine in the sphere of government:
So far from desiring to see Government control of
'medicine', I have tried for fifteen years, on the contrary, to
make it the chief object of my working life to help to get for
88 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 13, 1929. PRO FDI/4454.
89 Lord Dawson to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 11, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
90 Extract from Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Balfour. May 1, 1929. PRO FDI/4454. "He
[Dawson] continued at intervals to 'see red' about the iniquities of the Ministry of Health
somewhere between 1919 and 1924, of which it appears they are not yet sufficiently
purged."
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'medicine' its proper share in the control of Government. But
has your action helped to that end? How can the influence
of the profession in Government circles be advanced by
such methods as you have used? If the profession is to
have any effective influence in guiding the power of
bureaucracy, that can only be earned by absolute straight
dealing and by close and patient study of the subject
matters involved.91
This passage reveals how Fletcher could marry the ideals of science and
medicine through the identity manufactured by a sense of belonging to the
medical profession. Where he differed from Dawson was the central role
he assigned to the state in advancing the interests of the medical
profession and the progress of medical knowledge. Dawson was unwilling
to move towards a future where physicians became salaried servants of
the state, thus compromising their professional independence. He
articulated a concept of the profession that dated back to the mid-Victorian
era and in some cases earlier. He equated his professional ideals with the
mid-Victorian fee-paying professional economy where service to the
patient and service to the profession were one and the same. His
professional ideals were dedicated to the service of the public, working
towards a national health insurance scheme and state funding for health
education, but his precondition was the continuation of the institutions and
practices that guaranteed the professional independence of doctors from
the state. 92 Both Dawson and Fletcher looked towards the state as the
financial bedrock upon which their professional interests would be
91 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 13, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
92 Lord Dawson, "One Hundred Years and After", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [July 30,
1932], pp. 183-1 89, 189.
148
promoted. From his vantage point within the civil service, Fletcher saw no
conflict of interest between his position as a civil servant and his
professional integrity as a member of the medical profession. His concept
of the medical profession was wedded to his scientific ideals and his
experience of the MRC as a civil service body that could fund pure
research. Fletcher wanted doctors and surgeons working for the state
since they would directly increase the influence of the medical profession
in government. His proviso was that all actions had to be "earned by
straight dealing" and a working knowledge of how the civil service
operated. In Fletcher's eyes, this policy of honesty was a necessary
consequence of the need to build up relationships of 'trust' with civil
servants and their departments. The medical profession had to recognise
the central authority of the state and embrace the gentlemanly values of
the civil service in their relationships with it.
5.5 Conclusion
Once it had been established by Fletcher that Dawson's actions could be
construed as a misunderstanding rather than as a deliberate attempt to
undermine his own position, he was willing to bring the matter to a
resolution. This was achieved through the affirmation of friendship. Both
sides had been very careful in their letters to avoid personal abuse despite
some intemperate language and eventually assuaged their accusations
with an agreement that differences "of view" would not affect "the friendly
personal relations" that both valued.93 Fletcher explained to Dawson that
the sub-committee was only concerned with the supply of radium which
encompassed a number of "scientific problems". The sub-committee
93 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 13, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
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proposed administrative machinery for the distribution of radium for
medical purposes but expressly avoided ruling that the Commission
should be controlled by the Government or any one profession. Fletcher
was therefore willing to support Dawson in his wish to expand clinical
representation on the Commission and in the formation of "a sort of
informal Team Selection Committee of the kind you [Dawson] have often
favoured before".94 By agreeing to Dawson's strategy, Fletcher was
effectively repudiating a decision of the sub-committee on which he was
outvoted. 95 However, in these and subsequent letters, Fletcher was
unwilling to forget Dawson's actions. Dawson had delayed the appeal
while he mobilised the elite of the medical profession. He then refused to
cooperate with the sub-committee or the Ministry of Health until given a
firm assurance that a majority of the members of the Radium Commission
would be clinical representatives.96 Given Fletcher's poor opinion of the
Royal Colleges and their governing role in the ICRF, it is quite probable
that he considered Dawson's stance to be detrimental to medical research
and a personal setback. However Dawson had the public support of The
Times and, in his own words, of "some of the big contributors".97
The competence of the sub-committee and, by implication, Neville
Chamberlain, was questioned by a leader article:
It must be confessed that in this form the composition of the
Radium Commission is hardly calculated to commend itself
to the leaders of the medical profession, whose co-operation
94 Sir Walter Fletcher to Lord Dawson. April 17, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
95 Ibid.
96 Lord Dawson to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 18, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
7 Ibid.
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in this vital mafter is all-important. Indeed, the whole
recommendation about the Commission seems to go beyond
the terms of reference assigned to the Sub-Commiftee, who
did not apparently take any evidence from the Presidents of
the Royal Colleges - that is, from the accredited leaders of
the physicians and surgeons who are engaged in using
radium in the treatment of cancer.98
The Times called for the Royal Colleges to have a "deciding voice" on the
Commission.99 Succumbing to the public pressure and financial veto
exerted by the Royal Colleges, the Ministry of Health agreed to a majority
of clinicians on the Commission. Thereafter, Dawson endeavoured to
cooperate with the government by placing a lefter in The Times, calling for
funds for radium, and signed by a long list of eminent physicians. 100 The
funds collected soon reached the target anticipated by the government.
The Trust and Commission were established as viable, clinician-
dominated bodies during the summer of 1929. 101 Fletcher was now far
more wary of Dawson and suspicious of his actions in any negotiations
that required privacy and confidentiality. In the long-term, this strained
personal relationship was compounded by the political difficulties that
Fletcher faced in his dealings with the Royal Colleges.
98 "Radium", The Times, AprU 17, 1929.
99 Ibid.
100 "The National Radium Fund", The Lancet, vol. 216 [May 4, 1929], P. 937. The letter
appeared in The Times on April 29, 1929.
101 "The National Radium Fund", The Lancet, vol. 216 [May 4, 1929], p. 937; "Radium
Trust and Commission", The Lancet, vol. 217 [August 17, 1929], p. 346.
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Chapter Six
"BEHIND CLOSED DOORS": THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RADIUM
BEAM THERAPY RESEARCH BOARD
6.1 Controversy and 'Bomb' Therapy, 1928-1 933
The informal negotiations between Radium Beige and the representatives of
the British medical and scientific communities that took place at the
Athenaeum Club during the spring of 1933 were a good example of the
interactions between professional insiders that shaped formal scientific policy.
These negotiations incorporated renewed hostility between Lord Dawson and
Sir Walter Fletcher as they vied to institutionalise the influence of their
respective bodies, the Royal Colleges and the MRC, in the new research
organisation that would supervise beam therapy. This chapter concentrates
upon their dispute as it was mediated through these meetings and
organisational proposals before drawing out the structural elements within
their respective social backgrounds and educational experiences that
exacerbated the mutual antagonism of these two protagonists.
The financial drive of April and May 1929 increased the stocks of radium in
the country and allowed the Radium Commission to allocate a large amount
for the creation of a radium beam therapy unit at Westminster Hospital.1
Beam therapy was championed by many surgeons who were dissatisfied with
1 Francis Rock Caning, "Radium Teletherapy: Experience with a Temporary Bomb", British
Medical Journal, vol. i [May 11, 1929], pp. 845-848; "The Radium Commission", The Lancet,
vol. 217 [October 5, 1929], p. 275; "The Radium Commission", The Lancet, vol. 217 [October
19, 1929], p. 832. The radium was loaned by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga.
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the incremental results from needling methods and radon seeds. 2 While the
first 'bomb' was constructed in Great Britain in 1928, 3 research centres on the
Continent had been using the technique for a number of years and this
surgical lobby viewed the Westminster centre as the first step in the
modernisation of British radium therapy.4 The 'bomb' was the symbol that
emphasized Britain's equality with American, French and Swedish rivals in
the world of radium therapy and was represented as the Radium
Commission's first success.5 Controversy followed when the beam therapy
research unit was closed down in May 1932 on the grounds that it was an
2 The term beam therapy' did not really enter accepted usage until the establishment of the
body of the same name in 1933. However, since this essay explores the foundation of the
Radium Beam Therapy Research Board, beam therapy is a convenient shorthand for this
technique, despite its anachronistic use in the period leading up to 1933. Radium beam
therapy, when first developed, was described as teletherapy, massive radiation and distance
radium therapy.lt involved the incorporation of radium into a 'bomb' and could expose the
patient to a uniform dose of radiation through a beam. The technique involved no surgery
whatsoever unlike the needling techniques and this was hailed as one of its greatest
advantages. H. S. Souttar, "The Distribution of Radium", British Medical Journal, vol. i [April
27, 1929], pp. 787-788; Replies included R. H. Jocelyn Swan, "The Distribution of Radium",
British Medical Journal, vol. i [ May 4, 19291, p. 831; S. Forsdyke, "The Distribution of Radium",
British Medical Journal, vol. i [ May 18, 1929], p.927; F. Hernamen-Johnson, "The Distribution
of Radium", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [May 25, 1929], pp. 972-973; "The Effective Use of
Radium", The Lancet, vol. 216 [April 27, 1929], p. 881.
3 The earliest use of the term "bomb" in radium experiments can be traced back to J. E.
Petavel's use of a complete steel sphere, of half a foot diameter, where radium salts could be
exposed to high temperatures and pressures during controlled explosions. It is uncertain
whether this "bomb" was influential upon the "bombs" used in beam therapy or if these
experiments just imported the word and its meanings into the world of radium research.
Professor E. Rutherford F.R.S. and J. E. Petavel F.R.S., "The Effect of High Temperature on
the Activity of the Products of Radium", Report of the British Association for the Advancement
of Science 1907, London: John Murray, 1908, pp. 456-457.
4 A previous experiment involving a two and a half gramme unit had been carried out at the
Middlesex Hospital in 1920 under the authority of the MRC. It is described as a mass radium
unit ("bomb") but was quickly broken up and distributed amongst several research centres. F.
C. Spear and K. Griffiths, op cit., p. 133.
5 Sir Ernest Graham-Little, "Radium Therapy: Scientific Application", The Times, April 5, 1932.
He described the "reputation" of the foreign centres of Stockholm, Paris and New York as "far
higher, unhappily, than is the reputation of this country at the present time."
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uneconomic use of rare radium resources.6 However, having announced the
closure of the 'bomb' unit months before the actual event, the Commission
had to shelter from the lightning strikes of its critics.
The first intimation of this criticism came in Stanford Cade's letter to The
Times when he argued that Westminster Hospital wished to discontinue the
'bomb' for financial reasons and that this dissolution would burden beam
therapy with unfortunate connotations of danger or failure. 7 Cade's wish to
protect the reputation of beam therapy was soon superseded by the
campaign of Sir Ernest Graham-Little to establish a Committee of Inquiry that
would reorganise the existing system of distributing and supplying radium.
Both Cade and Graham-Little supported the continuation of beam therapy in
some form and cited the success of continental centres as evidence that the
research was valid. Graham-Little, Independent M.P. for London University
and knighted in 1931, was a "sturdy individualist...a strong supporter of the
Society of Individualists." and a physician who shared Dawson's belief that
medicine was an art and spoke out on medical matters in the House of
Commons. 8 He often asked Ministers of Health, whether Labour,
Conservative, or National, about the organisation of radium and his criticism
6 "Radium Problem'. A Survey by the Commission. Encouraging Results in Cancer Cases",
The Times, November 15, 1929. "A new weapon, and a powerful one, has been placed in the
hands of the medical profession , though how effective it may be it is impossible, as yet, to
say."; "Another Year of Radium", The Lancet, vol. 221 [October 17, 1931], p. 862. "The
continued use of the bomb in its present form is regarded as unwarranted.";H. S. Souttar,
"Radium in the Service of Surgery", British Medical Journal, vol.i [January 3, 1931]:, pp. 1-5, 5.
7 Stanford Cade, "Radium for Cancer: Experiments with Apparatus", The Times, August 10,
1931.
8 Henry Morris-Jones, "Sir Ernest Gordon Graham Graham-Little", Dictionary of National
Biography, pp. 315-317, 316. Like Alexander Watson-Watt, Graham-Little was born Little but
assumed a double-barrelled name when he acquired social status. In his particular case, it
was a knighthood.
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of the Radium Commission was detrimental to the influence of the Royal
Colleges.9 He called the termination of the 'bomb' unit a "retrograde step" and
argued that since the Radium Commission was not an expert body, it did
have the qualified individuals to judge whether beam therapy was successful
or not and a parliamentary expert committee, independent of the body,
should assess the situation.lO His provocative letter was followed by
supportive missives from J. H. Douglas Webster, Malcolm Donaldson and F.
Cavendish-Bentinck, the Vice-Chairman of the Middlesex Hospital. Both
Webster and Donaldson argued the line that continental centres were
superior to British hospitals and that radium therapy required greater support
and more funds.11
This flurry of letters was followed by a leader article in The Times on whether
Graham-Little's proposal for a Committee of Inquiry was plausible. The leader
noted that while the Commission was closing this 'bomb' because of poor
results, it had also stated that results in other countries had been better and
research with foreign 'bombs' was continuing on that basis. It argued that the
Commission's role was concerned with the supply and distribution of radium,
whilst the 'bomb' should be considered separately by a committee of expert
radiologists appointed by Parliament. This echoed and supported Graham-
Little's call for a parliamentary committee that would include expert
"Radium", British Medical Journal, vol i, [February 27, 1932], P. 408; "National Radium
Trust", British Medical Journal, vol i, [May 7, 1932], p. 869; "Report of Radium Committee",
British Medical Journal vol. ii, [December 3, 1932], p. 1038.
10 Sir Ernest Graham-Little, "Radium Therapy: Scientific Applications", 6.
11 J. H. Douglas Webster, "Radium Therapy", The Times, January 18, 1932; F. Cavendish-
Bentinck, "Radium Therapy", The Times, January 19, 1932; Malcolm Donaldson, "Radium
Treatment", The Times, January 27, 1932.
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radiologists and a "preponderent lay element". 12 This leader was not the
thunderous voice of The Times alighting upon another issue of public concern
but a deliberate accompaniment to the chorus of oppositional physicians. In
the same paper, a letter protesting against the closure of the 'bomb' unit and
mustering the standard arguments of foreign results, British backwardness
and the necessity of a committee of inquiry was published. It was signed by
six medical men: Stanford Cade, N. S. Finzi, E. Graham-Little, Douglas
Harmer, Walter G. Spencer and J. H. Douglas-Webster. The moving hand of
Graham-Little could be discerned in the description of the closure as "a
retrograde step", a phrase lifted from his earlier letter. 13 Graham-Little's
coterie was aware of the role of The Times in establishing the Radium
Commission and used a similar strategy of leader articles to publicise and
strengthen their own demands. The success of this strategy can be
measured by the response.
Lords Dawson and Moynihan responded to the bait with concessions to
Graham-Little's position. 1 4 Their letter proposing an inquiry under the
auspices of the Royal Colleges was designed to prevent parliamentary
encroachment upon the territory of the medical profession. Policing their
boundaries, Dawson and Moynihan argued that a parliamentary role was
"neither a necessary nor a desirable means to reach this end". They argued
that as Fellows of the Royal Colleges, the signatories of the letter of protest
12 E. Graham-Little, op cit., 8.
13 Stanford Cade, N. S. Finzi, E. Graham-Little, Douglas Harmer, Walter G. Spencer and J.
H. Douglas-Webster, "The Radium Bomb", The Times, February 17, 1932; "An Inquiry into
Radium?", The Times, February 17, 1932.
14 Lord Dawson of Penn succeeded Sir John Rose Bradford as President of the Royal
College of Physicians in 1930.
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could use the machinery of the Royal Colleges which would promote a
rational and scientific outcome. 15 Their conciliatory tone emphasised that
"differences of opinion" were a corollary of progress but "public interest"
demanded agreement and resolution on the questions raised by Graham-
Little. Given their efforts in assuring the preponderance of the medical
profession on the Radium Commission, neither Dawson nor Moynihan were
willing to allow the existence of this young body to be questioned. Their
concession was to establish an inquiry into the closure of the 'bomb' under
their own supervision in order to head off Graham-Little's accusations of
waste in the supply and distribution of radium. Graham-Little and his co-
signatories accepted that their original demands had been hijacked by the
Royal Colleges and welcomed the new conference while calling for a
suspension of the decision to close the 'bomb' unit. 16 With the problem now
subsumed under a professional conference whose deliberations were private,
the Commission proceeded to close the 'bomb' unit in July 1932.17
The Radium Conference was the foundation for the negotiations that would
take place in the Athenaeum from February 1933, moving some of these
protagonists to centre-stage. The conference met on March 4th, 1932 at the
College of Physicians and put forward its recommendations towards a
15 Lord Dawson of Penn and Lord Moynihan, "The Radium Bomb: Inquiry into Methods of
Treatment: A Matter for the Medical Profession", The Times, February 19, 1932. "In this way,
the facts can be ascertained, experience pooled, conflicting views weighed and we hope,
reconciled, and the best line of future action determined." The conference would come to a
scientific conclusion.
16 Stanford Cade, N. S. Finzi, E. Graham-Little, Douglas Harmer, Walter G. Spencer and J.
H. Douglas-Webster, "The Radium Bomb", The Times, February 27, 1932; E. Graham-Little
and Walter C. Spencer, "The Radium Bomb", The Times, April 18, 1932; Stanford Cade, N.
S. Finzi, Douglas Harmer and J. H. Douglas-Webster, "The Radium Bomb: Awaiting the
Report", The Times, April 19, 1932.
17 "The Re-Allocation of Radium", The Lancet, vol. 222 [June 18, 1932], p. 1319.
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resolution of the problem. 18 The conference was directed by the Royal
Colleges. Dawson was chairman and fellow members included Moynihan
and three representatives of the Radium Commission, who could be counted
upon to construct a resolution favourable to the Royal Colleges and
Commission. Graham-Little and his clique had no representation at the
conference. The conference absolved the Commission of incompetence, by
agreeing that the closure of the 'bomb' unit was "a sound conclusion".19
However, its second recommendation was for a radium institute, complete
with trained staff, to investigate "the more difficult and speculative problems
connected with radium and ray therapy". The question of financlng such ai
expensive research centre was not included in the report of the conference.
Finally, it decided that "an expert committee" should be formed to consider
the scientific advantages of beam therapy and compare the technique with
the dominant paradigm of needles and seeds. 2° Although Mr H. S. Souttar,
representative of the British Medca P'ssocatkon t te 	 'N
Chairman, the members of the expert committee included the Presidents of
the Royal Colleges. Other members included prestigious physicians in
surgery, gynaecology and radiotherapy but Graham-Little's group again did
not have representation. Physics was represented by Lord Rayleigh, (the
former President of the radium subcommittee which had established the
Radium Commission) and Professor John McLennan, an eminent professor
of physics from Toronto. Aware of the public pressure wielded by Graham-
Little through The Times and his position in the House of Commons, the remit
18 H. S. Souttar, "A Conference on Radium", The Lancet, vol. 222 [May 28, 19321, p. 1174.
19 "A Conference on Radium", The Lancet, vol. 222 [May 21, 1932], p. 1110.
20 Ibid.
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of the committee emphasised privacy: "This committee to obtain any
evidence and seek any information which it may think necessary; its
proceedings to be private and its report to be made to the Conference."21
Despite habitual references to the touchstones of radium therapy, expertise
and technique, the expert committee was successfully veiled from any public
pressure. The dissident voice belonged to Graham-Little who urged the
publication of the report of the expert committee through a parliamentary
question on November 28, 1932 and a letter to The Times. 22 The report of
the expert committee had been handed to the conference in the early autumn
of 1932 and remained unpublished until December 19, 1932. There is no
evidence to link Graham-Little's lobby and the report's publication.
The report supported the construction of a new research centre devoted to
beam therapy and containing a 'bomb' of at least five grammes. It took
evidence from Stanford Cade, one of Graham-Little's enthusiasts, Professor
Sydney Russ, a physicist associated with radium therapy since before the
Great War and E. Rock Caning, the expert on the Westminster 'bomb'.
McLennan and Souttar also visited Stockholm and Paris to inquire at first
hand about the techniques and successes of radium therapy. This focus
upon foreign centres was completed by the submission of Mr. Comyns
Berkeley who had explored the world of radium therapy for the League of
Nations. Given Souttar's original scepticism about beam therapy and praise
for the improvement of needling techniques, this report did embody a
21/bid. ( italics in original).
22 Sir E. Graham-Little, "Radium Treatment", The Times, December 14, 1932.
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conversion to beam therapy of one of the most influential investigative
surgeons in radium therapy. With such a scattering of expertise, the report
was perceived to have taken an even-handed and honest approach to the
problem. Graham-Little's call for the report to be published was in itself a
recognition that the report contained the most practical solution to the
divisions that had split the medical profession.23
Despite the promise of this report, it faced one almost insurmountable hurdle.
Radium was a very expensive element that could only be bought from a
monopoly supplier. The Government had already contributed one hundred
thousand pounds to a fund raising drive in 1928 before the Great Depression
shrunk public finances. In 1932, a year and a half after the crisis over
government spending that had preceded the formation of the National
Government, the probability that an administration wedded to balanced
budgets and financial orthodoxy would finance such a research centre was
slim indeed. 24 Such expenditure was not politically feasible and there is no
record of the conference considering the financial arrangements to support
their recommendations.25 Whether unofficial soundings took place remains
unknown, but another strategy required exploring the possibility of a 'oan
from the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga.
23 "The Value of Massive Radiation", The Lancet, vol. 224 [January 7, 1933], PP. 44-47.
24 In July 1930, the price of radium was £14,500 a gram which represented a reduction from
the wartime price of £25,000. At such prices, the cost of a five gram radium 'bomb' was
£72,500, almost three-quarters of the £100,000 given by the government in 1928. "The Price
of Radium", British Medical Journal, voLii [July 5, 1930], pp. 28-29.
25 John Stevenson and Chris Cook, Britain in the Depression: Society and Politics 1929-
1939, London: Longman Group UK Ltd., 1994 [1977]; Andrew Thorpe, Britain in the 1930s,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
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The Belgian monopoly had come into existence following the First World War
and was firmly established by the mid-twenties. Their ores were far richer
than the Austrian pitchblende from which the Curies had extracted the
original element. Since the price had almost halved between 1919 and 1930,
the American mines that had been their main competitors were slowly but
surely strangled. The costs of extraction were so expensive that even the
Belgians were unsure how large (or small) their profit was. This monopoly
was not looked kindly upon by other powers. In the exchanges preceeding
the establishment of the radium sub-committee in 1928, the existence of the
monopoly had vexed Fletcher and his correspondents. "The greedy Belgian
monopoly is holding everyone to ransom at present, only concerted action
against them is likely to have any effect."26 Professor Russ described its
destruction as "a very worthy aim".27 Radium soon acquired 'imperial'
overtones. With its military and medical applications, the substance was
deemed too important to remain under the purview of a fragile ally when a
war could necessitate the confiscation of medical supplies by the military
authorities. 28 Priority was to be given to "the possibilities of developing some
new sources of radium supply within our own Empire", since the ore was
derived from the Belgian Congo, a territory surrounded by British
possessions.29 This exchange reflected the postwar assumptions of imperial
self-sufficiency in a hostile world and the hostility felt towards the Belgians.
As Russ noted, "Cannot the Belgians be reminded that their gifts to one ally
26 Sir Walter Fletcher to Sir George Newman. November 1, 1928. PRO FD114454.
27 Professor Sidney Russ to Sir Walter Fletcher. March 21, 1929. PRO FD114454.
28 W. A. Robinson to Sir Walter Fletcher. May 2, 1928. PRO FD1/4454.
29 Sir Walter Fletcher to W. A. Robinson. May 15, 1929. PRO FD1/4454.
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(France) suggest that [the] same preferential treatment be given to us?"30
Alongside the parliamentary questions tabled, such statements reflected the
uphill journey the Belgian monopoly had to take in order to allay the
opposition of the civil service and the relevent professional interests to a
foreign monopoly.31
The loans that the Belgian monopoly made for radium beam therapy were
first given to the Parisian 'bomb' unit in Paris. Several reasons can be
discerned for these loans. Major powers were reconciled to the monopoly by
demonstrations that the Belgians took humanitarian considerations into
account when dispensing radium. Secondly, by supporting beam therapy in
other countries, the monopoly was stimulating demand for radium by
advancing a new technique that would use larger quantities than the more
economic techniques of radium needles and radon seeds.32 Thirdly, by
publicising its support for the medical application of radium, the monopoly
represented itself as a beacon of progress and as a friend of the cancer
patient. Finally, the monopoly looked askance at developments in Canada.
Excellent ores which contained no impurities had been discovered on the
shore of Great Bear Lake in the North Western Territories and the mining
companies expected radurn of a higher quat', than the Katana ores that
could be extracted more cheaply. The production of radium was expected to
start in February 1933 and provided the government with the imperial source
30 Professor Sidney Russ to Sir Walter Fletcher. March 21, 1929. PRO FD114454.
31 "Supply of Radium", The Lancet, vol. 216 [February 2, 1929], p. 260; "Supply of Radium",
The Lancet, vol. 218 [March 15, 1930], p. 600; "Radium Supplies", The Lancet, vol. 219
[December 20, 1930], p. 1375.
32 "Belgian Radium Loan". February 22, 1933. PRO FD113364. "...and he [Mr. G. L. Lechien,
the representative of Radium Beige] admitted that if this free loan now made should lead to
better use of big masses in this country, it would ultimately benefit the commercial suppliers."
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that it was so keen to find in 1928. 33 At about the same time it is noteworthy
that Radium Beige, the subsidiary of the Belgian monopoly, was available for
negotiations over a loan of radium and wished to involve government
agencies as guarantors. The monopoly had loaned radium for a 'bomb' at
Westminster Hospital in 1928 and the conference in 1932 was grappling in
private with the necessity of finding sources of funding. Their alternatives
after the closure of government funding were raising the funds privately or
charting the possibility of a loan from the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga.
Both sides found that they had mutual interests.
6.2 The Initial Negotiations on Beam Therapy at the Athenaeum
Souttar and Fletcher had an undated conversation sometime between the
report of the conference was published in Christmas 1932 and February 7,
1933. On the basis of this conversation, Souttar drew up a memorandum to
outline the most favourable proposal for guaranteeing a loan from the
Belgians. 34 It was decided to approach Radium BeLce the BeIq,ian comparnj
that sold the radium mined by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga and ask for
a loan of ten grammes in order to establish the Radium Beam Therapy
Research Board.35 The Board was projected as building upon the
achievements of the conference and the technical committee. The technical
committee would act as an "advisory body" to the Board whilst the DSIR and
33 Radium from Canada", British Medical Journal, vol. ii [December 3, 19321, pp. 1024-1025.
This discovery formed the subject of a lecture delivered by Major Bernhard Day at the
Institution of Mining and Metallurgy.
34 Sir Walter Fletcher, "Massive Radium Units", February 8, 1933. PRO FD 1/3364.
35 Radium Beam Therapy Research Constitution. February 7, 1933. PRO FD1/3364. The
Radium Beam Therapy Research Board was not named until May 1933.
163
the MRC would act as trustees for the loan of the radium. 36 The supervisors
were McLennan and Souttar. They were responsible for the organisation and
equipment that would be required to replicate the research undertaken at
Stockholm. The ten grammes of radium would be divided into a five gram
clinical unit based at London Hospital, where Souttar was a surgeon and
another five gram unit at the Radium Institute under McLennan's eye that
would be focused on "experimental work, both physical, biological and
clinical".37 Both McLennan and Souttar were the negotiators for the
conference who approached Radium Beige and learned the conditions for the
loan. Later statements identified McLennan as the conduit between the
company and the conference and one can surmise that these contacts were
built up on their European travels. It was also eased by Souttar's role as
surgeon at the Antwerp field hospital at the start of the Great War for which
he was awarded the Order of the Crown of Belgium. Such an honour held a
formal status in Brussels, similar to the honours system of the United
Kingdom.38
The scientific bureaucracy was required because the Radium Beige were
unwilling to consider a private venture for their loan. The company would
examine the loan favourably once it knew "that the investigation should be
obtained under the most authoritative auspices obtainable". 39 The conference
that had hitherto been dominated by the Royal Colleges was now forced to
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.




forced to include the MRC and the DSIR in its deliberations. These bodies
would provide government sponsorship and finance. They would pay for the
insurance of the radium, the cost of equipping a small physical laboratory with
the necessary, specialist apparatus and the salaries of the laboratory
technicians. This structure was not detailed in the original report of the
conference which called for a "large radium unit" that would incorporate
"coordinated clinical, experimental, and physical research". 4° The structure
that catered for both clinical and experimental science can only be traced to
the requirements of the loan since the Royal Colleges were unwilling to
retreat from institutions where they gained dominance or act in a way that
expanded the remit of the MRC at the cost of their own control. This division
of beam therapy between clinical and experimental science reflected a retreat
by the Royal Colleges from their hope of directing the new body towards the
clinicians and represented an effective compromise between the medical
profession and the scientific bureaucracy. The technical committee, now
acting in an advisory role, contained the Presidents of the Royal Colleges and
a representative of the MRC, allowing both sides to maintain an interest in the
proceedings of beam therapy research.41
The disagreements between Dawson and Fletcher in these informal
40 "The Value of Massive Radiation", The Lancet, p. 46.
41 E. Rock Caning, "The Value of Massive Radiation", The Lancef, vol. 224 [January 14,
1933]: p. 114. In this letter, Carting anticipated some of the points of the memorandum by
indicating the dangers of placing the new 'bomb' in one hospital where it could become
inaccessible to the research community. Carting called for research into the clinical, biological
and physical sciences. The unit should be directed by a clinician but the physics community
should be included. "It is highly desirable that every hospital should cooperate, and that all the
brains of the profession - including those of the physicians - should be laid under
contribution." (my emphasis). Carling only included such a phrase because he expected
physics to be poorly served by the new unit.
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negotiations involved the structure of the proposed Board that would research
beam therapy. Dawson prolonged the negotiations in his attempt to
guarantee the dominance of the Royal Colleges and minimise the role of
government. Secondary to the issue of structure was the pressure of time
that grew as the wrangles amongst the domestic camp developed and
prevented a comprehensive answer to the Belgian's proposal. With the public
disagreements between members of the medical profession that had
preceded the establishment of the conference and the public domain within
which issues concerning radium unfolded, privacy became an important
concern for all of those involved. The informal meetings that decided the
course of events needed a space that completely excluded any of the general
public and, especially, the media and Graham-Little. The Athenaeum, with its
strict rules of membership and reputation for exclusivity, provided a suitable
environment in which these negotiations could be conducted.
Lord Rutherford was the ringmaster at these d(scuss(ons because of (its
eminence and influence within the scientific establishment. These
negotiations bore the stamp of his particular approach to dealing with the civil
service: a belief in the small private group who, over lunch or dinner, in a
college or club, set the agenda and made the decisions that even the "small
sub-committee" inevitably followed. 42 Rutherford had already shown his
interest in radium when he worked with Henry Tizard, W. H. Bragg, Fletcher
and Russ to persuade the MRC to reallocate some of the radium held by its
42 David Wilson, Rutherford: Simple Genius, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983, pp. 453-
454.
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research units to the physicists. 43 By chairing these meetings, he was able to
maintain his guiding role over the use of radium in physics while the group
had obtained the support of one of the most prestigious men of science,
preeminent at home and abroad.
The first "informal discussion" took place at the Athenaeum on February 8th,
1933 between McLennan, Souttar, Sir Frank Smith, Secretary of the DSIR
and Rutherford. 44 Information about this meeting stems from Fletcher's aide-
memoire and Souttar's letter to him on the following day. The discussion
achieved a remarkable degree of agreement on the lnItla memorandum.
Constructive criticism was provided by Rutherford who argued that a period
of two years was the minimum required for research of this kind. He
"approved in particular of the exercise of a genera) contro)" by the DS)R and
MRC. 45 Rutherford was keen to ensure that beam therapy remained outside
of the control of particular interests like the Royal Colleges and under the
supervision of a body balanced between medical and scientific interests
represented through their respective research bodies in the civil service. The
memorandum incorporated this view and it is testimony to the instincts of
Fletcher and the drafting skill of Souttar that they were able to construct a
document on which a consensus amongst all the participants was
immediately achieved.46 However, neither Smith nor Rutherford were willing
to make the opening move in this "plan" and indicated that Fletcher should
43 Ibid., p. 480.
44 Sir Walter Fletcher, Massive Radium Units", February 8, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. uThe basis of the discussion was a memorandum drawn up by Mr. Souttar after a
conversation with Sir Walter Fletcher."
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act "representing the medical aspect". 47 Souttar and McLennan had
purposefully met with Smith and Rutherford as important and eminent
representatives of the scientific community. Smith and Rutherford were "in
favour of our [Fletcher and Souttar's] plan.. .[and] fully recognise, however,
the importance of the physical side and will back you all the way". 48 The men
of science were aware of the differences between the goals of the scientific
community and the medical profession. By advising that Fletcher make the
first move, they hoped to prevent the misrepresentation of their involvement
by physicians as an invasion on to medical turf.
At the first meeting, McLennan expected to arrange luncheon with the
representatives of Radium Beige at the Athenaeum on February 16, 1933.
However, this meeting was eventually rearranged for Wednesday, February
22.49 Unlike the earlier "informal discussion", this luncheon was organised
with McLennan as the host and those indv i dua(s who were not d&
were present as his guests.50 Present, apart from the original four, were
Fletcher, Dawson, Mr. Geoffrey Pearce and Monsieur G. L. Lechien. Pearce
was a manager of the Chemical Services Company Ltd., the company that
had organised the supplies of radium ordered by the King Edward's Hospital
Fund for London and the National Radium Trust. Sl Lechien was a highly
decorated director of the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga and his presence
demonstrated the importance with which the monopoly regarded these
47 H. S. Souttar to Sir Walter Fletcher, February 9, 1933. PRO ED 1/3364.
48 Ibid.
49 Professor J. McLennan to Sir Walter Fletcher. (Date illegible). PRO FD1/3364.
50 Sir Walter Fletcher, "Belgian Radium Loan". February 22, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
51 Ibid. Pearce was a Fellow of the Royal Physical Society, a member of the British Institute of
Radiology and a managing director of Watson and Sons (Electro-Medical) Limited.
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negotiations. 52 This semi-official luncheon was designed to place the
negotiations in a salubrious environment. The participation of Dawson,
Rutherford, Fletcher and Smith demonstrated to Lechien that Radium Beige's
willingness to consider a loan was of sufficient importance to demand the
personal presence of the leaders of the scientific and medical communities.
The gaze of Radium Beige was raised from the little indians to the big chiefs.
The choice of the Athenaeum was a reflection of that club's prestigious
reputation. Its exclusivity and sumptuous interior were symbols of gravitas
that reflected its historical focus upon learning and proved a powerful
attraction for academics whose salaries no longer afforded such a lifestyle.
Here, rather than the suburban house or the public restaurant did the
surrounds render all the participants equal by recreating for them the
experience of the upper middle class Victorian gentleman.
The luncheon started with Lechien proposing the conditions under which
Radium Beige was willing to loan the radium. The initial conditions, which
demanded the involvement of government agencies, had already been
52 Lechien was born in 1878 and his educational qualifications included a Candidat Docteur
en Sciences Physiques et Mathematiques and Professor Honoraire de l'Universite de
Montreal. His decorations included Chevalier del'Ordre de Leopold, Chevalier de l'Ordre de Ia
Couronne, Etoile de Service a une raie, Medaille Commemorative du Congo, Officier de Ia
Legion DHonneur and Commander de l'Ordre de Ia Couronne de Romanie. His commercial
positions included a former managerial position as Manager of the Ether Section at H.M.
Fautory in Gretna, Directeur de l'Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, Administrateur-Delegue de
Ia Societe Generale Industrielle et Chimique du Katanga, Administrateur-Delegue de Etudes
et Traitements Chimiques, Administrateur de Societe D'Epurations et D'Enterprises,
Administrateur de Pharmacie Centrale de Belgique, Administrateur des Pharmacies du
Congo, Administrateur de African Metals Corporation, Administrateur de Belgo-American
Trading Corporation, Administrateur de Radium Chemical Company, Vice-President de
Radium Luminous Corporation, Vice-President de Radon Company and Commissaire de
l'Union Chimique BeIge. Lechien, as his positions demonstrate, was a member of the Belgian
imperial elite whose eminence derived from his interests in the network of companies that
comprised the radium monopoly and whose decorations recognised and enhanced his
commercial status.
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conceded. Now, the company would loan ten grammes free of charge for one
or two years if the use of beam therapy took into account the experience of
foreign countries. Lechien noted that the failure of the Westminster 'bomb'
had "greatly discouraged the sale of radium on that [four grammes] scale" in
Britain. 53 The response to this offer was polite and enthusiastic. Rutherford
wished that the loan was guaranteed "for at least two years" so that the
research could be conducted under a reasonable timescale.54 All agreed,
though, that the loan would be used solely for research and not for routine
treatment. The acceptance of the radium and its use purely for research was
a source of consensus amongst all of the participants. When discussion
moved on to institutional arrangements however, this consensus vanished.
Fletcher had already seen Souttar's memorandum and unrolled this proposal
at the meeting. He and Smith agreed that neither the MRC nor the DSIR
would meet any real difficulty in acting as trustees for the radium. However
this meeting could be described as a charade. Souttar, McLennan, Fletcher,
Smith and Rutherford had decided to construct a united front on the
organisational apparatus in advance and exclude Dawson in order to prevent
him from taking unilateral action. Fletcher, especially, was wary of Dawson
after the debacle over the Commission. Their expectations that he would
disagree were fulfilled. The involvement of government agencies undermined
his professional role as he stressed. He stated his need for the medical
profession to be consulted and worried about the reaction of the Radium
53 "Belgian Radium Loan", February 22, 1933. PRO FD1/3364. The absence of an interpreter
indicates that Lechien was a good, if not fluent, English speaker. The quote also shows that




Commission. He thought they "might be offended". 55 Fletcher and Smith
answered this first objection and the document pays testimony to their
exasperation with Dawson and the bias of this subsequent aide-memoire.
Dawson's professional concern is reduced to predictable utterances 'about
the medical profession. "Dawson said it was most important to consider the
medical profession etc. etc., and all the other interests concerned etc.,
etc.,and the Radium Commission might be offended, and so on, and so
on."56 Additionally, Fletcher felt that Dawson's concentration on the
institutional equipment was rude, noting that the discussion was "not
interesting to Lechien and Pearce".57 A mannered escape was achieved by
Rutherford's overture that the issue should be discussed by a committee
composed of Fletcher, McLennan, Souttar and Smith with Dawson in the
Chair, thereby absolving the Lord of Nelson from any responsibility and
assuring his neutrality. In a conversation with Fletcher "on leaving the club",
Dawson was still "uncertain" and thought that the Souttar Committee was too
unwieldy for the role assigned to it.58
The tactics of this group depended upon the gentlemanly code of manners
that governed such meetings. The others hoped that the pressure brought to
bear by the presence of Lechien and Pearce would constrain Dawson from
uttering divisive comments in his role as spokesman of the medical
profession. Such comments, providing evidence of splits in the domestic






could then be interpreted as agreement to the offer. Unfortunately, this pre-
emptive line depended upon Dawson's tacit perception that arguing the toss
in front of the opposition would be 'bad form'. Dawson did not share their
view of the meeting and tenaciously advanced his interest into the open.
Etiquette here provided a political resource for censoring a 'difficult' member
of the domestic group, but due to the elastic and unspoken nature of
mannered behaviour, the strategy failed to contain a determined individual
intent upon defending his corner.
6.3 Professional Conflict and the Organisation of Beam Research
The structure of the new Board was contested by Dawson and the scientific
network as he tried to establish the dominance of the Royal Colleges and the
scientists tried to guarantee the loan. Dawson, as the chairman of the
committee proposed by Rutherford, arranged for a luncheon at the
Athenaeum on March 6th. 59 Fletcher's report of this meeting in his aide-
memoire was unfavourable, concluding that "No real progress [was] made".6°
Dawson wished to negotiate the proposal with Radium BeIge by himself since
he believed "that this opportunity must be used for welding the rival medical
bodies firmly together etc. etc.".61 He therefore proposed that the conditions
of the Belgian loan should be discussed by the radium conference who could
then "refer the question back to the bodies they represented". 62 Fletcher,
suspicious of Dawson's reasons, saw parallels with 1929. "He [Dawson]
59 Secretary of the Royal College of Physicians to Sir Walter Fletcher. March 2, 1933. PRO
FD113364.




plainly did not know what to propose, and only wanted somehow to delay,
presumably so as to bring himself or, the two Royal Colleges somehow into
control."63 However, he toned down his active resistance to Dawson's
prevarications because he did not wish to jeopardise his "good working
terms" with the physician on the MRC. 64 The personal suspicions of Fletcher
and Dawson, representative of their differing conceptions of medicine and
their institutional aims, again coloured the development of radium policy.
Dawson used a similar strategy to his previous altercation. As a leader of the
medical profession, Dawson perceived a need to consult all of the interests
involved and form a consensus before any action could be agreed. Such a
consensus required time and consultation that the others, including Souttar,
did not see a need for. Fletcher, especially, was a man whose time was
running out. Living under the increasing constraints of ill-health, he depended
upon the private meetings to provide a speedy resolution to the negotiations.
Although Fletcher was quick to ascribe a Machiavellian role to Dawson's
prevarications, the situation could be interpreted as a further clash of roles.
Dawson's position as President of the Royal College allowed him both to act
and consult as he wished. It is very hard to interpret his motivation as a belief
that éonsultation was required before such a momentous step in radium
policy could be taken or whether he was using his position as a smokescreen
to delay any action until he could marshall the professional forces required to
ensure that the Radium Beam Therapy Research Board was controlled by
the Royal Colleges. Indeed, the two motives are not incompatible. The
63 Ibid.
64 Sir Walter Fletcher, [Untitled]. March 7, 1933. PRO FD 1/3364.
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incompatibility lay between the methods of Dawson and Fletcher. Dawson
saw part of his role as meeting all areas of the medical profession and
agreeing a line before negotiating with other public bodies. This accorded
with the establishment of the radium conference as a method of defusing
public dissent within the profession and an ideology of clinical science that
could hold together the increasing number of specialisms that had been
institutionalised in medicine during the first years of the twentieth century.
Fletcher, on the other hand, was a civil servant whose years in government
and broad networks had crystallised his strategy into one similar to
Rutherford's: private meetings behind closed doors to resolve difficulties fast
and present a united front to other interests to gain maximum advantage.
Given Rutherford's and Fletcher's positions within the scientific community,
one could argue that this strategy of private negotiation and public unanimity
was representative of elite scientists within the civil service, the Royal Society
and the universities.
Dawson's objections to the predominant role of the MRC and DSIR as
custodians of the radium remained the main obstacles to any resolution at
this meeting on March 6th. Both Souttar and McLennan were "indignant" at
his failure to cooperate.65 Rutherford had proposed this small commiffee as a
way of finding common ground between Dawson and the other participants.
However, Dawson's wish for referral back to his constituency only widened
the gap between his aims and those of his companions. It was very easy for
65 Ibid. "Smith said he had hardly met D. [Dawson] before, and he seemed amazed that
anyone could act so obstructively without being able to give any clear reason for anything he
proposed. He said, 'Even when we tried to crystallise his ideas, he only poured more water on
to keep them in solution'."
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Fletcher to perceive this delay with deja vu and transmit his suspicions to
Souttar, Smith and McLennan. Certainly, his own view was that Dawson was
up to his old tricks, preferring the supervision of the Royal Colleges to the
scientific custody of a government department. However, Dawson did face
the conditions of Radium Beige which no amount of professional meandering
would be able to outmanoevre.66
At this meeting it was agreed that the ten grammes of radium offered by
Radium BeIge should be handled at the Radium institute with "supplementary
activities" provided by Mount Vernon Hospital. 67 Disagreement remained over
responsibility for the radium and the constitution of the consultative
committee to the Radium Beam Therapy Research Board. Fletcher set the
scene quite clearly in his memorandum to all members of the informal
committee. His emphasis lay on the speed required to capitalise on these
negotiations; an emphasis directed at Dawson's delaying tactics. Fletcher
also spiced his argument with manners stating that "it will be discourteous to
keep the Radium BeIge much longer in doubt". A fortnight had already
passed since the initial meeting with Lechien and Pearce. Fletcher's tactic
was to sideline the issue of the consultative committee and offer the services
of the MRC and DSIR as custodians of the radium. Both bodies had
cooperated for more than a decade in handling radium. There were no other
facilities comparable to theirs' and their involvement was welcomed by
Radium BeIge. McLennan and Souttar were also writing to the Radium
66 Ibid. Even Fletcher was astounded by Dawson's refusal to agree that the MRC should have
custody of the radium. Fletcher described it as "(not a very pleasant thing from a member of
my Council to say about the Council's work to these outsiders!)". (my italics)
67 Sir Walter Fletcher, "Belgian Radium Loan". March 7, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
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Institute with details of the new centre. While the radium was being
transported and measured, Dawson and the committee could negotiate over
the constitution of the consultative committee that would supervise the
research into beam therapy. Fletcher drew attention to the model of the Marie
Curie Hospital where a small advisory committee functioned harmoniously
with a research centre. He endorsed the same structure for the new
Research Board and indicated that it "corresponds with the small Committee
of six or seven which Lord Dawson proposed".68 The document was a
compromise, offering Dawson concessions on the consultative committee so
long as he agreed to the MRC's custody of the radium. Fletcher wished to
open official negotiations as quickly as possible in order to prevent Radium
Beige from withdrawing their offer.
Fletcher's acquiescence at the meeting with Dawson on March 6th was a
stimulus for his circulation of the confidential memorandum detailed above,
which could serve as a base for negotiations. Returning to the Athenaeum for
lunch on the following day, he ran into McLennan, Souttar and Smith "by
chance".69 These three had already agreed to meet and may have read
Fletcher's passivity as a detachment from their 'interest'. Their anger with
Dawsdn was considerable and McLennan was threatening to act alone and
open negotiations. Smith's and Fletcher's admission that they were going to
see Stanley Baldwin the next day for official permission to ratify the loan
defused this potential rupture. Fletcher's familiarity with Dawson's actions
was again highlighted by his reflection that Dawson's methods had been a
68 Ibid.
69 Sir Walter Fletcher, [Untitledl. March 7, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
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"revelation" to both Souttar and McLennan.70
The idea of seeing Baldwin was first mooted by Smith in a conversation with
Fletcher, followed up with a supportive letter to Rutherford. 71 Baldwin was
Lord President of the Council, a role that included ministerial responsibility for
the MRC and DSIR. Informing Baldwin of the negotiations would ensure
political support for the loan and could strengthen the hand of Fletcher and
Smith in their discussions with Dawson. The meeting with Baldwin took place
at the House of Commons on March 8th, 1933. The delegation of Rutherford,
Smith and Fletcher indicated the importance of the loan to them but its
marginal impact upon politics can be seen in the fact that Baldwin was only
willing to give them ten minutes of his precious time. 72 After a short
description of the background leading up to the loan, Fletcher was clear that
it involved no financial burden and it was only brought to his attention
because of the "international character" of the loan. 73 The position of the men
of science as supplicants is made clear by Fletcher's description of Baldwin's
reaction as "interested, and [hel directed us to carry on".74 Baldwin was their
political master and had the power to halt their actions. Through this meeting,
the MRC and DSIR gained political legitimacy for their proposal which was
designed to strengthen their demands vis-a-vis Dawson's. This meeting
demonstrates the freedom of action that the secretaries of the MRC and
DSIR were privileged to hold and shows the limits to their sphere of freedom.
70 Ibid.
71 Sir Frank Smith to Lord Rutherford of Nelson. March 6, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
72 Ibid.
73 Sir Walter Fletcher, [Untitled]. March 8, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
74 Ibid.
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Able to initiate and follow through policy within their financial limits, the
departments had to seek political support when their actions had the potential
to antagonise external interests. Fletcher and Smith were using Baldwin as a
political resource but at the same time keeping him informed to avoid the
danger that he could become embroiled in a controversy through an
approach from other quarters. The avoidance of political interference
depended upon the research bodies keeping concerned politicians onside.
In order to solve the structural question, Rutherford formulated a proposal,
enhanced by his neutral position between Dawson and the others,
concerning the constitution of the consultative committee. Rutherford
proposed that the consultative committee should include the Presidents of
the Royal Colleges and the Royal Society plus the Secretaries of the MRC
and the DSIR. This effectively left the unaligned President of the Royal
Society with the casting vote whilst the structure of the committee recognised
that the interests of the government and the Royal Colleges were evenly
represented. Rutherford's bid to break Dawson's deadlock over the future of
beam therapy depended upon his manipulation of the meetings to present a
mask of impartiality to Dawson. However, by broaching the suggestion with
Fletcher and Smith first of all, Rutherford was testing its acceptability and
secondly, relying upon the support of his professional colleagues and
personal acquaintances. This informal dependence was compounded by the
drafting of Rutherford's proposal to Dawson by Fletcher. Through
professional and personal links, Rutherford was favourably inclined towards
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and McLennan.75
Rutherford's letter to Dawson symbolised the entrance of an establishment
heavyweight into the ring. After declaring his continued interest and
involvement in the matter, the proposal was unfolded. Rutherford's concern
that "the work is done under auspices that will command general assent and
confidence" was his motivation for preventing any delay to the negotiations
with Radium BeIge. 76 His proposal included the assumption, challenged by
Dawson, that the DSIR and the MRC would be responsible for the custody of
the radium. 77 Rutherford's suggestion could have been perceived by Dawson
as an unwelcome intrusion. It was therefore reinforced by Baldwin's personal
seal of approval. Rutherford used this political encounter as a sanction but it
was couched in terms of a personal favour on his behalf towards Dawson
and the others: "...and Mr. Baldwin has privately assured me that he will
approve this, in view of the international nature of the loan and of the
importance of the work proposed." 78 This letter was supported by all three as
a realistic resolution of the dispute.
Dawson chose to ignore Rutherford's compromise since he had already
drafted an alternative plan for the development of radium beam therapy
which came to light at the meeting of the Radium Institute in early March. He
75 Ibid.
76 Lord Rutherford to Lord Dawson. March 8, 1933. PRO FD1/3364. The final sentence
included the same sentiment. "Would not such a Committee as this have the immediate
confidence of all the interesrs concerned?"
77 This inclusion can probably be traced to Fletcher who used this opportunity as an attempt
to remove this issue from the dispute.
78 Ibid.
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slip in the first meeting at the Athenaeum that he wished to consider the
centre for postgraduate medical education in Hammersmith as a site for
beam therapy. 79 Fletcher's reaction to this at the time was puzzlement.
However, Sir Cuthbert Wallace, director of Mount Vernon Hospital which
specialised in cancer and a member of the governing committee of the
Radium Institute, warned Fletcher that Dawson had opposed acceptance of
McLennan's scheme. 8° Dawson wished to create institutional links between
the Radium Institute and Hammersmith, replacing the postgraduate course in
radium therapy that was taught in cooperation with Mount Vernon Hospital.81
This linkage would enhance the influence of the Royal Colleges in radium
therapy. No doubt Fletcher must have perceived this move as an
opportunistic affront that placed the interests of the Royal Colleges above
those of the country and endangered the negotiations.
The bureaucratic wheels began to turn. Fletcher detailed the negotiations in a
memorandum for the MRC. 82 The process was discussed by the Radium
Conference. 83 Whereas Fletcher only asked for permission at a later stage to
assume custody of the radium, Dawson attempted to steer the Conference
towards his goal by using his influence as Chairman. The Hammersmith
Hospital was discussed as a possible site for beam therapy and the
constitution of the Governing Committee was decided. The Conference
plumped for the Radium Institute as the most suitable location because
79 Sir Walter Fletcher, "Belgian Radium Loan". February 22, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
80 Sir Walter Fletcher, [Untitled]. March 9, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
81 "The Teaching of Radium Therapy", The Lancet, vol. 218 [April 5, 1930], p. 783.
82 Sir Walter Fletcher, MRC Memorandum: "Radium Therapy". March 14, 1933. PRO
FD1/3364.
83 Minutes of Radium Conference. March 10, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
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Dawson was unable to persuade the representatives of the Radium
Commission that Hammersmith was a feasible site. 84 However, when
Rutherford's proposal was discussed, it was mutilated by Dawson to ensure a
majority of clinicians.85 The elegant simplicity of its political balance was
consigned to the dustbin of history. The DSIR was removed and replaced by
the Radium Institute and the Radium Commission. With a medical profession
constituting a majority, the influence of the Royal Colleges would be easier to
wield. A scientific advisory committee "including a clinician or
clinicians.. .selected because of their scientific knowledge and experience"
would act as a check upon the researchers. "Subject to the assistance of this
Advisory Committee, those appointed to engage in the researches [sici will
be free and unfettered in their work."86 Dawson wished to ensure that
clinicians would govern, direct, supervise and assist in all aspects of beam
therapy. This structure was passed by the Conference
However, the formal offer of the loan was now sent by Pearce after his talks
with McLennan. Radium BeIge wanted to ensure that their loan was
guaranteed to benefit beam therapy research. Their demands included the
right to approve the Physical Director. They wished the 'bomb' to be modelled
on the Stockholm centre where the Medical Director would require two
months training. The responsibility for the custody and return of the radium
84 Ibid. "It was pointed out that at the present time the Radium Institute has a working
arrangement with Mount Vernon Hospital and the co-operation of these two bodies has for
some time past received the support of the Radium Commission." The Radium Commission
had three representatives at the Conference.
85 Although no record exists that Dawson had received Rutherford's letter by March 10, there
are noted similarities between Rutherford's proposal and the Conference's Governing Body.




had to reside in a "properly constituted legal body" and that Pearce would sit
on the Governing Committee. Such a "legal body" would require government
support and effectively ruled out a voluntary organisation which would have
been preferred by the Royal Colleges. These conditions were strict but
Radium BeIge wanted a public success that showed the benefits of beam
therapy. Publicly, Radium Beige were indulging a "humanitarian view" stating
"that they, as custodians of supplies of Radium feel a moral obligation rests
on them to provide the means of demonstrating the value of Mass Radium
Treatment of Malignant Disease". 87 Their agenda was revealed by Clause 12
of the letter seeking assurance "that the scheme meets with the full approval
and cooperation of the National Radium Trust". 88 The Trust was the main
purchaser of radium in the United Kingdom and Radium Beige wanted to
maintain a good working relationship in private with its British purchaser as
well as gaining public support from "the English Nation".89
As the offer was tendered, Fletcher accepted the Conference's motion
concerning the constitution of the Radium Beam Therapy Research Board.
He did not try to defend Rutherford's bid at mediation when the motion was
presented to the MRC. 90 Time for the dispute to solve itself was closed off by
the arrival of the offer. One could also interpret Fletcher's acquiescence as a
quid pro quo. Since Dawson had dropped his support for Hammersmith
Hospital and accepted the MRC as the custodian of the radium, Fletcher
87 Geoffrey Pearce to Professor J. C. McLennan. March 16, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 MRC Memorandum: 'Radium Therapy'. March 17, 1933. PRO FD113364; Minutes of
Medical Research Council, Minute 34. March 17, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
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could afford to support this constitution so that the offer could be accepted as
quickly as possible.
The dispute rumbled on due to the time taken by the Radium Institute to
ascertain whether it could house the new centre. Dawson was also unwilling
to antagonise Rutherford and remained in contact with him and Fletcher
concerning "the formation of a representative supervisory body, bringing
together the chief scientific and professional interests".9 1 McLennan lunched
with Dawson the following day and the new structure was agreed. Dawson
agreed that the Governing Body should be reconstituted as a Board, with an
Executive Committee administering research and the scientific advisory
committee existing as previously proposed. He recommended that a
representative of the Radium Institute should be added to the Board, mooting
Lord Moyne with whom he had worked. 92 These were far-reaching
concessions from his previous position. His intentions are unclear but
perhaps he thought that these concessions would allow him to act without
further interference. He agreed to a representative of the DSIR which he
seemed to regard as a personal role for Rutherford, having taken a dislike to
Smith. 93 He conceded to restructuring the proposed body as a Board,
effectively abandoning the motions proposed by the Radium Conference.
After consulting the medical profession, he was unwilling to allow their
institutional decisions to encroach upon his flexibility. For all his rhetoric,
91 Sir Walter Fletcherto ProfessorJ. McLennan. March 31, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
92 Professor J. McLennan to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 1, 1933. PRO FD113364. The Board
would consist of Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins (P.R.S.), Lord Dawson (P.R.C.P.), Mr.
Wilfred Trotter (M.R.C.), Lord Rutherford (D.S.l.R.) and a representative from the Royal
College of Surgeons.
93 Sir Walter Fletcher, [Untitled]. April 7, 1933. PRO FD113364. "I gather D. funks Smith and
thinks Rutherford more amenable!"
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Dawson remained a senior officer, always willing to pull rank.
Rutherford's acquiescence in Dawson's self-appointed role as organiser of
the new Board had been a tactical error, designed to halt an argument in
front of the representatives of Radium Beige back in February, but effectively
giving a licence to Dawson to act in his own time and using his own
resources. The result was "general dissatisfaction" amongst the others at
their "casual talk" in the Athenaeum in early April.94 Their shared anxiety
focused upon the completion of all the arrangements concerning the Board in
a "reasonable time". 95 Fletcher was also determined to point out that the
MRC could act independently of the Lord President and had the machinery to
establish the Board within Iwo to three days. All the participants blamed the
delay on Dawson and his shenanigans.
Dawson was preparing the membership of the Board in his own time. He had
already invited the Royal CoUee of Surgeons to appoint a representative and
asked Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins, President of the Royal Society, to
lunch to discuss the position of the Royal Society. He himself would be
appointed by the Royal College of Physicians to the Board at their meeting on
April 10th. He had also lunched with Rutherford to keep him up to date.
Rutherford had tried to persuade Dawson to accept a Board appointed by
Baldwin, resolving the situation in a simple and rapid manner. Dawson
refused and his possessive references to "his Body" demonstrate how far he
had come to view the putative success of this venture as a matter of personal
94 Ibid. Present at this meeting were Fletcher, Smith, Rutherford and McLennan.
95 Ibid.
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and professional honour.96 This personal and professional commitment
would not brook interference by a government department.
Fletcher had automatically received a letter from Hopkins asking what this
invitation from Dawson was actually about since he was regarded by the
scientific elite to be the administrator for medical research and called on
Dawson at home, uninvited, to offer his help in the urgent completion of the
situation. 97 Under this renewed pressure, Dawson drew back from his earlier
acceptance of the structure of the Board as passed by the motions of the
Radium Conference. He tried to represent his lunch with Rutherford to
Fletcher as a symbol of his power. His acceptance of the DSIR on the
Governing Body was a personal gesture to Rutherford and, in return,
Rutherford had accepted the motions of the Conference that the research
should be based at the Radium Institute and governed by a Body appointed
by the concerned professional and research interests. Dawson's judgments
about the role of the other participants indicate his ignorance of the personal
relationships that tied the men of science together. He did not anticipate
Rutherford communicating with Fletcher about this lunch.
Fletcher's main point in this conversation was that the MRC could have
established this organisation without any delay:
I [Fletcher] explained again the difference between the M.R.C.
and the S. & I.R.D. and urged that he had never understood
96 Ibid.
97 Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 6, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
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that properly till this moment (which he admitted), and it was
galling to me, when I had won complete executive freedom for
the M.R.C. [in] the interests of the medical profession, that he
instead of using this freedom to get what he actually wanted,
was turning rather to the S. & I.R.D., which meant turning to an
Advisory Council and therefore to their Minister, that is [to] what
he called the 'Government' for executive action.98
He argued that he had stepped back and allowed Dawson to act without any
restraint. In Fletcher's account, time was passing, and Dawson was writing
letters, holding lunches, without any resolution to the crisis. Indeed, Dawson
had failed to write a letter to the Royal Society and, to cover up this omission,
invited the President of the Royal Society, Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins
down from Cambridge for lunch to discuss the new body. Hopkins had asked
Fletcher "what it all meant". 99 Fletcher was perceived as the overseer of
medical research by the scientific eUte and Dawson's antics were an
embarrassment to the MRC. Dawson was a member of the MRC but did not
use its facilities. Through his independent actions, he was risking the
reputation of the MRC for efficiency and bringing it into disrepute with the
scientific community. Fletcher reinforced this argument by stating that what
took Dawson four months took the MRC three days.
By airing his grievances in a frank manner, Fletcher hoped to remove




delay. In the first meeting at the Athenaeum, Fletcher stated he had not
supported "McLennan & Co.", in order to "keep the peace".lOO His description
of the cause of their anger was telling:
I [Fletcher] said that my own temper was not at all short, but that
McLennan, Souttar and Smith were certainly cross at being told
by him that they must run away and play, and do nothing at all
until he had made some wonderful arrangements with the higher
medical powers of which he could not condescend to explain the
details.101
Fletcher's reticence can be traced to the need to maintain a good working
relationship with a fellow member of the MRC. He was also familiar with
Dawson's waywardness and fierce defence of his interests. His strategy was
to show that Dawson's fears were misplaced. If Dawson had been less
suspicious of the MRC and had depended upon Fletcher, this whole crisis
would not have occurred. The MRC embodied the professional interest.
Fletcher also pointed out that delay was inevitable until May since Henry
Dale, Secretary of the Royal Society was away in America and the next
session did not take place until that month. Again, his own personal
knowledge of Dale and Hopkins would have been sufficient to swing the
invitation without any need for lunches or letters.




preparing. 102 Although not documented, Hopkins took up Dawson's offer of
the chair on the Governing Body, as expected. 103 Dawson's formal proposal
was not drafted until May. Agreement from all interests and representatives
concerned with the Board was announced at a special dinner party hosted by
Dawson on June 16. 104 The body itself came into existence from July. The
MRC and DSIR both agreed to the custody of the radium. 105 Because of its
nongovernmental base, Smith opined that the opportunity for extending and
enlarging the loan had been lost since Radium Beige had expressed its
preference for government supervision. 106 The Radium Beam Therapy
Research Board was publicised in the medical journals that same month.107
The Governing Body was chaired by Hopkins and included the Royal
Colleges, the DSIR, the MRC, the Radium Commission and the Radium
Institute. An Executive Research Committee was chaired by McLennan.
Dawson had succeeded in fending off government support for this body but
he was unable to extend the control of the Colleges. This structure embodied
an uneasy compromise between the medical and the scientific interests.
Fletcher himself had to retire due to ill-health and the absence of his
experience added to the confusion and delay. This was not a victory for one
side or another but a conflict between two different communities.
102 Sir Walter Fletcher to Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins. April 9, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
103 Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins to A. Landsborough Thomson. July 12, 1933. PRO
FD113364.
104 Viscount Dawson to Lord Rutherford. May 13, 1933; Viscount Dawson to Lord Rutherford.
June 14, 1933. Rutherford Papers, Add. MS. 7653. Cambridge University Library.
105 Minutes of the Medical Research Council, Minute 27. July 14, 1933. PRO FDI/3364.
106 F.E. Smith to Sir Walter Fletcher. May 9, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
107 "Radium Research: New Facilities for Beam Therapy", The Times. July 14, 1933;
"Radium Beam Therapy", The Lancet, vol. 224 [July 15, 1933], p. 135; "Radium 'Beam
Therapy' Research'" British Medical Journal, vol ii [July 15, 1933], p. 121-122.
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One of the most revealing features of this episode for the historian was the
perception by Fletcher that it was exceptional. In various letters, Fletcher and
his immediate successor as Secretary, A. Landsborough Thomson,
continually emphasized the departure from the normal methods of the MRC
to others as they became involved. "This proposal for new work on bomb
therapy became entangled at the start in a curious way with medical politics,
and the M.R.C. have had to make what they could of a procedure which was
not of their choosing or like their own usual practice." 1 08 Fletcher was keen to
absolve himself from the delay by claiming that he could have established the
body within two days using the machinery of the MRC "and had done again
and again in similar cases for many past years".109 Although this claim came
to the fore as the delay lengthened, it does cast light on the differences in
working practices between Dawson and Fletcher.
6.4 Conclusion
The educational and institutional backgrounds of Fletcher and Dawson
supported the gentlemanly world of the professions. Fletcher's father was a
nonconformist Liberal civil servant who became Chief Inspector of Alkali
Works in London. His son attended the University College School, a
nonconformist competitor to the public school system and was a graduate of
Sir Michael Foster's physiological laboratory at Cambridge where he had
collaborated with Gowland Hopkins on research. 110 Dawson was the fifth son
of an architect who attended a Clarendon public day school, St. Paul's, and
108 A. Landsborough Thomson to Professor Sidney Russ. June 28, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
109 Sir Walter Fletcher, [Untitled]. April 7, 1933. PRO FD1/3364.
110 T. R. Elliott, "Sir Walter Morley Fletcher", The Dictionary of National Biography. London:
Oxford University Press, 1949, pp. 284-285.
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undertook his medical training in London. While Fletcher was following his
research career as a Fellow of Trinity College, complemented by medical
training at Baits Hospital, Dawson had to pursue his own research part-time
while working as a private consultant.111 Fletcher the nonconformist was
inducted into the scientific elite and became Secretary of the MRC whilst
Dawson, the 'old boy' of St. Paul's, struggled to compete in the competitive
medical world of London hospitals. Fletcher settled into this powerful position,
but Dawson entered the gentlemanly firmament when he became physician-
extraordinary to King Edward VII in 1906, the first step to his viscountcy.
Fletcher grasped the academic and administrative opportunities opening up
for the career scientist in this period and Dawson combined scientific and
gentlemanly reputations within his own elevation up the the ladder of the
medical profession. Fletcher was a scientific administrator whose education
and research career at Cambridge provided invaluable ties with other
members of the scientific elite while Dawson's links with the medical and
social elites embodied the marriage within his profession between expertise
and its service to gentlemanly clients.
Fletcher had the organisational facilities of the MRC to aid any course of
action that he undertook, whereas Dawson had to write his own letters and
arrange his own meetings.112 This most telling distinction was the difference
between the professional administrator and the lobbying professional.
However, it is not a sufficient explanation for their actions. Fletcher was an
111 Sybil D. Eccies, "Bertrand Edward Dawson", The Dictionary of National Biography, 1941-
1950, London: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 201-204.
112 Ibid.
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effective manager who could communicate to interested parties with ease
using the letter and the telephone. He could utilise the reputation and
machinery of the MRC to support his role and provide an institutional
framework for such projects. The most important advantage was his
membership of the small community that incorporated the scientific
leadership. He belonged to the Royal Society and the Athenaeum. The
benefit of such membership was demonstrated by Hopkins's natural turn to
him to explain Dawson's invitation.113 Similar to Rutherford's operations,
Fletcher would contact all concerned and work for a consensus on a
particular scheme or body before allowing the matter to come before a
committee or a politician. He represented himself as a spokesman of the
medical profession amongst men of science and they turned to him as a
conduit with physicians and surgeons.
On the other hand, Dawson's methods were an amalgam of "casual talks and
luncheons and spasmodic letters". 114 Dawson had served on committees and
held a number of professional positions, but without institutional backing of
the MRC's calibre, his strategies resembled those of the political operator. He
did not know many men of science and his actions show that he was
unaware of Rutherford's acquaintance with Fletcher or Smith. This ignorance
of the networks that bound the scientific leadership together was probably his
greatest disadvantage. Knowledgeable of the speed with which the MRC
resolved administrative problems, Dawson's first response was
procrastination, followed by an attempt to shore up his position by
113 Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins to Sir Walter Fletcher. April 6, 1933. PRO FD113364.
114 Sir Walter Fletcher to Sir Frederick Gowland Hopkins. April 8, 1933. PRO FD113364.
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professional allies behind a united front. This depended upon personal
contacts rather than institutional loyalty mirroring the fractured nature of the
medical profession and the design of its leaders to promote unity through an
ideology of clinical science.
The actions of Fletcher and Dawson reflected their corporate identities and
their positions within a world of state funded research councils and
professional bodies.The most surprising theme within this political opera is
that Dawson's unilateral acts broke down the smooth course of events which
the scientists were used to and provided the key for us to witness the private
conclaves that took place behind closed doors.
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Chapter Seven
"TOOLING UP FOR APPEASEMENT": THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
THE TIZARD COMMITTEE
7.1 Introduction
As hopes for a peaceful resolution to the diplomatic questions governing
the postwar settlement in Europe began to fade under the domestic
political pressures of economic catastrophe, the pacifistic mood that
gripped the United Kingdom was reinforced by lurid descriptions of the
horrors awaiting any nation that dared to use the bombers. The aeroplane
was one of the most important symbols of technological progress in the
interwar period, combining romantic associations of freedom with an
anticipated potential for wreaking more damage than any previous
weapon of war. 1 This cultural symbol played a powerful role in the politics
and diplomacy of the period. All concerned with the analysis of air warfare
drew attention to the peculiar vulnerabilities of the British Isles. The
obstacles that rendered invasion across the Channel so costly appeared
to be useless for containing the threat of the bomber. Indeed it was
argued that traditional immunities were now advantageous to the
continental enemy. Long stretches of coastline and the large conurbations
sprawling across the island prevented standing patrols of aircraft operating
as an effective defence and magnified the damaging potential of an
enemy bomber fleet. This fear was often accompanied by the token quote
of Stanley Baldwin that politically legitimated these warnings: "The bomber
I Olaf Stapledon, Last and First Men! Last Men in London, Harmondsworth, Middlesex:
Penguin Books Ltd., 1972 [1930], pp. 26-27.
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will always get through."2
Narratives on radar have been derived from the stories that participants or
their biographers published after the need for secrecy ended. These texts
were shaped by and contributed to destinate histories of Britain. The
history of radar is therefore a political history. It requires an interpretation
quite distinct from the traditional nationalist Whiggism that has served as
its context. The Second World War distorts the thirties and fosters
associations between that decade and the war itself. Thus radar is usually
located on the road to 1939 and characterised as the invention that saved
the United Kingdom by the skin of its teeth from invasion. Those who
supported radar become gifted with foresight and those who opposed or
hindered its development are guilty men. Moreover, national myths of
plucky British ingenuity, a special destiny of the elect and the immunity of
the island race from invasion were all sustained by picking the radar rabbit
out of the historical hat. One of the historiographical problems with this
interpretation was the association of those who supported radar with
appeasement whilst wartime heroes like Churchill hindered its
development. This complication also rendered radar problematic for the
accounts of appeasement which followed Cato's 'guilty men' thesis and
condemned the ministers of the National Government for lacking the
foresight to avoid the strategic disaster of 1936 to 1941 when the Empire
faced three enemies, (Germany, Italy and Japan), on at least two fronts.
Such historical texts are better off consigned to the level of the primary
source, dropping out of the historiographical stratum and telling us more
2 David E. Fisher, A Race on the Edge of Time: Radar - The Decisive Weapon of World
War II, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988, p. 11. On 10th November 1932,
Stanley Baldwin said, "I think it is as well for the man in the street to realize that no power
on earth can protect him from gethng bombed. Whatever people may tell him, the bomber
will always get through".
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about its period as a text than as a contribution to debate.3
The study of the origins and development of radar cannot be divorced
from its political context. The ministers and civil servants who sanctioned
and financed this infant and the officers and scientists who assured its
operational effectiveness all lived and breathed in an atmosphere of
mounting political pressure and increasing urgency as the pace was
forced by timetables of diplomacy and rearmament. These two chapters
aim to explore the origins of radar in its institutional setting - the
establishment of the Committee for the Scientific Survey of Air Defence
(C.S.S.A.D.), also known as the Tizard Committee after its chairman,
Henry Tizard. 4 This Committee was an area of conflict for two factions: the
professional scientists allied to the Air Ministry and the appeasers versus
Winston Churchill and his scientific advisor, Frederick Lindemann. In turn,
their battles were shaped by the ease with which scientists became
insiders at the Air Ministry and the alienation that Lindemann felt for this
world of gentlemanly professionalism.
7.2 Gentlemanly Professionalism and the Aristocratic Lindemann
The Air Ministry was not part of the mainstream structure of Whitehall.
Like the other Service Ministries, the War Office and the Admiralty, it was
staffed by a mixture of serving officers and administrators. It did not
3 cato" [Frank Owen, Michael Foot and Peter Howardi, Guilty Men by "Cato", London:
Victor Gollancz, 1940.
4 Radar has excellent potential for analysis as a case-study using Thomas Hughes's
systems approach. Such a methodology would have to tackle the importance of
operational effectiveness versus technological 'advance' since the radar stations built by
Britain, 1936-1 939, can be viewed as a national 'success' but as a technological 'failure' in
comparison to the Germans. Tony Devereux, Messenger Gods of Battle: Radio, Radar,
Sonar: The Stoty of Electronics in War, London: Brasseys (UK) Ltd., 1991, p. 104.
Germany's 'Freya' system was developed by Dr. Rudolph Kuhnhold between 1933 and
1936 "for coastal surveillance of surface vessels".
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therefore conform to the typical structure of a Ministry, presided over by
generalist civil servants and confining specialists to a subordinate position.
However, the Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force (RAE) were not the
bureaucratic excretion of a machine responding to new technological
opportunities but owed their existence to the political recognition of air
power in Great Britain. 5 The RAF was formed on the 1st April 1918 in a
revolutionary Act of Parliament that established an air force independent
of both the Army and the Navy. 6 Once the Armistice was declared, the
RAE had to overcome the interservice rivalry that worked for its dissolution
and justify its usefulness to the Treasury by acting as a cheap "Imperial
police force" beginning with the Iraqi insurgency of 1921-1923. 7 As
Edgerton summarises:
Here was the shape of things to come. An air force separate
from the two traditional services, with an increasing
emphasis on the bombing of civilians, a continuing
association of aviation with right-wing politics and the right-
wing popular press, and a deep concern on the part of the
state with the economics of warfare.8
By 1934 the RAE had been in existence for sixteen years and was
perceived to be a permanent addition to the military structure by Whitehall
despite the arguments of the Army and the Navy. However, continued
institutional insecurity directed the RAE towards the adoption of tactical
5 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological
Nation, London: The MacMillan Press, 1991, p. 13.
6 Malcolm Smith, British Air Strategy between the Wars, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984,
pp. 14-18.
7 Ibid., p. 14.
8 Edgerton, op cit., p. 17.
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and strategic doctrines on the imperial and continental stages whilst
ignoring the possibilities of air defence on the Home Front.
The Secretary of State for Air managed his Ministry with the cooperation
of the military. This was achieved through the Air Council on which the
Minister, senior RAF officers and the permanent secretary sat. This was
the principal body through which the Secretary of State supervised the
RAF and coped with its primary source of power, the links between the
Chief of the Air Staff and the Deputy Director Plans. The other two
positions of some importance on the Air Council were the Member for
Personnel and the Member for Research and Development. Since the
number of Service staff in the Ministry numbered only 370 in 1934, "the
Ministry and the Service formed a closely-knit and relatively informal
group, in which quite junior officers could make their voices heard".9 This
informal structure was helped by the small size of the Ministry and the lack
of time necessary for institutions to ossify into rigid hierarchies. As a
consequence, the RAF was more flexible in its recruitment than its older
siblings and able to accommodate a loose cannon like the Tizard
Committee. Sir Hugh Dowding, the Air Member for Research and
Development from 1931 to 1936 in charge of Tizard's toy, raised the
importance of his department but was passed over when Sir Edward
Ellington, Chief of the Air Staff, 1933-1 937, retired. Dowding's
disgruntlement was caused by his reputation as a taciturn loner and by his
emphasis on the fighter in strategic thinking which placed him out of step
with the Air Staff who supported the strategy of the bomber as a priority of
Smith, op cit., p. 42. The number of Service staff was to treble by 1939 in response to
the rearmament campaign.
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forward planning.10 His association with the Tizard Committee and the
diversion of vital funds from rearming bomber squadrons to air defence
also counted against him.
This informal structure should not blind us to the common class origins of
the majority of professionals associated with the air force and the air
industry. Due to its technological underpinnings, the RAF required
educated pilots, engineers, mechanics and researchers. All involved with
the enterprise would have gone to some form of secondary school and/or
served an apprenticeship. This service was far more professional and
middle-class in its orientation than either the Army or the Navy. Both the
Army and the Navy relied on the working-classes to provide their soldiers
and sailors but the RAE looked to the public schools for their pilots and the
'respectable' working-class or the lower-middle-class for their mechanics
and other ranks, Its earliest history provides evidence for this. The Royal
Flying Corps (RFC) recruited many of its pilots from the ranks of cavalry
officers who also provided its first commander, yet it originated as a Royal
Engineering unit.11 More than just "a corps of flying civilian or military
engineers", its pilots transferred their equestrian glamour to the
aeroplane. 12 The RFC was romanticised as a chivalric order, the 'knights
of the air' and it continued to legitimate these values on the Home Front
and in the military world long after disillusionment permeated the trenches.
The gentlemanly ideal that the RFC reproduced was one derived from the
ideology of the public schools but, given the novelty of the aeroplane, the
qualities of seeking adventure and courage were accentuated. As Sir
1 0/bid., pp. 37-39.
11 David Edgerton, op cit., p . 51.
12 Ibid.
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Walter Raleigh's official history of aviation in the Great War recounted:
We were late in the beginning, but once we had begun we
were not slow. We were rich in engineering skill and in the
material for the struggle. Best of all, we had a body of youth
fitted by temperament for the work of the air, and educated,
as if by design, to take risks with a light heart - the boys of
the Public Schools of England.13
An immense service was rendered in those early days by
gentlemen adventurers, engineers and pilots, who all for love
and nothing for reward, built machines and flew them.14
When Edgerton reproduced these quotes from Raleigh, he noted that
gentlemanly status covered the engineers and the pilots as well as the
adventurers. The professional status of these occupations, acquired
during the Great War, utilising the order that all pilots had to be officers
and directing recruitment drives towards the professional classes, resulted
in a lack of distance between the pilots, the engineers and the scientists.15
To understand Lindemann's actions against this context of gentlemanly
professionalism in the Air Ministry, his background and friendship with
13 Sir Walter Raleigh (1861-1 922) was a critic, essayist and Merton Professof of English
Literature at Oxford from 1914. His patriotic writings during the First World War paved the
way for an invitation to write the official history of the RAE in July 1918, just four months
after the service was established. His obituarist noted that "the fervour of his admiration
on the heroism of the air is everywhere apparent". D. Nichol Smith, "Sir Walter Alexander
Raleigh" in The Dictionary of National Biography, 1922-1930, ed. J. R. H. Weaver,
London: Oxford University Press, 1937, pp. 701-704; Sir Walter Raleigh, The War in the
Air, Vol. 1, London: Oxford University Press, 1922, p. 111.
14 /bid., p.121.
15 Ronald Clark, Tizard, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1965, pp. 23-24; Sir Henry Tizard,
Autobiography, Tizard Papers, HTT 713, pp. 73-80.
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Churchill must be studied, since it was this path that led him away from
professional assimilation with English science. His upbringing did not
conform to the educational path of public school and university that
characterised the professional classes. Born of an Alsatian father and
English mother, he was raised in Sidholme near Sidmouth and educated
by private tutors before spending three years at Blair Lodge in Scotland.
However, although he did not advertise the fact, he was actually born at
Baden-Baden in Germany. This upper-middle-class existence left
Lindemann proficient in three languages (English, German and French),
expert in tennis and classical music and confident in science . His father
pursued his amateur interest in science within his private laboratory and
Lindemann's early researches were exercises in dilettante
experimentation. l 6 Used to wealth and a secure income, Lindemann's
professional pursuit of science naturally turned to the centre of
international science in the Edwardian period, Germany. With no
language barrier and the manners of a gentleman, he undertook scientific
training at Darmstadt before gaining his Phd at the Physikalisches
Chemisches Institut under Nernst. 17 Private income and professional
success allowed the maintenance of a leisured lifestyle. Lindemann was
one of champions of tennis in a sport dominated by amateurs and it was
noted that "his normal chivalry to women [was]... notably absent on the
courts". 18 With financial security and exposure to the paternalistic
hierarchy of German science, Lindemann had not been socialized in the
world of professional English science.
16 The Earl of Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds: The Official Life of F. A.
Lindemann, pp. 22-29.
17 Lindemann's Phd was awarded for a programme of measuring the specific heat of
substances at very low temperatures in order to acquire proofs of Planck's Quantum
Theory. Ibid., pp. 30-37.
18 Ibid., p. 48.
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Lindemann's entrance to this world was hurried if unforced. Wartime
service was spent at the Royal Aircraft Factory in Farnborough where he
befriended Robert Watson Watt, the progenitor of radar, and was able to
overcome his disabling foreign background when mixing with professional
scientists or conforming to their norms. 19 Despite his wartime contacts, he
did not know many influential British physicists apart from Tizard and
Rutherford. It was Tizard who provided the testimonial and leverage for
his new position as Clarendon Professor of Physics, which included the
management of the Clarendon Laboratory. This base was far less
prestigious than its rival, the Cavendish, because the previous incumbent
did not pursue research and the university authorities had starved the
institution of funds necessary to establish a laboratory equipped to
professional standards. Lindemann overcame these obstacles by raising
funds from collegiate and commercial sources and his professorial career
left the Clarendon as a thriving laboratory and a scientific asset for
Oxford.20 Lindemann's competitive nature set the attainment of the
Cavendish's scientific reputation as the goal for his own institution but this
gold standard remained out of reach after 1932. Lindemann's elevation to
the Clarendon was rewarded by a fellowship of the Royal Society but
there was no further scientific recognition for his research and academic
achievements.
This was because Lindemann joined the social round of country-house
parties and enjoyed the lifestyle of a leisured aristocrat. With his private
19 Sir Robert Watson Watt, Three Steps to Victo,y: A Personal Account by Radar's
Greatest Pioneer, London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1957, p. 42.
20 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., pp. 81-114.
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source of income, he could afford a personal servant in his quarters at
Oxford who also doubled as a chauffeur. Lindemann was especially proud
of the vehicular status symbol, being driven around in a succession of
cars including a Mercedes, a Daimler and a (second-hand) Rolls Royce.21
This lifestyle corresponded with his political views. 22 Lindemann's
reactionary attitudes are best illustrated by the observations of Thomas
Jones, who stayed with him and Churchill at Chartwel during the miners'
strike of 1926. "Lindemann, I quickly discovered, regarded all miners, if
not all the working classes, as a species of sub-humans. This drove me to
the Extreme Left with Winston at the Right Centre [during the argument]."
Jones warned Churchill of the Professor's influence on his eldest son,
Randolph, and stated that "it was desirable he should not be unduly
Lindemannised" given the continuous democratisation of British politics
over the next twenty years.23 These eugenic overtones in Lindemann's
contempt for the lower classes were repugnant even to moderate Tories.
Lindemann first met Churchill in 1921 and they soon became firm friends.
Churchill, like other politicians, cultivated contacts in as many professions
as possible for use in his political career and journalism. Lindemann,
nicknamed the 'Prof', was a member of the same social set and as a
scientist, proving a convenient acquaintance for an author whose eclectic
interests straddled history, science and politics. A source of knowledge
turned to friendship as Churchill had lost his seat in the House of
Commons and had more time to renew and explore associations outside
21 Ibid., pp. 121-123.
22 Ibid., pp.146-156.
23 Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Volume V: 1922-1939, London: William
Heinemann Ltd., 1976, pp. 181-182. Thomas Jones was the secretary of the Coal
Committee negotiating with the owners and the strikers for a state sponsored
settlement. Churchill was chancellor of the Exchequer. His prescience was accurate
given the electoral victory of welfare socialism in 1945.
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of the hothouse of Parliamentary politics. Lindemann was still new to post-
war English 'Society' and required friendships with eminent men,
preferably of old and distinguished families, to anchor his entry and
secure acceptance to these exclusive circles. He was already on friendly
relations with the Earl of Birkenhead, but he became a companion of
Chu rch ill. 24
Lindemann began to holiday with the Churchills from the mid-twenties,
often staying at Chartwell or accompanying them on their summer trips to
the South of France and North Italy. 25 Churchill was appreciative of "the
Prof's agreeable and instructive company" and "swore by" him as an
impeccable oracle of knowledge on subjects of which Churchill was
himself ignorant.26 Their lobby was more successful because of the
dovetailing of their interests. Lindemann provided the scientific ballast for
Churchill's claims while the politician provided the channel where the
scientist could deploy his knowledge and skills in the political arena for the
good of his country. The major consequence of Lindemann's neglect of
the scientific world was his ignorance of the protocols and gentlemanly
codes that governed relationships amongst the professional classes. This
was noted by his biographer, "He [Lindemann] was as remote from the
proletariat as an aristocrat of the French ancien regime, and he knew little
of the retired clergyman type.. .or of the professional classes who were
working and issuing publications at the same time as himself."27
241he third Earl of Birkenhead was the father of Lindemann's biographer.
25 Martin Gilbert, op cit., pp.132, 141, 245, 277, 299, 437.
26 Ibid., pp. 245, 442.
27 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., p. 125.
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7.3 The Political Pressures of Air Defence, 1934-1 935
The political forces that shaped radar derived from the failure of the
Disarmament Conference in 1933. Britain's strategic vulnerability was
initially addressed through diplomatic initiatives at this conference that
aimed to outlaw the principal weapon of air attack, the bomber. However
Hitler's accession to power led to the dissolution of the Disarmament
Conference and the need to find new approaches that would solve
Britain's weakness and allow Hitler to revise the Versailles Treaty through
negotiation and stabilise Germany's position in the international system.
The drawing-board was the Defence Requirements Committee and this
decided that air rearmament was an economic method of deterring
potential German aggression while demonstrating to the domestic
electorate that the Government was responding to their anxieties about air
attack. The change of policy was announced in July 1934 by Stanley
Baldwin, who had sat on the sub-committee of the Defence Requirements
Committee with Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister and assessed different schemes
of air rearmament. Ministers were addressing Britain's weaknesses in air
defence through policies of diplomacy and deterrance, the precursors of
appeasement, but a concrete scientific solution would reduce the
probability of a successful air attack on the British Isles.28
The Air Exercises of 1934 had brought home to the Government the
deficiencies of air defence. Under the rules of these nocturnal wargames
the Air Ministry and the Houses of Parliament were successfully destroyed
without difficulty. Sir Winston Churchill chillingly described London as "the
28 Malcolm Smith, op cit., pp. 109-139; David E. Fisher, op cit., p. 23; John Ferris, "The
Theory of a "French Air Menace": Anglo-French Relations and the British Home Defence
Air Force Programmes of 1921-25", Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 10 (1987), pp. 62-
83; Sir Robert Watson-Watt, op cit., pp. 78-80.
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greatest target in the world.. .a valuable fat cow tied up to attract the
beasts of prey", like Rome, prostrate before the barbarians. 29 Lindemann
took the first step independently by writing to The Times on the need for
research into a system of air defence. The letter was peppered with
references to "gangster Governments", "gases", "bacteria" and other lurid
phrases that conjured up the nightmare of aerial attack. Within this
rhetorical flourish could be divined Lindemann's unstated goal: a strong
and concerted effort to develop a system of air defence independent of
the Air Ministry and the Civil Service. "The problem is far too important
and too urgent to be left to the casual endeavours of individuals or
departments."30 Lindemann's aims had been fleshed out years earlier.
Amongst his positions in the world of aeronautical research, he had been
a member of the Anti-Aircraft Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence which was chaired by Lord Haldane until its dissolution on his
death in 1928. 31 Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet and the
Committee of Imperial Defence, asked Lindemann for his views on air
defence. Lindemann replied after the dissolution of the committee:
Though the results attained by this particular Sub-Committee
may not have been as gratifying as could be wished, I am
convinced that there is not only room but a very decided
need for some such Sub-Committee provided a suitable
Chairman and personnel can be found. As I have often told
you, it seems to me that general scientific information and
29 Sir Winston Churchill, quoted in Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, Baldwin: A
Biography, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969, P. 1085.
30 F. A. Lindemann, "Science and Air Bombing", The Times, 8th August 1934.
31 Lindemann was appointed to the Meteorology Sub-Committee of the Aeronautical
Research Committee, 1921-1924. In 1925, he was appointed Chairman of the Kite
Balloon Sub-Committee of the Aeronautical Research Committee. In 1926, he was
appointed to the latter committee, on which he served until 1932.
205
advice are essential for any proper consideration of defence
problems, and a Sub-Committee to suggest and discuss
new problems and methods would seem to me an important
adjunct of the C.l.D. [Committee of Imperial Defence].32
A month after the letter to The Times, Lindemann had escaped to the
South of France with Churchill and his son Randolph. Whilst there, they
called upon Stanley Baldwin, Lord President of the Council and leader of
the Conservative Party, during his holiday at Aix. Baldwin was the power
behind the throne in the National Government and wielded more influence
over parliament and party than the Prime Minister, James Ramsay
Macdonald. Baldwin's position outside the main Departments of State left
him able to catch fish that could slip through other ministerial nets. The
two highlighted Britain's vulnerabilities and called for a research campaign
into new methods including Lindemann's pet, aerial mines. The
backbencher and his adviser therefore raised the matter of air defence
with the man who had the power, inclination and time to fulfil their
demands. Air defence and radar were indissolubly linked with the policies
of the National Government and the internal machinations of the
Conservative Party.33
Rowe, a scientific civil servant at the Air Ministry, was motivated by the
cultural fear of the aircraft and the perceived vulnerability of the British
Isles to collect the fifty-three relevant files on air defence.34 His misgivings
32 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., pp. 174-5.
33 Ibid., p. 175; Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 781; Martin Gilbert, op cit,.
p. 560.
34 A. P. Rowe to Henry Tizard, 22nd February 1936. Tizard Papers HTT 79; A. P. Rowe,
Our Story of Radar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948, p. 1. Rowe was
"employed wholly on armament problems and the legality of even this was open to doubt".
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were confirmed by the miniscule attention the subject had received at the
Air Ministry and he compiled a memorandum surveying the state of air
defence for the attention of his superior, I-larry Egerton Wimperis, the
Director of Scientific Research, on the 4th June 1934, concluding "that
unless science evolved some new method of aiding air defence, we were
likely to lose the next war if it started within ten years". 35 Rowe
recommended bringing the memorandum to the attention of the Secretary
of State for Air, Lord Londonderry.
Wimperis read Rowe's memorandum and lunched with his old friend
Professor A. V. Hill at the Athenaeum, discussing the possibilities of a
'death ray' in combination with the importance of air defence. 36 Hill argued
that the 'death ray' was a sterile approach but that air defence problems
should be scientifically investigated. 37 Hill was an idiosyncratic
conservative who opposed any intrusion of the state on the professional
world of science especially in the guise of 'planning' or Marxism and
shared the public concern with air defence.
Wimperis wrote a memorandum which was sent to Dowding, Ellington and
Londonderry suggesting a committee "of outsiders" to study the problems
of air defence on the 12th November.3 8 The paucity of research resources
and personnel at the Air Ministry demanded the recruitment of external
professionals if the state of air defence was to be evaluated successfully.
35 Ibid., p. 5.
36 Archibald Vivian Hill was the Royal Society's Fowlerton Research Professor in
physiology at University College, London froml926 to 1951. He was awarded the Nobel
Prize in 1922.
37 David E. Fisher, op cit., p. 27.
38 Ibid.; R. W. Clark, op cit., pp. 109-111. The suggestion for an expert committee of
academic scientists and the prospective members came from Wimperis. H. E. Wimperis,
'Radiant energy methods of A.A. Defence. Note of a discussion with Professor A. V. Hill,
FRS", Tizard Papers HTT700.
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The inclusion of scientific specialists and academic personnel on
aeronautical research was already a long-standing practice. For example,
Tizard was Rector of Imperial College in London and also doubled as the
Chairman of the Aeronautical Research Council. Both Dowding and
Londonderry endorsed the proposal. However Londonderry was a
confidante of Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, and enjoyed few
links with the powerful spine of the National Government, the
Conservative Party. He was appointed because of his enthusiasm for all
things aeronautical and his tenure as Secretary of State for Air left the Air
Ministry in a political backwater. He saw the proposed Committee for the
Scientific Survey of Air Defence (CSSAD) as not just a response to the
misgivings of individual officers and administrators but also an opportune
answer to parliamentary and cabinet pressure. When the Disarmament
Conference and the British diplomatic campaign to outlaw the bomber
foundered in 1933, the political factions supporting disarmament and
rearmament utilised the images and fear of aerial bombardment to support
their arguments. Questions about bombing and air policy were raised in
parliament between November 1933 and July 1934 before culminating in
the 'air panic' that crystallised public anxiety during the winter and spring
of 1935.39 This Committee strengthened Londonderry's hand in
responding to Conservative critics like Baldwin who distrusted the Air
Ministry and tended to marginalise its Minister on the increasingly
important policies that linked aviation, diplomacy and strategy.40
Baldwin had already become involved in the problem of air defence
39 Un Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber: The Fear of Air Attack and British Politics,
1932-1939 London: Royal Historical Society, 1980, pp. 1-47, 68.
40 J. A. Cross, Lord Swinton , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982, p.135.
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through the overtures of Churchill and Lindemann. He had suggested that
Lindemann contact him upon his return to London but did not see him until
after the end of the Conservative Party Conference in early October.
Lindemann's sense of urgency was apparent when he telephoned for an
appointment with Baldwin on 29th September followed up by a letter to his
Private Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Fry, on 9th October. When they eventually
met, Baldwin suggested that Lindemann should summarise his proposals
before the new Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence
dealing with air defence, under the chairmanship of Air Chief Marshall Sir
Robert Brooke-Popham. To this end, Baldwin checked that Lindemann
had not approached the Air Ministry through the offices of the Assistant
Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Wing-Commander E. J.
Hodsall. Having avoided stepping on ministerial toes, Baldwin arranged
through Hodsall for Lindemann to be invited to appear before the Brooke-
Popham Committee.
Lindemann's qualms about the organisation of air defence reflected his
earlier ideas that were expressed in the letter to Hankey in 1928. He wrote
to Baldwin on 3rd November questioning the effectiveness of the Brooke-
Popham Committee. Lindemann foresaw a committee of scientists and
service representatives under the chairmanship of an eminent and
dynamic individual like Lord Weir - a member of 'the great and the good'
but independent of the Civil Service.4 1 Lindemann believed that the need
to develop rapidly a system of air defence required a committee
unburdened by the normal constraints of the civil service or the narrow
remit of a single department, under the aegis of the Committee of Imperial
41 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., p. 175; Keith MiddTemas and John Barnes, op cit.,
pp.1086-1087.
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Defence. Independently from Tizard, Lindemann also concluded that only
cooperation with the armed forces would successfully bring such a system
to operational effectiveness. Lindemann met Tizard at the Royal Society
on the 15th November to sound out his response to the proposals.
According to his notes, "Mr. Tizard undertook to support them if possible"
and he thought he had secured a certain degree of professional support
for his plan through Tizard and his contacts.42
As Chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee from 1934 and a
former Secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research,
Tizard was perceived to be the natural Chairman of the new committee.
His experience in wartime research for the RFC and his wide links with the
scientific communities in the administrative and academic spheres were
considered to be supremely useful assets. Tizard was a Fellow of the
Royal Aeronautical Society, a Fellow of the Royal Society and a member
of the Athenaeum Club. As Chairman he was an expert in aeronautical
science with a track record in research and was thus deemed to have the
capability of teasing out new possibilities in the field of air defence. His
scientific contacts also gave him the influence to call expert witnesses and
to direct research to those most capable of producing results. He had
already met Sir Philip Joubert de Ia Ferte, Commandant of the RAF Staff
College, Wimperis and other concerned parties at a meeting of Air
Defence Great Britain, that part of the RAF dealing with the defence of the
metropolis, in October 1934. They discussed means of detecting incoming
aircraft and Tizard advised that acoustical methods were useless whilst
42 R. W. clark, op cit., p. 112; Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 1087.
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mooting electrical processes as a possible alternative.43 Wimperis's
proposition for a new Committee was approved by the Air Council on 12th
November 1934 and letters were sent out soon after inviting Tizard, Hill
and P.M.S. Blackett, Professor of Physics at Birkbeck College in the
University of London, to become members.44
Meanwhile Lindemann wrote to Churchill on 25th November outlining the
continuing inadequacies in British air defence. 45 Churchill was aware of
Lindemann's attempts to engage with the government machinery, as it
formed one part of their two-pronged assault on the Government.
Lindemann's final attempt came with his evidence to the Brooke-Popham
Committee on 27th November which stopped his campaign with a
bureaucratic finality, lost in the yawning depths of a report. Churchill's turn
came a day later with the parliamentary debate on air policy and
rearmament. Churchill set down an amendment criticising the
Government's rearmament policy and warned of the dangers of German
rearmament, especially its bombing capability.46
Baldwin's reply to this speech included the claim that there was no
defence against the bomber. The leader of the Tories would not give
ammunition to the critics of the Government unnecessarily especially after
he became aware that the Tizard Committee was on the drawing board.
Lindemann however took this statement at face value as the symptom of a
"defeatist attitude" and wrote off Baldwin as an advantageous conduit for
43 H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy between the Wars, 19 18-1939, London:
Wifliam Heinemann Ltd., 1976, pp. 323-324.
44 Ibid., p. 324.
45 Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 570.
46 Ibid., p. 573.
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changing the policies concerning air defence.47
Lindemann had actually gained Baldwin's attention, as shown by the aid
given in October. Baldwin now turned to Hodsall, one of his main advisers
on military concerns, to keep him informed of developments on air
defence.48 Hodsall had been acting as Secretary of the Committee of
Imperial Defence during Hankey's sojourn in Australia. He had suggested
"a joint military and scientific committee" to assess the number of
inventions that were coming to the attention of the Service Departments.49
Hodsall soon became aware of Rowe's endeavours and informed Baldwin
of events in the Air Ministry.50 Hodsall's interest in these matters was
confirmed and reciprocated by Wimperis who met him on 29th November
to discuss the new Committee and secure its position within the Service
Ministries. The alternatives were a departmental committee or as a sub-
committee under the Committee of Imperial Defence. Wimperis's plan for
a departmental committee was agreed to by Hodsall. Agreement was
inevitably provisional given the intensely political nature of the subject and
the interest shown in this matter by their political masters. Hodsall then
related his conversation with Wimperis to Baldwin on the following day.5l
Lindemann was irked by the failure of his approach to Baldwin but
continued to sting the Air Ministry. However, his approaches would never
lead to administrative action because of his friendship with Churchill. As
Hodsall observed, "Whitehall shied off Lindemann like the plague, the
47 Ibid., p. 578.
48 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 753.
9 Ibid., p. 1086.
50 Ibid., p. 782.
51/bjd., p. 1088.
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Government scientists hated the sight of him, and because Churchill had
Lindemann as his stooge.. .Ministers avoided him also, as being highly
dangerous."52 Lindemann's last throw of the dice before the end of 1934
was a letter to Lord Londonderry, the Air Minister, outlining and modifying
his proposals in the light of Baldwin's disappointing parliamentary
response. Lindemann now called for the same committee that he had
proposed earlier to be established under the power of the Prime Minister.
Its remit was also narrowed to the discovery or invention of methods of air
defence which the relevant Service Ministries would then implement.
Londonderry, already supporting the CSSAD as a departmental initiative,
wrote back to inform Lindemann of this and suggest that he should
contact Tizard.53 This correspondence anticipated the approach of
Churchill and Lindemann to the Prime Minister in 1935.
The CSSAD was an unusual committee because of the wide range of
political views represented and because of the exclusion of aeronautical
experts from the aircraft industry or the academic world. Hill was a
physiologist with an international reputation as a Nobel Laureate and
experience in military research as director of the Anti-Aircraft Experimental
Section during the Great War. The section was known as 'Hill's Brigands'
and worked on the improvement of anti-aircraft gunnery and the behaviour
of shells. Hill ended the War as a Brevet-Major, having joined up as a
Captain in the Cambridge Regiment. 54 He was third Wrangler in the
52 Ibid.; Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets, Volume III 1931-1963, London: William
Collins Sons & Co. Ltd., 1974, P. 144. "Lord Butler describes Lindemann as 'that sharp-
witted sharp-tongued, pertinacious and more than slightly conspiratorial character who
has long been Churchill's closest friend and confidant'."
53 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., pp. 176-1 78.
54 Meg Weston Smith, "E. A. Milne and the creation of air defence: Some letters from an
unprincipled Brigand, 1916-1919", Notes and Records of the Royal Society of London, vol.
44 (1990), pp. 241-255.
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mathematical tripos of 1907 at Cambridge and subsequently took the
natural sciences tripos before taking up physiology as a Fellow at Trinity
College, Cambridge. His elite education was combined with his position in
one of the most important professional positions in English science - the
Biological Secretary of the Royal Society. Hill's interest in defending his
chosen profession of scientist and his individual brand of conservatism led
him to become an Independent Member of Parliament for Cambridge from
1940.55 He was also a member of the Athenaeum Club from 1923.56
Blackett, on the other hand, was the son of a stockbroker who had
embarked on the naval career chosen for him, attending Osborne Naval
College and Dartmouth Naval College. After active service during the First
World War he had availed himself of the opportunity given to ex-naval
officers to attend Cambridge University and took the natural sciences
tripos. Under Rutherford's eye, he undertook research in the Cavendish
Laboratory for the following twelve years culminating in his discovery of
the positron in 1932. It was through this connection that he was probably
brought into contact with Tizard. Combined with his membership of the
scientific elite, Blackett's politics were to the left of either Tizard's or Hill's
and he is remembered as one of the "outstanding 'progressive' scientists"
of this period.57 Unlike Gary Werskey's 'Visible College', Blackett was a
left-liberal, who shared the post-Depression enthusiasm for planning but
not for scientific socialism in its Soviet mode. With Wimperis representing
the Air Ministry, these three formed the core of the committee under
55 William McGucken, Scientists, Society and State: The Social Relations of Science
Movement in Britain, 1931-1947, Columbus, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1984, pp.166-
168, 185-193. 225-225. This outlines Hill's attempts, following his membership of the
Tizard Committee, to reorganise state research and free scientific resources for the war
effort.
56 Royal Society Yearbook 1923, London: The Royal Society, 1923.
57 Gary Werskey, The Visible College: A Collective Biography of British Scientists and
Socialists of the 1930s, London: Free Association Books, 1988 [1978], p. 10.
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Tizard. Their careers and their positions reflected the comfortable world of
metropolitan science that governed these connections. An Oxbridge
education, a prestigious university post and membership of the
Athenaeum were all suitable credentials for the membership of the Tizard
Committee.
7.4 The CSSAD and the Promotion of Air Defence
After the CSSAD was appointed, the actions of the committee and its
political opponents were inextricably intertwined. Tizard and the other
members needed a viable air defence technology to justify their existence
before Churchill and Lindemann persuaded their political masters to
abolish the CSSAD and replace it with a new committee beyond the Air
Ministry's control that would support aerial mines. Tizard received the
invitation to become Chairman of the CSSAD in mid-December, 1934.58
Ronald Clark argues that "Tizard did not leap at the idea; he warmed to
the work over the weeks rather than jumped at it immediately.. ."59 This
hesitation should be linked to Tizard's awareness of Lindemann's hopes
for a new committee, his gradual appreciation of the latter's failure, and
the effect of such a position upon his rectorship of Imperial College. The
terms of reference were "to consider how far recent advances in scientific
and technical knowledge can be used to strengthen the present methods
of defence against hostile aircraft". The committee also had the power to
"consult" any expert.60 The terms were necessarily imprecise because of
the lack of research on the subject since the last war. More surprising to
the historical onlooker is the free hand given to committee members to
58J M. Wright to Henry Tizard, 12th December, 1934. Tizard Papers, HTT 111.
59 R. W. Clark, op cit., 112.
60 Ibid.
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explore and follow avenues without any formal supervision or control on
the part of the Air Ministry beyond the contributions of Wimperis.
Wimperis's judgment and the professional credentials of the scientists
were considered sufficient for the level of trust required to sit on an Air
Ministry Committee. Their military records were an advantage and their
services were given for free despite Hill's quibbles about a fee.
In his proposal for the establishment of a scientific committee on air
defence, Wimperis dismissed claims that a 'death ray' could disable
aircraft engines, kill humans or trigger bombs. Alongside this closure of
the 'death ray' concept, he wrote about the increasing difficulties in air
defence posed by the improvement in aircraft technology and argued that
only a scientific survey of progressive technologies would bridge the
defensive deficit. 61 The CSSAD was not established to exploit a specific
technological development. The belief of ministers, military officers and
civil servants in the general promise of the ideology of progress, as
articulated by the scientists, led to expectations that a scientific survey
would provide a solution to the weaknesses of air defence. Wimperis
contacted Robert Watson Watt, the Superintendant of the Radio
Department at the National Physical Laboratory, to consider further the
possibilities of a 'death ray'. Wimperis represented the Air Ministry on the
Radio Research Board of the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research and had met Watt in this capacity. Watt met Wimperis
unofficially at the Air Ministry on the 18th January 1935 and promised to
calculate the power required to kill a pilot or disable his aircraft using a
'death ray'. 62 It is unclear if Wimperis was trying to verify the impossibility
61 H. E. Wimperis, "Radiant energy methods of A.A. Defence".
62 Sir Robert Watson-Watt, op cit., p. 81.
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of a 'death ray' with independent scientific advice and head off useless
discussion with Hodsall or whether he thought farming out the proposal
might raise some fresh angle previously unconsidered. It could have been
a mixture of the two but it does demonstrate the unpromising material with
which the CSSAD had to work.
Watt wrote two memoranda: one debunking the 'death ray' and one
elaborating on the possibilities of radiolocation as a form of air defence.
Watt's account of the work leading up to these drafts was contested by his
deputy, Arnold Wilkins. Watt claimed that he set a problem on the 'death
ray' for Wilkins and that their subsequent discussions rubbished the
claims of the 'death ray'. Watt only posed the question of radio detection
and location whilst drafting his first memorandum to Wimperis in order to
leaven its uncompromisingly bleak conclusions. 63 However Wilkins
claimed that Watt was displeased with the failure of the 'death ray'
problem and asked him if there were other possibilities that might help the
Air Ministry. Wilkins recalled reading the results of engineers at the
General Post Office who had reported aircraft leaving echoes on their
radio equipment. Watt and Wilkins calculated the power needed to detect
an aircraft and found that it was theoretically feasible. 64 Watt regarded
Wimperis as an influential figure and was unwilling to report back that the
'death ray' was a total failure lest his own standing suffer. Radiolocation
was initially a desperate attempt to secure Wimperis's approval and
improve Watt's reputation for willingness and originality amongst the
community of government scientists. The beginnings of radar were not the
work of a brilliant mind discovering the military application of a pure
631b1d., pp. 81-82.
64 David E. Fisher, op cit., pp. 28-29.
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science.
Watt's second memorandum, "Detection and Location of Aircraft by Radio
Methods" drew directly on the work of the Radio Research Board. First of
all, Watt wrote that obvious methods of detection such as sound, light and
infra-red were too unreliable. This process of elimination left radio-waves
as the only practical alternative. Detection technologies were either
improbable or non-existent and Watt's rhetorical enhancement of the
potential of radio accorded with Tizard's assertion that only electrical
methods were practical. However Watt not only asserted the means but
also the method. His research since the war had been the exploration and
refinement of radio techniques in atmospherics. He therefore outlined,
succinctly and clearly, with accompanying calculations, the two methods of
radiolocation available: "illumination" (also known as "floodlighting") and
pulse. The latter was to be preferred:
If now the sender emits its energy in very brief pulses,
equally spaced in time, as in the present technique of echo-
sounding of the ionosphere, the distance between craft and
sender may be measured directly by observation on a
cathode-ray oscillograph directly calibrated with a linear
distance scale, the whole technique already being worked
out for ionospheric work at Radio Research Station.65
His pulse technique would approximately measure height, speed and
course. Watt implied his own suitability for conducting the necessary
65 Robert Watson Watt, "Detection and Location of Aircraft by Radio Methods" in Robert
Watson Watt, op cit., pp. 470-474, 471.
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experiment by marketing radiolocation as an extension of the practices
employed at Slough under his tutelage. "I am, however, convinced that the
work can only be brought to a successful issue by the utilization of the
wide range of cathode-ray technique in which Radio Research Station,
Slough has specialized for many years, and in which its experience is
unique."66 He also disarmed potential critics by arguing that ionospheric
disturbances could be filtered out and that secrecy would cover up the
detection of radiolocation devices by other countries. Watt's whole
proposal was a carefully constructed attempt to reorient the work of the
Radio Research Station to an area of national importance. Watt was
aware of the crucial nature of air defence for British politicians and their
public. He wanted to capitalise on an opportunity that gave him the chance
to supervise the development of a system of air defence; a surer road to
professional recognition and social honours than his position as a middle-
ranking official in an obscure cog of government.
Waft's proposal was scheduled to be discussed by the CSSAD at their
first meeting on 28th January 1935. Whilst Londonderry's initiative
appeared to be uncovering some promising material, Churchill and
Lindemann were unwilling to let go of the rope. Within the first week of the
New Year Lindemann returned to the attack, writing to Londonderry on the
7th January and stating "that he and his 'friends' would feel obliged 'to
continue to press for more vigorous action". 67 That same day he sent a
draft note calling for a Committee of Imperial Defence inquiry into air
defence to Churchill and Austen Chamberlain, which, signed by all three,
would be forwarded to the Prime Minister. Churchill and Lindemann hoped
66 Ibid., pp. 473-474.
67 Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 623.
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to circumvent the leadership of the Conservatives by appealing to the
Prime Minister directly with the support of Austen Chamberlain, "the elder
statesman of the Party".68 Macdonald agreed to their proposals in his
reply on January lOth.69 However MacDonald was unaware of the
existence of the Tizard Committee but was soon persuaded of its
advantages by his close friend, Londonderry. MacDonald wrote to
Chamberlain again on the 15th, in a letter drafted by Wimperis, outlining
the proposed work of the Tizard Committee and, as a sop to these critics,
calling on Lindemann to give evidence.70
In Cabinet it was agreed that the best way of neutralising these dissenters
was to invite Lindemann to join the Tizard Committee and establish a sub-
Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence studying the same
subject. Hankey had taken up Hodsall's ideas and presented them to
Baldwin and MacDonald who now forged a consensus on the subject in
the National Government. 71 Churchill and Lindemann had not received
any sign to persuade them that the Tizard Committee was anything more
than a tool of the Air Ministry. When the letter of invitation was sent out by
the Air Ministry on 30th January, Lindemann's "reply was cautious in the
extreme". 72 In letters to Churchill, Lindemann branded the Tizard
Committee as "totally inadequate" and "a mere waste of time". He thought
that under departmental control, such a Committee suffered from a
68 Ibid., p. 587.
69 Ibid., p. 624; The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., pp. 178-179; Keith Middlemas and John
Barnes, op cit., pp.1087-i 088.
70 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 1088; The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit.,
pp.179-180; Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 624; H. E. Wimperis, Diary entry, 15th January 1935.
lizard Papers HTT700.
71 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 1089; H. E. Wimperis, Diary entry, 23rd
January 1935. lizard Papers HTT700. "From 3 to 3.30 with Londonderry on the work and
organization of our new Committee. The Government would like us to add Lindemann.";
Stephen Roskill, op cit., pp.143-i 47.
72 Stephen Roskill, op cit., p. 145.
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"complete lack of status and power" leaving it unable to "proceed with
experiments". 73 The two considered the Air Ministry to be sensitive to
dissent within the Conservative Party and unwilling to act in any way that
would compromise its standing.
The first meeting of the CSSAD discussed the "Possibility of detecting
short wave electromagnetic reaction reflected from the metal surfaces,
using a ground source..." and the height of balloon barrages. Wimperis
stated that Watson-Watt's memorandum wou(d e cccu(aed as soon as c(
was received.74 The memorandum was received on 12th February and
the importance of its impact can be gauged by the meeting that took place
in the Athenaeum two days later. 75 Tizard, Wimperis and Sir Christopher
Bullock lunched with Watt and discussed his proposals. Within the
convivial familiarity of a clubland lunch, Watt was questioned over his
memorandum and had to make his sales pitch before the Chairman of the
CSSAD, the Permanent Secretary of the Air Ministry and its Director of
Scientific Research. Bullock was probably invited to keep Londonderry
informed of developments and ensure departmental support for the
development of Watt's ideas. Clark describes these "next moves" as
"made on a purely personal basis" and does not ascribe any motives to
this meeting. 76 Given Lindemann's campaign to dissolve the CSSAD, it
required good reasons to justify its continued existence. Hence there was
the need for this urgent meeting a week before the CSSAD was due to
meet again on the 21st February.
73 Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 624.
74 Extracts from Minutes of CSSAD. 1st Meeting, 28th January 1935. Tizard Papers
HTT7O5; R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 117.
75 Notes on Sir Robert Watson-Watt's book, 'Three Steps to Victory". Tizard Papers
HTT699.
76 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 117.
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The site was picked because at least two of the participants, Tizard and
Wimperis (and probably Bullock as well) were members. Waft would be
assured of privacy behind the doors of the club and interested members of
the Conservative Party were unlikely to witness this meeting. For the
members, there was also the advantage that the 'guest', playing away
from home, would be discomforted by eating in the heartland of the
Establishment, uncertain of custom or etiquette. However the impression
upon Watson Watt remains unknown because he never mentions this
early foray into clubland in his autobiography. The meeting was judged
successful as Wimperis noted in his diary, "It seems that it will be worth
while doing some experimental work at once at Orfordness with N.P.L.
[National Physical Laboratory] radio staff on Radio detection." 77 Waft had
been able to persuade these powers to support his proposal whilst they in
return gained something concrete to give to their political masters.
On the same day as the Athenaeum meeting, Churchill, Lindemann and
Chamberlain had again arranged to see MacDonald to push for air
defence to come under the responsibility of the Committee of Imperial
Defence. Lindemann had already seen Londonderry on the 12th February
to press for the dissolution of the Tizard Committee. According to
Lindemann, MacDonald "agreed that they had made out the case and
promised to get the Tizard Committee to present a report at an early date
and then to wind it up and form the sort of Committee under the CID which
had been demanded" 78 Following this up, Lindemann appealed to the
77 H. E. Wimperis, Diary entry, 14th February 1935. Tizard papers HTT700. It should also
be noted that Orfordness, the first site for R.D.F. experimentation was mooted from the
beginning.
78 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 1089.
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1922 Committee to support the dissenters in their campaign to reform air
defence. On the 15th February, Wimperis asked Dowding for an initial
£10000, to finance a first batch of experiments at Orfordness. Dowding
was sceptical, despite the confidence of Tizard and Wimperis, and he
suggested a demonstration of the theory. Wimperis, unable to disagree
with the pursestrings, suggested that Watt should demonstrate detection
at the Radio unit in Slough. 79 By mid-February air defence had spawned
one actual committee and a hypothetical organisational alternative. The
departmental committee was fighting for its existence, protected by its
ministerial patron, Lord Londonderry but MacDonald, Baldwin, Hankey
and the Tory dissenters all agreed that the Committee of Imperial Defence
should add air defence to its empire.
Apart from the quotidian agenda that dogged the CSSAD, a
demonstration of 'practical proof confirming the existence of the
radiodetection of aircraft promised to be the only card that the Air Ministry
could play for the retention of the committee. Empirical confirmation would
strengthen the hand of Dowding in asking for finance and Londonderry in
defending the Tizard Committee against criticisms of powerlessness and
departmental inertia. With Churchill and Lindemann urging that the new
sub-committee should be established before the Air Estimates were
debated on the 19th March, it was critical that a 'successful' demonstration
was conducted as soon as possible. Watt met Dowding at the Royal
Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough to explain the layout of the
demonstration and veto any thoughts of failure:
R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 118; H.E. Wimperis, Diary entry, 15th February 1935. Tizard
Papers HTT700. "Have asked for £10,000 to start the Orfordness experiment."
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We will drive this mobile set to a field ten or twenty miles
from Daventry, and if you will make one of your aircraft fly up
and down the Daventry beam at a height of eight thousand
feet or so, we will show you large indications on the visual
display. But (I added in effect) this is a game which I cannot
and will not play unless I am allowed to write my own rules.
They are quite simple. If I score, I have won. If I don't score,
'it don't mean a thing'! If we don't get the indications we
expect, it will not be because we are wrong in our theory or
seriously wrong in our rough figuring. It will be because we
will have 'lashed up' a rough equipment meant for other
purposes, set up a miserable strand of wire as an aerial,
picked an unsuitable site, mis-estimated the strength of the
Daventry beam, misinstructed the pilot, who can't be allowed
to know why he is patrolling a dull and vacant beat, or have
done one of a hundred things that should be avoided in a
crucial demonstration, but can't all be avoided in a hurried
demonstration.BO
Waft, unaware of these political pressures, wished to safeguard the future
of radiodetection by preventing the use of one demonstration as the sole
guarantor of future development. He also arranged for the Heyford
bomber to trail "a long communications aerial" in order to increase the
chances of success. 81 If the demonstration did not succeed, Dowding
80 Sir Robert Watson-Watt, op cit., p. 109. I follow Watt in referring to this event as a
demonstration though it conforms to the definition of an experiment in that it was an
attempt to verify empirically a theoretical proposition and application.
81 Robert Buderi, The Invention that changed the World: The Story of Radar from War to
Peace, London: Little, Brown and Company, 1996, p. 58.
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was to accept that it was due to the lack of sensitive equipment or human
error rether than a theoretical failing on the part of Watt. However, this
financial veto was evidence that the Air Ministry was prepared to
recognise the Tizard Committee as a failure if radiodetection proved a
false god.
The demonstration took place at Daventry on 26th February 1935. Watt,
with Rowe as the witness for 'success' or 'failure', drove out to a grassy
field in sight of the BBC Daventry radio masts in the early morning where
an antenna had been set up the day before with a cathode-ray
oscillograph screen. It was hoped that the Daventry masts, the nearest
sited to the Radio Unit at Slough would provide the radio signals needed
for the demonstration. Rowe was shown the visual effect of the Daventry
signal on the oscillograph screen as a baseline of 'normality' from which
he could measure the effects of radiodetection. This was a dot about an
eighth of an inch in length. A Heyford bomber from Farnborough flew four
runs over Daventry, turning the dot into a line that wavered between half
an inch and an inch and a quarter in length; growing and dwindling as the
plane approached and receded the site. 82 This 'string and sealing wax'
approach was considered adequate evidence for the existence of a
radiodetection application. The flaws of the demonstration were covered
up by the gentlemanly rules that governed such events. A large proportion
of Watt's claims were 'taken on trust' since he effectively controlled the
demonstration. Apart from Rowe as a witness, Tizard and his committee
had accepted Watt at face value. This was the hallmark of their
gentlemanly professionalism - the courtesy and acceptance of character
82 /bid., p.111.
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that professionals extended to each other. If there had been real doubts,
the Tizard Committee could have demanded proper scientific verification
before themselves or outside experts that would have rigorously criticised
the demonstration.
However the pressure for results demanded that Tizard and Wimperis
gamble. They had to rely upon their own professional judgment of Watt's
character and one trusted witness as the criterion for success. As
Wimperis wrote to Dowding, "You enquired this morning whether
preliminary tests to check the calculations could be made with existing
apparatus at Ditton Park. Mr. Tizard and I have sufficient confidence in Mr.
Watson Watt's work not to regard this as a necessary preliminary.. "83 In a
mirror image of the Tizard Committee's reliance upon Watt, was the trust
that Londonderry and the Air Ministry placed in Tizard. This trading in the
reputations of experts was vindicated by the Daventry demonstration.
Rowe reported that radiodetection was "demonstrated beyond doubt".84
Wimperis received the news in a letter from Rowe the next day and asked
for the finances that Dowding had promised on the 28th February.85
Moreover Baldwin instructed Tizard to keep him informed of developments
upon his Committee. This provided additional political support on a
personal basis from the main power in the National Government and gave
Tizard a valuable conduit outside of the Air Ministry.86
83 Ibid., p. 109.
84 Ibid., p. 112.
85 "Glad indeed to have a letter from Rowe (I was at Folkestone) saying that yesterday's
radio tests had been successful. Good Watson Watt!" "Dowding delighted with the
success of experiment. I can now have 'all the money I want within reason!" H. E.
Wimperis, Diary entries, 27th February and 28th February 1935. Tizard Papers HTT700.
86 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 782. Baldwin chose a number of advisers
during his first term as Prime Minister including Tizard and Sir Basil Blackett. Ibid., p. 496.
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The success of the Daventry experiment temporarily thwarted
Lindemann's plans and removed the offer of a place for him on the Tizard
Committee. 87 At the third meeting of the committee on the 4th March, it
was agreed that further radiodetection experiments should take place at
Orfordness on the Suffolk coast. 88 Meanwhile Baldwin was taking steps to
establish the new sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence
without jeopardising the existence of the Tizard Committee. Macdonald
and Hankey were both supporting this innovation but Baldwin was the
prime mover in providing political impetus to air defence whilst outfianking
Tory critics at the same time. Baldwin's choice of Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister
as the new Chairman was based on a longstanding friendship stretching
back to the break-up of the Lloyd George administration in 1922. This
friendship was strengthened by their cooperation on air rearmament in
committees of the Committee of Imperial Defence and Cunliffe-Lister was
perceived by Baldwin "as his main co-adjutor in this field". 89 The
appointment of Cunliffe-Lister marked Baldwin's exertion of control over
the area of air defence and the final marginalisation of Londonderry.
Puzzlingly, Clark represents this new sub-committee as the "first success
of the Churchill-Lindemann lobby" without examining their underlying
political failure.9° Neither Churchill nor Lindemann were able to do much
more than watch as their original proposal was adopted and modified
without increasing their political influence one iota. The sub-committee
87 Sir Hugh Dowding to Henry Tizard, 21st March 1935. lizard Papers HTT11I.
88 Extracts from Meetings of CSSAD. Third Meeting, 4th March 1935. Tizard Papers
H1T705. The Daventry experiment formed the thirteenth minute of the meeting which was
primarily concerned with the effectiveness of gunnery in destroying incoming enemy
aircraft. Since this was Hill's area of expertise, see also A. V. Hill to Henry lizard, 21st
March 1935 and A. V. Hill to lizard, 25th March 1935. lizard Papers HTT57.
89 J. A. Cross, op cit., p. 135.
90 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 122.
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was to study "the political and more general problems of air defence" while
the lizard Committee was retained as the technical committee.91
Londonderry had written to Baldwin on 14th March over the uncertain
future of the Tizard Committee as this structure developed, stressing its
early successes as "a small and active Committee working in close
harmony with a sympathetic department." 92 However the incorporation of
the lizard Committee within the new Sub-Committee was not considered
useful by Baldwin after the Daventry demonstration. Wimperis certainly did
not see the new structure as a threat, commenting that air defence had
been "legitimised".93 Tizard had already seen Hankey face-to-face and
been assured that the lizard Committee would continue to exist but that
he, Wimperis and Hill would also sit on the new sub-committee.94 A letter
of invitation for lizard eventually arrived on April 1st stating that members
of his committee could attend if lizard "thought it advisable". 95 Scientific
representation on the sub-committee was now diluted and lizard was
thankful that he had not broken Hankey's confidence. "I note that I am to
be the only member of my Committee to serve. Perhaps it is just as well
that I said nothing to my colleagues about my conversation with you!"96
This structure reflected the political status of air defence. The duality of
the lizard Committee's function as a technical committee and as a
departmental committee reflected the importance politicians placed upon
this subject. Not only did lizard have to report to his Minister but to a
wider audience since the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence was
91 Ibid.
92 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 1089.
93 H. E. Wimperis, Diary entry, 18th March 1935. Tizard Papers HTT700.
94 H. E. Wimperis, Diary entry, 19th March 1935. Tizard Papers HTT700. Hankey must
have proposed to bring all the members of the Tizard committee onto the new sub-
committee. Blackett's absence is curious.
95 Sir M. Hankey to H. Tizard, 1st April 1935. Tizard Papers HTT99.
96 H. Tizard to Sir M. Hankey, 3rd April 1935. lizard Papers HTT99.
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reviewed by the Cabinet. This ended the supervision of the Air Ministry
over air defence but guaranteed political support. As Hankey wrote:
You need not be under the least apprehension as to
interference with your Committee. The Prime Minister, Sir
Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the Chairman of the Committee and the
War Office have all told me that the last thing they want is
any interference with your initiative. The Treasury are going
to give the Air Ministry a letter saying that the appointment of
the new Committee will in no way alter their own attitude
towards your Committee. I think you can make your mind
quite easy on this point.97
The Air Defence Research Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence first met on the 11th April 1935.
7.5 Conclusion
The beginnings of radar show clearly the rules and institutions that
governed the relationships between scientists, politicians and civil
servants. Political and scientific success were interdependent, linked to
the interests of the National Government in responding to and
marginalising the lobbying efforts of its critics. Yet it also depended upon
Tizard's intrinsic skill in conforming to the rules of Whitehall and turning
them to his advantage. Tizard had learned the ropes as Secretary of the
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Civil servants and
politicians respected his reputation as an administrator and advisor. Two
97 Sir M. Hankey to H. Tizard, 4th April 1935. Tizard papers HTT99
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events from the unfolding story have stood out as examples of this skill.
One is Tizard's use of the Athenaeum as a resource for hastening the
development of radiodetection. When aware of the vulnerabilities of one's
position, one draws on one's available defences. If the lunch was merely
social, lizard could have used one of a number of hotels or tea-rooms
that would have provided more pleasant surroundings and better servings
than the stodgy fare of the Coffee-room.
The Athenaeum was chosen because it guaranteed privacy in the minds
of its members. Radiodetection's secret status had to be kept hidden from
the eyes of the public (and the enemy) as well as from any political
opponent until its success was assured. From the inception of the Air
Defence Research Sub-Committee, all of Tizard's letters and memoranda
on the subject of air defence were marked SECRET. The Athenaeum was
perceived to be a proper place to discuss government secrets: protected
by its strict rules of membership and the etiquette that guaranteed that no
member would eavesdrop or utilise information that he came across while
within the club. The perception of clubs and gentlemanly status by civil
servants as adequate guarantors for the maintenance of secrecy reflected
the extraordinary trust and value placed in these institutions.
The other example is the role of 'confidence', referred to in an earlier
chapter. lizard's conversation with Hankey in March on the structure of
the new sub-committee was not as important as the Athenaeum meeting
and indicates that friendly meetings were an important conduit of
information. Although there is no documentary confirmation, it is probable
that this meeting took place at the Athenaeum since both men were
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members and would have met at a convenient location. The importance of
the meeting lies in Tizard's confirmation that he could have spoken to his
colleagues on the committee but was stopped by an unspoken wish not to
break the confidence of Hankey. In fact the only person he did confide in
was Wimperis, a civil servant whom he felt he could trust not to divulge
the content of the meeting with Hankey. This confirms that friendly
relationships amongst civil servants depended upon the protection of the
source of one's information, facilitating the free-flow of knowledge
amongst Whitehall networks and demonstrating its dependence upon
conventions like 'confidence' that prevented embarrassing situations or
dangerous conflicts.
This story also revealed the vulnerability of the Tizard Committee to
changing political equilibriums in the constellation of power that held the
National Government together. As its work developed, it warmed to the
curious stability that marked the Spring of 1935. The lobby of Churchill
and Lindemann had been muzzled by snatching their clothes and leaving
them shivering outside the door. The Air Defence Research Sub-
Committee first met on 11th April and then only once in May. Experiments
at Orfordness began to expand the potential of radiodetection. However,
this respite from the political battle was to prove short-lived. Churchill soon
became dissatisfied with the results of the Sub-Committee and criticised
the Government for its lack of urgency in tackling the problems of air
defence. The new Sub-Committee was a "slow-motion picture" while a
proper scientific committee would have had twenty experiments on the
go.98 Churchill's misinterpretation of the development of air defence can
98 Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 653.
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be seen through his description of the Cunliffe-Lister Committee as a
'scientific' committee and his lack of knowledge concerning the work of the
lizard Committee. Baldwin and Cunliffe-Lister realised that their new
committee would not silence Churchill. Yet their position was strengthened
by the resignation of Macdonald and the resumption of Baldwin as Prime
Minister for a third time. Londonderry was instantly dropped because of
his political marginalisation and tactical errors. He had compromised the
position of the Government in April by defending the air force and
challenging Hitler's claim to air parity as Baldwin prepared to call a general
election and face a pensive electorate opposing rearmament yet fearful of
air attack. Given the strength of pacifism in public opinion, Londonderry
was identified by the public and the Opposition as the Minister most
supportive of rearmament. This political liability was replaced by Cunliffe-
Lister and the Air Ministry was brought firmly under the control of
Baldwin.99 Any chance of confusion between the Air Ministry and the
Cunliffe-Lister Committee was also removed. Confident of their ability to
control the direction of air defence, Baldwin and Cunliffe-Lister were now
willing to concede a position on their committee to one of their critics.
Austen Chamberlain was the first Tory approached but declined and
Churchill, less representative of the Right or backbencher opinion, was
offered the position instead. Churchill was only willing to become a
member if he retained the right to criticise official policy if he deemed it
necessary and only if Lindemann became a member of the lizard
Committee as a scientific aide. Baldwin found these conditions acceptable
on the grounds that keeping a bulldog on a leash renders it less
dangerous than one running loose in the parliamentary playing fields.
99 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., pp. 805-807.
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The Tizard Committee had an unwelcome member foisted upon its
meetings. Lindemann's entry was the accommodation of an interest.
Swinton realised this and immediately conferred with Tizard before
meeting with Lindemann.100 After the meeting Swinton wrote to Tizard
setting out Lindemann's response to Churchill's condition and
circumspection in approaching Tizard. Lindemann had asked Swinton to
approach Tizard on his behalf and confirmed that an invitation to join the
Tizard Committee would be answered in the affirmative. Swinton and
Tizard collaborated closely from the Minister's earliest days at the Air
Ministry - an alliance that married the work of the Tizard Committee to
Baldwin's project of air rearmament. Lindemann "was a little inclined to go
into past history" at his interview with Swinton; 1 01 an indication that his
lobbying for the dissolution of the Tizard Committee had strained his
friendship with Tizard and he was very uncertain if the actions of the
previous six months would prejudice his position.102 The scene was now
set for "the dramatic conflicts immortalised in the rather lurid pages of
Lord Snow".103
lOO Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister was raised to the peerage as Lord Swinton when he was
appointed Air Minister in order to act as an 'executive' for air rearmament.
101 Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister to Tizard, 26th June 1935. Tizard Papers HTT67.
102 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 124.
103 Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, op cit., p. 1091.
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Chapter Eight
"ONLY CONNECT": THE BREAKDOWN OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE
SCIENTIFIC SURVEY OF AIR DEFENCE
8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the Tizard Committee provided the crucial focus for
examining the relationship between professional scientists and government.
This chapter is a sequel and studies the consequences of Lindemann's
appointment to the committee in May 1935 including its dissolution and
reconstitution in the summer of 1936. The historical lens magnifies the roles
of Tizard and Lindemann because most sources have portrayed these events
as a personal and bitter feud between these two protagonists. One can utilise
the controversy surrounding the antipathy between Tizard and Lindemann to
examine further the professional world of the scientist and its proximity to the
gentlemanly worlds of the air force, both military and administrative. The
shared values and assumptions that underpinned the two globes are linked to
the socialisation processes of the public schools.
Snow and Clark have narrated the story of the Tizard Committee as a battle
between Tizard and Lindemann, following up their portrayal of radar as the
wizard weapon that saved Britain in 1940 with representations of Tizard as a
prescient administrator and Lindemann as a misguided saboteur. These
accounts inspired the alternate and oppositional viewpoint of Lindemann's
biographer, the Earl of Birkenhead. Both sides of this school focus on one
particular aspect of the "personal tragedy": the technical and political
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differences between Lindemann and the remainder of the Tizard Committee
that led to personal animosity. l It also follows Snow in considering the
Committee as a case of 'closed politics' that functioned independently from
the political context of the National Government. Yet it is Snow's poetic
licence that provides the key to the historical interpretation of the events
leading up to Lindemann's expulsion from the Tizard Committee. Snow's
Godkin Lectures demanded the representation of the protagonists as
fictionalised individuals through a combination of psychological traits,
personal histories and mannerisms. Thus Lindemann was drawn as "a
Central European business man - pallid, heavy featured, correctly
dressed... "2; his character defined through rhetorical observation: "He
enjoyed none of the sensual pleasures. He never drank. He was an
extremely cranky vegetarian, who lived largely on the whites of eggs, Port
Salut cheese, and olive oil." 3 Snow's prejudicial and rather batty account
contrasted the natural English ness of lizard with the foreign (reading of non
Anglo-Saxon extraction) eccentricity of Lindemann, but his assumption that
the personal histories of the characters provided a deep well of explanation
for their behaviour proves more accurate. The metaphor of the duel was
applied to these events because Tizard's earlier friendship with Lindemann
would always add a personal dimension to the story of a chairman dealing
with a recalcitrant member. However, the conflict was a corporate, not a
personal affair. Therefore lizard should be studied, despite his peculiarities,
as a representative of the professional scientists on the Committee and not
1 R. W. Clark, Tizard, London: Methuen and Co., 1965, p. 125.
2 C. P. Snow, Science and Government, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 11.
3 Ibid., pp. 12-13. This puritanical description of Lindemann is inaccurate.
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merely for his own personal role.
8.2 Lindemann's Membership of the Tizard Committee
As referred to above, Tizard and Lindemann had known each other from their
earnest beginnings as research students in Berlin. Although their
recollections of friendship were marred by later conflicts, the ties were strong
enough for Tizard to name Lindemann as the godfather of his son. By 1934,
this friendship was muted by distance and Tizard's mistrust of Lindemann's
judgment and performance on scientific committees. Lindemann had become
a member of the Council of the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research in 1926 under Tizard's sponsorship "but his critical attitude made
him unpopular with the other members". 4 This episode estranged the two
but, more importantly, demonstrates that Lindemann did not have the
required skills for working upon expert committees with other scientists and
was unable to identify himself with other men of science. This legacy would
have profound effects upon his attempt to cooperate with the other members
of the Tizard Committee.
Lindemann's marriage to the Tizard Committee was marred by the small
dowry of faith that he held in its activities. He wrote to Austen Chamberlain in
June 1935 that he was "unsatisfied" with his new position and the thwarting
of his concept of an expert sub-committee:
I can scarcely believe that the somewhat unimportant Tizard
4 Professor R. V. Jones, "Air Defence Clash in the Thirties" The Times, 6th April 1961.
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Committee can have the authority or power that is required,
more especially if it is a question of getting work done by the
War Office or some other Department. The Prime Minister
[Ramsay Macdonald], of course, at our meeting promised to
replace the Committee by a more powerful C.I.D. [Committee of
Imperial Defence] Committee. Now they seem to want to whittle
away the functions of the C.l.D. Committee and allow it merely
to co-ordinate researches done by the various small
departmental Committees.5
This passage shows that Lindemann fundamentally misunderstood the
networks of power within Whitehall and lacked the skills of compromise and
negotiation that marked a successful committee member. Lindemann did not
perceive the tapestry of networks that interlaced the institutional boundaries
and allowed individuals or committees to achieve their goals through
brokerage and diplomacy. Lindemann only saw the institutional power of
bodies like the Prime Minister or the Committee of Imperial Defence. To
achieve an operational system of air defence that would not become waylaid
by the Service highwaymen, he looked to the coordinating role of the
Committee of Imperial Defence and a tough Chairman to ride roughshod over
the sensibilities of particular Departments.
Lindemann's sojourn on the Tizard Committee lasted a year, from his political
appointment at the tenth meeting on 25th July 1935 to his angry departure at
5 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., p. 182.
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the twentieth meeting on the 15th July 1936.6 During these eleven meetings,
the back of the lizard Committee was broken and the original scientists
invited to become members all resigned. The troubles of this technical sub-
committee are hinted at in the extracts from the minutes. The first portents
appeared at the eleventh meeting on 25th September 1935 with "(Much too
much talk about trailing bombs)" and "(Lindemann arguing for infrared)",
followed some weeks later on the 10th October by "Lindemann trying to crab
radio location because of possibility of jambing". 7 These meetings became
increasingly rancorous and the first one held with Lindemann's replacement,
Edward Appleton, in October 1936 was noted for its "much better
discussion". 8 This division and eventual breakdown should not be examined
through Snow's school of blame but studied as a valuable opening on to the
interwar world of science. As Lindemann's biography shows he was ill-fitted
to join any expert committee with other professional scientists. This handicap
was revealed and then exacerbated by the professional, political and
technical issues that divided Lindemann from his colleagues on the lizard
Committee.
When Lindemann met Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister concerning his invitation to
join the lizard Committee he had sent a memorandum outlining the
justifications for his actions of the previous year and his judgment on the
feasibility of various means of air defence. His sole motivation was defence of
the country; to be achieved with as much speed and resources as the
6 Extracts from Minutes of c.s.s.A.D., Tizard Papers HT1705.
7 Ibid.
8 /bid. This was the twenty-first meeting on 8th October 1936
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allow. Like lizard, he recognised the importance of contacting and
cooperating with serving officers in supporting and shaping experiments that
would be useful to the military users of an air defence system. As Cunliffe-
Lister had emphasized the secrecy of the entire project, Lindemann had
written this text to outline his own ideas, publish his right to priority in the
confines of the Committee and confirm that he was not the source of a 'leak'.
"I desire to place this on record so that it should be plain in case any of my
suggestions have already, or in case they should percolate through other
channels, that I have not divulged anything in request of which the Committee
should be entitled to demand secrecy from me." 9 Lindemann's exaggerated
sense of scientific property owned two concepts: the aerial mine and infra-red
detection of aircraft. He was critical of traditional methods of detection and
defence, arguing that acoustic methods were poor and anti-aircraft fire was
limited because it required the saturation of the entire sky. The tactical
objectives of air defence which framed the development of radar, namely
detecting, locating and damaging or destroying enemy aircraft formed a
consensus amongst all parties. However Lindemann's answers to these
tactical problems was detecting aircraft by means of their infra-red emissions
and destroying them by seeding their projected flight-paths with aerial mines
on wire parachutes. Both concepts required arduous and detailed
programmes of experimentation before they could be assessed or brought to
fruition. 10
This memorandum was analysed by Rowe who discarded most of
9 Memorandum of Professor F. A. Lindemann, FRS. Tizard Papers H1167. (My italics)
10 Ibid.
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Lindemann's suggestions by referring back to the work of the lizard
Committee over the previous few months. Lindemann had suggested anti-
engine devices and Rowe commented that, "The possibility of puffing an
engine out of action is well known and has been considered at length. The
Committee has not favoured the idea because of the prodigious quantities
needed unless interception has been achieved when other methods have
been employed." 11 Rowe, as Secretary, became an expert on the technical
researches that air defence engendered and the particular work undertaken
by the Tizard Committee. Unlike the permanent members who held other
positions and met only monthly, Rowe recorded and implemented their
technical conclusions. With this full-time position, he became a specialist in
the field of air defence and his comments show how far the Committee had
come in evaluating various technological possibilities and constructing a
programme of research in air defence, focused primarily upon radiodetection.
Lindemann was therefore forced to accept a consensual programme of
research that he had no part in and discard his own methods of air defence to
which he was greatly attached. Rowe had concluded that: "Perhaps the only
useful point in the memorandum is the stress laid on the wire-parachute
possibility". He recommended that Colonel Wrisberg of the Ordnance
Committee and a representative of the Royal Aircraft Establishment should
be invited to the next meeting "to help the Committee to get down to an
immediate programme of experiments". 12 Rowe's objective was to bridge the
gap between Lindemann and the Committee. He had read the memorandum,
discarding those suggestions that were incompatible with the Committee's
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. (My italics)
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agenda and attempting to find one possibility that might yield experimental
results. To appease their new arrival, the Committee concentrated its first
meeting with him to exploring the "wire-parachute possibility". 13 From the
first, Lindemann's presence distorted the comfortable consensus that had
been shaped by the other members.
Snow pictured the scene at these meetings for the benefit of his audience,
embellishing the recollections of others with authorial licence. His passage is
worth quoting for the distortions and misrepresentations that Snow added to
the historical record:
Blackett and Hill would be dressed casually, like academics.
Tizard and Lindemann, who were both conventional in such
things, would be wearing black coats and striped trousers, and
both would come to the meetings in bowler hats. At the table,
Blackett and Hill, neither of them specially patient men nor
overfond of listening to nonsense, sat with incredulity through
diatribes by Lindemann, scornful, contemptuous, barely audible,
directed against any decision that Tizard had made, was
making, or ever would make.14
In Snow's lecture the committee meeting was transformed into a boxing ring
with Tizard and Lindemann as pugilists, the other members as astonished
13 Tenth Meeting, 25th July 1935. Extracts from Meetings of C.S.S.A.D. Tizard Papers
HTT7O5.
14 C. P. Snow, op cit., p. 32.
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witnesses. Blackett recalled that the main consequence of Lindemann's
arrival was the meetings becoming "long and controversial" as he disputed
"the priorities for research and development". 15 Lindemann was unwilling to
compromise with the decisions that the Committee had already taken and
continually advanced the case for the aerial mine and infra-red detection at
every meeting. This undermined Tizard's position as Chairman since the
agenda and shape of every meeting was outlined in advance by himself and
Rowe, only for Lindemann to disrupt the planned minutes with justifications
for his concepts. This reflected badly upon Tizard since the role of the
Chairman was to maintain a corporate consensus and bring the members to
a united conclusion. Lindemann's arguments also cast doubt on the
professional judgment of his fellow scientists since he had to criticise and
undermine their research programme in order to change the priorities in air
defence. Lindemann was convinced that his arguments were impervious to
criticism from other scientists and considered them more important than mere
committee etiquette. The Tizard Committee became a Sophoclean stage
where he declaimed his implacable belief that he was correct before a
Chorus of 'Nos'.
The main differences between Lindemann and the other members of the
Committee lay in the prioritisation of various areas of research. Defenders of
Lindemann have always maintained that he did not try to impede or criticise
15 p . M. S. Blackett, "Tizard and the Science of War" in P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War:
Nuclearand Conventional, London: Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1962, pp. 101-119, 105.
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the development of radiolocation. 1 6 Since decisions were taken in the
committee room, it seems foolish to discard the evidence that in the autumn
of 1935, Lindemann was still sceptical about the advantages of radiolocation
and that this scepticism combined with his natural skills of criticism. 17 Since
the other scientists had invested their professional reputations in the hands
of Watt and radiolocation, Lindemann's criticisms struck at their professional
judgment and at the main reason for the continued existence of the technical
sub-committee. Given his earlier actions to dissolve the Tizard Committee,
political suspicions and professional criticism were soon fused with personal
animosity.
The other issue that divided Lindemann from the Committee was his sense of
urgency. Both Lindemann and Churchill had voiced their anxiety about
Britain's vulnerability to air attack and emphasized the necessity of speed in
rearmament and air defence development at the expense of other concerns
like strategic direction or the quality of research. After Lindemann had joined
the Committee, he was given the finances to conduct the infrared
experiments for which he had lobbied. The initial infrared experiments took
place at the Clarendon Laboratory in the autumn of 1935 and the "scaled-
down" research programme on aerial mines was authorised on 4th
December 1935. 18 Churchill's presence on the Swinton Committee (the Air
16 Professor R. V. Jones, op cit. "It has been said that Lindemann objected to the high priority
given to radar: but, whatever the verbal exchanges may have been at the committee table,
Lindemann's papers show that the relevant objection in his written minority report was the
reverse of this..."
17 Twelfth meeting, 10th October, 1935. Extracts from Minutes of C.S.S.A.D. lizard Papers
H1T705: "Lindemann trying to crab radio location because of jambing".
18 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 131; Sir Hugh Dowding to H. Tizard, 29th June 1935. lizard Papers
HIllil.
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Research Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence) had given
his air defence agenda increased weight. 19 When the infrared experiments
proved unpromising during the autumn of 1935, Rowe wrote to Tizard, asking
if he had any objection to the report being sent to the Swinton Committee.
"Personally I think it is well that it should, since it will show one particular
member of that Committee [Winston Churchillj that infra red has not been
forgotten and has limitations."20 Despite these comments, the Tizard
Committee continued to finance R. V. Jones, a physicist at the Clarendon
Laboratory, to probe the possibilities of infra-red detection on a full-time
basis.21 Lindemann and Churchill remained dissatisfied with the institutional
arrangements coordinating air defence research. They utilised their hard-won
positions on these commttees to implement their research programme
against scientific and departmental opposition.
Even more important for the Tizard Committee was the role of Rowe in
averting conflict between the Swinton Committee and its technical sub-
committee. He was secretary of the Tizard Committee and co-secretary with
Hodsall of the Swinton Committee. His letters to Tizard show the cooperation
necessary to fix an agenda that would reconcile all members of the Tizard
Committee. When he wrote memoranda on air defence it was from a
19 A. P. Rowe to H. Tizard, 3rd October 1935. Tizard Papers HTT79. "Professor Lindemann
'phoned me yesterday and wanted me to go to Oxford before the next meeting on order to
discuss the infra red data I sent him, but I certainly cannot go this week, but will try to do so
before this meeting. He particularly wished the further consideration of infra red detection to
appear on the Agenda for the next meeting, and since the Cunliffe-Lister Committee have
asked to report on this question in due course, I have taken a chance that you will agree to
the addition of this item."
20 A. P. Rowe to H. Tizard, 28th November 1935. Tizard Papers HTT79.
21 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 134. "Despite this negative result, the Tizard Committee - rather
surprisingly in the strained circumstances - asked me [R. V. Jones] to continue the work on a
full-time basis, with the object of developing an airborne infra-red detector."
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conscious stance, such as the "Headquarters view" of January 1936,
designed to give an overview for "the three members of the Committee who,
after all, are not intimately in touch with Air Defence problems - Blackett, Hill
and Lindemann".22 lizard found that his position was shifting from an
advisory to a managerial role that involved coordinating the diverse
enterprises overseen by his Committee. As the months passed, he was
increasingly seen as an ad hoc civil servant rather than as an independent
expert. This perception was fostered by the cordial relationships that he
maintained with Swinton and Dowding. At a day-to-day level, a strong rapport
was forged between lizard and Rowe, while Lindemann was unable to
muster the administrative resources to strengthen the concessions given
during 1935. This rapport allowed Rowe to voice his frustration at the
departmental obstacles that seemed to dog the work of the Committee.23
This frustration grew out of the inherently political nature of the lizard
Committee's work. The programmes, the experiments and the results were
all reviewed by the Swinton Committee and subject to the various interests
represented upon it. This political accountability resulted in the
recommendations of the lizard Committee being delayed by the objections
of the Air Ministry or the RAF. This is demonstrated by the difficulties that the
lizard Committee encountered when it pushed for interception experiments
in order to analyse relevant scientific problems as they arose. It also
undermines the claims of radar apologists that its success was due to
22 A. P. Rowe to H. lizard, 1st January 1936. Tizard Papers HTT79.
23 A. P. Rowe to H. Tizard, 18th January 1936. Tizard Papers HT179. 'The months are going
on and we get little further on this vital business."
245
continuous cooperation between the concerned scientific and military
interests. The Tizard Committee recommended that "frequent exercises"
should take place so that a scientific staff could study interception problems.
lizard thought that these experiments would contribute to an operational
system of air defence as he wrote on the 27th March 1936:
On the other hand I am not at all happy about the other side of
the work. ..These are tactical problems. Scientific problems are
involved, in which the help of a scientific committee is useful,
and perhaps essential; but they are far from being purely
scientific problems. Practical experience of flying, organisation
and command is essential if this side of our work is to be fruitful
and not wasteful. I feel that we want much more constructive
criticism from experienced officers of the R.A.F.24
lizard was aware of the importance of service feedback for the success of air
defence and Rowe therefore included his proposal in the conclusions of the
Swinton Committee. When Swinton examined the draft conclusions he
ordered this recommendation removed. 25 Whatever the reason, this
recommendation was placed in limbo and continued to fester. By the end of
June, Rowe was tentatively proposing that Swinton's veto should be
bypassed by utilising Churchill to publicise the failure of the Government to
test the operational effectiveness of the country's air defence system:
24 R. W. Clark, op cit., pp. 135-1 36.
25 A. P. Rowe to H. Tizard, 16th March 1936. Tizard Papers HTT79.
246
I would like to give you a reason (or excuse) for quoting the
recommendation of your Committee on exercises. If Winston
wants a real scandal he could have it on this question. There
has never been a full-scale trial of the A.D.G.B. [Air Defence
Great Britain] system - Observer Corps, searchlights, D/F
[Direction/Finding] etc. Many of us believe that the existing
scheme will be useless, and that its existence gives a false
sense of security. Yet, this year, only two days will be given to
something called Sector training and might be called a small-
scale exercise. In my opinion the only thing that will make
people see the danger is a full-scale trial, yet the only result of
your Committee's recommendation is that less will be done this
year than ever before.26
The obstacles placed in the way of the Tizard Committee's recommendations
during the first half of 1936 seemed, in Rowe's eyes, to demand a political
solution. If the mountain to be scaled was forcing a civil servant like Rowe to
confront unspoken conventions like neutrality in politics, then the temptation
to intervene must have been akin to treading in the footsteps of Tantalus for
a political beast like Lindemann.
8.3 Watson Watt and the Rift within the Tizard Committee
This 'politicisation' of the Tizard Committee was accelerated by another issue
that engaged its members at the same time. The Tizard Committee
26 A. P. Rowe to H. Tizard, 29th June 1936. Tizard Papers HTT79.
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recommended that Watt should be transferred from the Department of
Scientific and Industrial Research to the Air Ministry on 13th March 1936 as
Superintendant of Bawdsey, the experimental centre for radiolocation
research.27 In addition, Watt would also be responsible for all research into
the location and detection of aircraft, advising the Air Staff as required.28
Effectively, Watt would be taking a position that combined administrative
duties at the Ministry with supervision in the field. Despite this
recommendation, the Air Ministry did not respond to the urgings of the Tizard
Committee and finally offered Watt a position as "an out-station man" with far
less flexibility and independence than the scientists wanted.29 lizard was
continually aware of these limited moves on the part of the Air Ministry since
Watt kept "in touch" with him. To rectify this situation, lizard met Wilfred
Freeman, Dowding's successor as Air Member for Research and
Development, in early May, "and explained at some length the absolute
importance we [the Tizard Committee] all attached to the job and my
[Tizard's] views as to the organisation and as to the proper personal position
of Watson Watt." 30 lizard's arguments were not accepted and he was frozen
between telling Watt to reject the Air Ministry's offer whilst acknowledging
that Watt had to accept because of the "extreme national importance" of the
work31 Therefore, Tizard wrote to Watt's superior and his own successor, Sir
Frank Smith, the Secretary of the Department of Scientific and Industrial
Research and a member of the Swinton Committee, lizard wanted to ensure
27 Sir Robert Watson-Watt, Three Steps to Victoty: A Personal Account by Radar's Greatest
Pioneer, London: Odhams Press Ltd., 1957, p. 145.
28 Ibid., p. 146.
29 Ibid., p. 147.
30 H. Tizard to F. E. Smith, 21st May 1936. lizard Papers HTT9O.
31 Ibid.
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that Smith was supporting his actions before he approached Swinton to cut
through the bureaucratic tape with political scissors.
lizard's 'political' solution to this problem undermines Snow's assertion that
he was an apolitical administrator and also shows that he retained
confidence in his influence with his political patrons rather than looking for
influential contacts with the Opposition, the right-wing press or the Tory critics
of air rearmament. Smith agreed with Tizard and only opposed Watt's
specific proposals for restructuring scientific research at the Air Ministry to
accommodate himself. 32 Smith wrote to Sir Christopher Bullock, Permanent
Secretary at the Air Ministry to support Waft's suitability for the post of
Deputy Director of Scientific Research at the Air Ministry and Superintendant
at Bawdsey, endorsing the lizard Commifttee.33 lizard thought that his
marshalling of administrative and political resources would overcome the
bureaucratic delays and propel Watt into his new job.
Tizard's own strategy was undermined by Lindemann's determination to
capitalise on any opportunity that would reveal the Air Ministry's 'sabotage' of
air defence. Lindemann's earlier scepticism of radiolocation had been
replaced by respect for Waft's administrative and scientific capabilities. The
striking successes of the radiolocation programme led Lindemann to write to
Churchill that, "The reason for this seems to me to be that it has been put in
the hands of a man who suggested the method and believed in it and that he
32 F. E. Smith to H. Tizard, 22nd May 1936. lizard Papers HTT9O.
33 F. E. Smith to Sir Christopher Bullock, 26th May 1936. lizard Papers HIT9O.
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could and did push whatever experiments he thought necessary".34
Lindemann's praise for Watt was linked to his wider critique of the Tizard
Committee. Radiolocation was "the only work which has made satisfactory
(or indeed any) progress".35 Lindemann blamed institutional inertia rather
than the limitations of his own scientific judgment for the lack of success in
aerial mines and infra-red detection. He confided to Churchill that he believed
the Tizard Committee had "not materially itself initiated or even seriously
helped any new developments". 36 Even after serving on the lizard
Committee, Lindemann was unable to recognise its role as a body for
facilitating, coordinating and applying scientific research to the needs of air
defence. Lindemann saw administration as a parasitical burden on the free-
flow of pure scientific research, and his perception of the Tizard Committee
conformed to this view. It merely added an extra layer of bureaucracy to the
Swinton Committee:
It is probably true to say that experimental work cannot be
carried out by a Committee, since each experiment must be
based upon the previous one and usually fifty or even a
hundred experiments will be required before success is
attained. If each new experiment must await a new meeting of
the Committee, progress can only take place at a snail's pace.
The only method is to hand over research to people who are
enthusiastic believers in the possibility of finding a solution and
34 The Earl of Birkenhead, The Prof in Two Worlds. The Official Life ofF. A. Lindemann, Lord




utilising the Committee, if at all, as an occasional advisory body
to which those in charge can appeal if desired.37
Lindemann was an early subscriber to the view that scientists should be on
tap but not on top, as his own relationship with Churchill indicated. Convinced
that the body on which he was serving was a hindrance to the long-term
project of establishing a viable system of air defence, Lindemann felt no
corporate loyalty and dutifully reported all scientific failures to Churchill to be
aired in the Swinton Committee.38
Baldwin and Swinton's plan to appease Churchill by appointing him to the
Swinton Committee had backfired since it soon became a shooting gallery
with the Tizard Committee as the target. Churchill coordinated his increasing
litany of criticisms with Austen Chamberlain, Lindemann and Archibald
Sinclair, the leader of the Liberal parliamentary party. He wrote to Austen
Chamberlain on 10th May, complaining about the "slow progress of all the
experiments" and to Sir Thomas lnskip, the Minister for the Coordination of
Defence, on 25th May, accusing the Tizard Committee of "dilettante
futility". 39 From 2nd June, Churchill strengthened his hand by circulating a
paper in the Swinton Committee, based on Lindemann's knowledge and
criticising the Tizard Committee for failing to divert sufficient funds or time to
the development of the aerial mine. Tizard was already alarmed at
Lindemann's indiscretions. Thomas Merton, Professor of Spectroscopy at
37 Ibid., p. 186.
38 Ibid.
39 Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill Volume V, 1922-1939, London: William Heinemann Ltd.,
1975, pp. 737, 743.
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written to Tizard in April that Lindemann had used some "unfortunately
suggestive phrases" in an newspaper article about air defence, specifically
"talk of surrounding England with rays!!" 40 Now lizard did marry science and
politics by matching Lindemann's political patronage with his own. He
complained to Swinton that Lindemann was enlisting the support of an
individual outside of the Committee to influence internal scientific debate
within the Committee in a letter on 12th June and circulated his own
memorandum setting out the history of authorised aerial mine research. 4 1 As
Lindemann and Churchill increased the intensity of their attack, Tizard
ensured political support for his own position which superseded any criticisms
he might have held against the Air Ministry. Wimperis noted in his diary that
"Winston's latest will, I think, take L. [Lindemann] off the C.A.D. [Committee
of Air Defence] - H.T. [Henry lizard] says so, anyway"42
Lindemann invited Watt to tea with himself and Churchill at the latter's
Westminster home on 12th June 1936.43 Watt was unsure if this approach
was officially correct but Lindemann assured him that Churchill, as a member
of the Swinton Committee, had a right to be informed about the experiments
on radiolocation. 44 Watt saw this as an opportunity to publicise the Air
Ministry's lack of enthusiasm for appointing himself to the post of Deputy
Director and roundly condemned the department for failing to institute
"emergency machinery" and consequently delaying the advance of
40 Thomas Merton to H. Tizard, 20th April 1936. Tizard Papers H1T67.
41 Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 750 ; A. P. Rowe to Lord Swinton, 10th June 1936. PRO
Cab2l/426.
42 H. E. Wimperis, quoted in R.W. Clark, op cit., p. 138.
43 Sir R. Watson-Watt, op cit., p. 147; Martin Gilbert, op cit., pp. 750-751.
44 Sir R. Watson Watt, op cit., p. 147.
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radiolocation. He also linked this issue to the need for interception exercises
and wartime simulations of the radiolocation devices, clouding Tizard's own
lobbying with the criticisms of Churchill and Lindemann. Watt was also aware
that his own actions could be "interpreted in Air Ministry as manoevres to
magnify the importance of my prospective post".45 Watt had criticised his
prospective employers, the Air Ministry, before Churchill, one of the major
critics of the National Government. In order to prevent any accounts of the
meeting that could be interpreted as support for these critics, Watt detailed
the interview in a letter that he sent to all concerned: Churchill, Lindemann,
Sir Frank Smith and Freeman.
Churchill's memorandum, criticising the Tizard Committee for failing to
support the aerial mine, was circulated on the 2nd June and discussed by the
Swinton Committee on the 15th June at what Wimperis's diary recorded as a
"vehement meeting".46 The Committee was divided over Churchill's charges
with Swinton and Tizard defending their policies vigorously. Wimperis also
conversed with Freeman who was "incensed" at Churchill's intervention.
There had been a natural constituency for Churchill's accusations since
many of those concerned with air defence had observed with increasing
disquiet the inertia of the Air Ministry. However, his alliance with Lindemann
effectively blocked the support of the scientific community. Tizard thought
that Churchill's intervention was a breach of gentlemanly conduct. "Had Mr.
Churchill been a gentleman, he would have come to me first."47 This episode
45 Ibid., p. 148.
46 H. E. Wimperis, quoted in R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 138.
47 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., p. 190.
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undermined Churchill's position on the Swinton Committee since he was
unwilling to divorce his role as government critic from his role as advisor on
air defence. It also doomed Lindemann's position on the Tizard Committee.
Tizard was now determined to remove him. The rest of Wimperis's diary for
that day recorded that Tizard was meeting Hill and Blackett urgently in order
to discuss the future of the Comm ittee.48
Hill's letter to Tizard on the following day encapsulates the uncertainty and
issues that resulted from the tumultuous meeting. Hill proffered his support
and stated that he would resign if Lindemann was made Chairman. The
scientists on the Committee were still unsure of their long-term position and
Hill's possible futures included victory for Lindemann and the reconstitution of
the Committee under another Chairman. Yet he also took this opportunity to
return to the failure of the Committee to have its recommendations for trials
carried out. If Hill resigned, he was prepared to state "publicly" the reasons
for leaving the Tizard Committee to the Labour Party or the Daily Mail. Hill's
personal frustration was linked to the downgrading of his own experimental
agenda in air defence - "that of making hostile aircraft visible against
illuminated cloud" - in favour of "foolish experiments with bombs tied to
parachutes". 49 The unwillingness to stage any form of trial, combined with
the reported growth of the German airforce, was pushing even professional
scientists like Hill to contemplate political action in order to force the
Government's hand.
48 Ibid.
49 A. V. Hill to H. Tizard, 16th June 1936. Tizard Papers HTT67.
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lizard had seen Swinton and made clear his view that Lindemann's position
was untenable following Churchill's "written attack". He also wrote to
Lindemann personally in his capacity as Chairman and set out his arguments
for opposing Lindemann's actions. First of all, Churchill had not approached
lizard as Chairman to confirm his criticisms, effectively undermining his
leadership role. Secondly, Lindemann had not demonstrated any loyalty to
the Committee or any willingness to observe its rules. "I should really enjoy
working with you if you were ready to work as a member of a team, but if you
are playing another game I don't think it is possible for us to go on
collaborating without continual friction." 50 Thirdly, "the only effect of your
[Lindemann's] actions is to retard progress".51 lizard's use of the sporting
metaphor in his description of the Committee shows how this small body
functioned through fostering corporate loyalty from its membership, aided by
the common professional values to which the scientists subscribed. These
unwritten ties of loyalty to the team derived ultimately from the public schools
and were inculcated there or propagated through other channels like
magazines, the cinema, wartime experience, or university. Lindemann had
shown that he was unwilling to recognise the concept of the "team" or the
professional values that lizard embodied. The letter finished with lizard's
declaration that he was "writing a general statement about the policy
underlining the priority attached to different items of our [the Committee'sJ
work", a text that would effectively open up the contested differences
between Lindemann and the rest of the Committee. 52 On the 17th June,
50 H. lizard to Professor F. Lindemann, 17th June 1936. Tizard Papers H1T67; R. W.
Clarke, op cit., p. 139.
51 Ibid.
52 H. lizard to Professor F. Lindemann, 17th June 1936. lizard Papers H1T67.
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lizard had also discussed the recruitment of Professor Edward Appleton,
Professor of Physics at King's College, London and an eminent radio
researcher, with Wimperis.53 There is no direct documentary evidence for the
assertion that Appleton was lined up as Lindemann's replacement but his
anticipated membership of the lizard Committee was a response to
Lindemann's actions. As lizard explained to Swinton:
I think I have told you before that none of the present members
of the Research Committee have made any special study of
radio problems. That has not mattered much up to now, but
recent events have made it highly desirable that we should enlist
the help of someone of standing who is capable of advising on
the details as well as on the general nature of radio research
work. 54
Tizard wanted to remove Lindemann from his Committee and replace him
with an academic, supportive of radiolocation, who would be able to explain
its workings to the Swinton Committee and head off any criticism from its
members. The Committee's Report was used to accentuate the differences
between Lindemann and the rest of the Committee by focussing upon those
issues which caused the most conflict.
Swinton had an interview with Watt on 17th June to discuss his grievances
and ascertain his rote in this affair. After Watt assured Swinton that Churchill
53 H. Tizard to H. E. Wimperis, 19th June 1936. lizard Papers HTT111.
54 H.Tizard to Lord Swinton, 19th June 1936. Tizard Papers HTT111.
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would not use the meeting of the 12th June for parliamentary fodder, the
Minister invited him to come to the Air Ministry as Superintendant at Bawdsey
and guaranteed his own support. Watt later became Director of
Communications Development in 1938 at Freeman's behest and learned that
the delay of fifteen weeks betwen Tizard's recommendation and his final
acceptance of the Air Ministry's offer was caused by negotiations with the
Treasury. As research at the Air Ministry was divided between the Directorate
of Scientific Research and the Directorate of Development. Watt's own
projected post would have trespassed upon the demarcated subjects of each
Directorate and the Treasury was unwilling to fund a new position that
brought the administrative structure of the Air Ministry into question.55
Swinton's own intercession and Watson Watt's acceptance defused the
immediate crisis as the leading pawn was now securely attached to the Air
Ministry and the work in radiolocation could continue without fuss.
8.4 The Breakdown of the Tizard Committee
Churchill and Lindemann had lost their ace with Watson Watt's acceptance of
the status quo. Churchill wrote to Swinton on June 22nd complaining about
the "slowness" of experimental investigations, the lack of research into aerial
mines and his inability to raise specific issues in public. "I am however quite
sure that if instead of serving on your Committee Lindemann and I had
pressed our points by all the various methods and channels open to us,
these ideas would have had better treatment than they have received."56
55 Sir R. Watson-Watt, op cit., pp. 149-151.
56 Martin Gilbert, op cit., p. 752; Winston Churchill to Lord Swinton, 22nd June 1936. PRO
Cab 21/426; The letter is reproduced in The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., pp. 188-1 89.
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Implicit in this sentence was the threat that Churchill and Lindemann could
cause more trouble for the Government through public and parliamentary
criticism outside the Swinton Committee than their arguments within the
official circles of air defence. Swinton replied on 25th June vigorously
denying Churchill's claims and wrote to Hankey on the 26th condemning
Churchill's estimates of air strength - another point of dispute - as
"fallacious".57 Churchill had rendered all of his criticisms nugatory by his
uncritical support of Lindemann.
Lindemann himself wrote a fierce letter to Tizard defending the use of any
method to accelerate progress given the "immense importance of the
question". 58 His inability to recognise the collegiate features of committee
work was enshrined in the sarcastic finish to his letter, personally addressed
to lizard. "I am sorry if this offends you, but the matter is too vital to justify
one in refraining from action in order to salve anyone's amour propre."59
Lindemann was unable to differentiate between lizard the individual and
Tizard the Chairman. Events in the committee room had often propelled the
two into personal conflict as Lindemann endeavoured to reiterate his
arguments and Tizard tried to focus the meeting on the agreed agenda.
Lindemann's maladaptation to committee politics led him to elevate and
personify this dispute. Tizard replied by shifting their contest back to the
workings of the Committee and Lindemann's inability to conform to what was
expected of the members:
57 Lord Swinton to Sir Maurice Hankey, 26th June 1936. PRO cab2l/426.
58 Professor F. Lindemann to H. Tizard, 25th June 1936. Tizard Papers HTT67.
59 Ibid; R. w. clark, op cit., p. 140.
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You need not worry about salving my amour propre. I haven't
got any. My quarrel with you is not that my dignity has been
affronted, but that your way of getting on with the job is the
wrong one, and that far from 'accelerating progress' you are
retarding it. Of course I know you want to get on with the job,
but do try to realise that other people are just as anxious about
this as you are, and are really puffing in just as much work.60
This self-effacement and personal reminder of teamwork was accompanied
by a call for Lindemann to put his "scheme on paper in detaif' in order to
provide polished scientific arguments that might convince his scientific
colleagues, instead of denigrating their personal contributions by calling them
"slackers". 61 Tizard had invited Lindemann to resolve their conflict by setting
out his arguments for aerial mines and infra-red detection in the form of a
scientific paper. He also ended his letter realistically by looking forward to
further "co-operation" but stating that the continuation of Lindemann's
antagonism would end in the Committee's dissolution.
Armed with this promise, Lindemann was appalled to receive a copy of the
draft report on July 10th from Rowe that removed any opportunity for him to
put forward the scientific case for aerial mines of infrared detection. Tizard's
offer of 'co-operation' was now perceived by Lindemann to be conscription to
the committee line without any reciprocal chance to voice his own arguments
over the priorities for research in air defence. After angrily expressing his
60 H. Tizard to Professor F. Lindemann, 5th July 1936, quoted in ibid., p. 141.
61/bid.
259
views on how a draft report should be studied by a committee and finding the
timescale of three days for comment "intolerable", Lindemann threatened to
write his own "brief report" and circulate it with the official report. Tizard had
already written to Swinton enclosing a copy of his letter to Lindemann of the
5th July, stating that, "If he [Lindemanni does not respond to it I feel that I
must press you to remove him" 62, to which the minister replied, praising
Tizard's final gesture to Lindemann for cooperation.63
A meeting of the Tizard Committee had been scheduled for 15th July to
approve the draft report which would be discussed at the Swinton Committee
on the 24th July. Lindemann was now determined to write his own report and
concluded that his membership of the Tizard Committee had ceased to be of
any use. He wrote to Rowe on the 11th July stating that he would submit his
own draft "as a basis for discussion". 64 On the same day he wrote to the
electors at Oxford University informing them of his decision to stand as an
independent candidate, supporting the National Government but critical of its
policies on air rearmament and air defence. 65 Swinton and Tizard considered
any overt political moves by one of their experts as incompatible with their
advisory role within the Air Ministry. Expert judgment would be tainted by
political interests. In the eyes of the other members of the Tizard Committee,
Lindemann was transgressing the boundaries of professional science. Tizard
62 H. Tizard to Lord Swinton, 5th July 1936. Tizard Papers HTT67.
63 Lord Swinton to H. Tizard, 6th July 1936. Tizard Papers HTT67.
64 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 142.
65 The Earl of Birkenhead, op cit., pp. 149-155. Lindemann had already tried to stand as a
candidate during the 1935 General Election when he was already a member of the Tizard
Committee. This renewed attempt was far more controversial because Lindemann's
candidacy could be perceived as an abuse of position; contributing to policy on air defence as
a member of the Tizard Committee yet politically criticising it in general terms at the same
time
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had met Wimperis on the 14th July to coordinate a united front to
Lindemann's demands and the acrimonious meeting took place. According to
Btackett, the arguments became "so fierce.. .that the secretaries had to be
sent out of the committee room so as to keep the squabble as private as
possible".66 Lindemann and Tizard did not attempt to cooperate or
compromise. Tizard saw Lindemann as a Churchillian tumour that would
continue to disrupt the Committee's work and whose value as a concession
to the Tory critics was at an end. Lindemann believed that the Tizard
Committee constrained his attempts to wield political influence. Having
worked within a research structure that he continually criticised, he saw a
parliamentary seat as an alternative from which he could campaign for
administrative reform and the prioritisation of his own research agenda.
The Committee's consensus had broken down. Lindemann was permitted by
Tizard to submit his Minority Note. Hill and Blackett both informed their
Chairman that they were no longer prepared to serve with Lindemann and
wished to resign. Tizard did not attempt to dissuade them but advised that
they write to Swinton personally "so that their letters need not be regarded as
'official' and final". 67 lizard wrote an account of the meeting for Swinton from
the Athenaeum on the same day and at the same location as Hill was writing
his resignation letter. It is reasonable to assume that he read and approved
Hill's letter. Both Hill and Blackett followed lizard's advice and submitted
their resignation notes on a personal basis. Both letters had two constants.
One was support for Tizard's "able chairmanship" and the other was placing
66 P. M. S. Blackett, op cit., pp. 105-1 06.
67 H. Tizard to Lord Swinton, 15th June 1936. PRO Cab2l/426.
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the cause of the Committee's breakdown upon differences with
Lindemann. 68 Blackett wrote his letter at Birkbeck College and succinctly
explained his actions. Hill's letter, under Tizard's tutelage, set out detailed
reasons for his own resignation since the missive would probably be read by
all interested in the Committee's breakdown, including the Prime Minister,
Baldwin. Tizard maintained his neutrality as Chairman but was able to
express his own opinions through professional collegiality. Lindemann's
inability to respect the Committee's confidence was cited as the main reason
for this breakdown with his Oxford candidacy given as supporting evidence:
You know the whole story but my view of it is as follows. [A
sentence that demonstrates Hill was aware that Tizard was in
contact with Swinton] Instead of being frank and open with his
colleagues on the Committee, he [Lindemann] went behind their
backs and adopted methods of pushing his own opinions which
- apart from anything else - would make further co-operation
with him very difficult. It is clear, moreover, from paragraphs in
his morning's press in reference to Prof. Lindemann's
candidature for Oxford University that he intends to use any
available method of advertising the unique value of his opinions,
and, no doubt, to use his membership of the Committee, while
criticising it behind its back, as a means to his own ends.69
The letter was crafted through sarcasm to stress Lindemann's individualism
68 Professor P.M. S. Blackettto Lord Swinton, 15th July 1936. PRO Cab2l/426
69 A. V. Hill to Lord Swinton, 15th July 1936. PRO Cab2l/426.
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in contrast with the collective unity and achievements of the Committee. If
Lindemann's political and scientific misanthropy and indiscretions were not
sufficient to guarantee his expulsion, then the letter played the 'secrecy' card.
"The other Members of the Committee are only anxious to work as quietly as
possible and to avoid publicity of any kind which can only be harmful in such
work as we are undertaking. The very undesirable publicity of 1935 was due
to Lindemann and his friends." 70 According to Hill, Lindemann was no longer
just a political liability but also a security risk because of his machinations
and provided an additional and more serious argument for his removal.
Although Lindemann's Minority Note was phrased in far more conciliatory
terms than the notes he circulated to the Tizard Committee, it was impossible
for him to retain his position. Swinton was determined to interview Blackett
and Hill to ensure that they would continue to serve on the technical sub-
committee. 71 Tizard also wrote to Hill, observing that "we are in a strong
position, for we want to do a useful job of work. We don't want notoriety, we
don't advertise, and we don't mind if the Government decide they would do
without us."72 Tizard echoed Hill's resignation thoughts before adding an
assurance that the majority on the Committee would win this round.
Whatever lizard's private thoughts on Lindemann's conduct, he was now
projecting their dispute in oppositional terms and employing military
metaphors to emphasize the division. Swinton saw Blackett and Hill on 22nd
July to confirm their unofficial resignations whilst lizard retired to the Lake
70 Ibid.
71 Lord Swinton to A. V. Hill, 16th July 1936. Tizard Papers HIT58.
72 H. lizard to A.V. HIll, 16th July 1936. lizard Papers H1l58.
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District for a quick fishing holiday before an anticipated conflict with Churchill
at the next meeting of the Swinton Committee on 24th July. However, the
showdown did not materialise as Churchill backed down after Tizard outlined
the events leading to the breakdown of his Committee. Blackett's and Hill's
letters were read out demonstrating the gravity of the crisis. Churchill was
unwilling to take responsibility for the inevitable hiatus in scientific research
that would follow the dissolution of the Tizard Committee. He also knew that
Tizard and his professional colleagues enjoyed the political support of
Swinton and, through him, Baldwin. Better to retain his voice in Jerusalem
than return to solipsistic shouting in the wilderness. Therefore the Swinton
Committee decided to reconstitute the Committee with "members who could
work effectively together". 73 Over the summer recess, Tizard, Hill and
Blackett officially resigned forcing the dissolution of the technical sub-
committee and it was reconstituted less Lindemann plus Appleton.74
8.5 Conclusion
The story of the Tizard Committee allows the historian to stand at the
threshold and observe the world of the professional scientist during the
nineteen-thirties. The first drawback to earlier narratives like Snow's or
Clark's is the narrow conception of politics employed and the withdrawal of
technics behind an apolitical guise. This artificial division is then utilised in
descriptions of Lindemann and Tizard, projecting the former as the political
taint and the latter as the prescient man of science. For example, Clark
73 H. E. Wimperis, quoted in R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 145.
74 Lord Swinton to A. V. Hill, 3rd September 1936. A. V. Hill to Lord Swinton, 3rd September
1936. Lord Swinton to A. V. Hill, 9th September 1936. Tizard Papers HTT58.
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divides their perceptions of the Tizard Committee into Lindemann's executive
body and Tizard's advisory role, linking these goals to their differing reaction
to politics. While this interpretation gives some indication of the divisions
between the two scientists, it distorts the motivations and ideals that shaped
their utterances and actions. Clark subscribes to the professional ideology of
science so prevalent during the interwar period and purifies Tizard of all non-
scientific associations. Tizard and his colleagues conflated their patriotism
with their faith in science and then advised politicians and airmen to support
radar, simplifying its intricacies to enable elected representatives to make the
right decision. Lindemann's belief that political control of air defence is
necessary to hasten its implementation becomes a betrayal of scientific faith
and a questioning criticism of his patriotism. Yet how can one divorce politics
from the administrative structure that politicians use to implement their
policies? We have seen how radar was spawned in the political and cultural
brew of 1934 that triggered Rowe's search through old air defence files and
the important decision to finance air rearmament, lizard's own close links
with the Conservatives in the National Government have been examined and
placed in the context of his Committee. One must conclude that the historical
analysis of Tizard's and Lindemann's actions requires an understanding of
the political context within which they operated.
Tizard's own position demonstrates that networks permeated the political,
administrative, military and scientific elites which were collectively called the
Establishment by postwar critics, As shown, the Service Departments
functioned at arm's length from Whitehall but remained within its circle
265
through the appointment of generalists as permanent secretaries and the
pivotal position of Hankey who combined the Secretaryships of the Cabinet
and the Committee of Imperial Defence. More important than this for the
history of science was the proximity of scientists to the centres of political
power. Radar provided Tizard and his committee with an awareness of their
influence and importance in the context of appeasement and rearmament.
Yet, if the Tizard Committee was examined in institutional terms, its advisory
remit and provisional existence would cloak the executive role that it
effectively undertook. Despite the marginalisation of specialists in the
occupational structure of the civil service, scientists and other experts were
able to gain powerful positions and wield influence under opportune
circumstances. Historians have to investigate the 'old-boy' networks which
brought scientists to the notice of potential political and administrative
patrons if they wish to understand the role of the scientific specialist in the
interwar civil service.
Unlike the earlier case-study on the Radium Beam Therapy Research Board,
the Athenaeum club played far more of a peripheral role in the story of radar.
Its utilisation as a site to discuss Waif's memorandum on radiolocation
reinforces the concluding arguments of previous chapters. Wimperis, Tizard
and (probably) Bullock were members and confirmed the professional and
elite composition of the membership. Like Fletcher's lunches, Tizard's
meeting was also arranged with the certain knowledge that the club
guaranteed security. The second comparison between Fletcher and Tizard
lay in their use of the club's surroundings to persuade a stranger, the 'guest',
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to accede to the host's demands. Fletcher hoped that consensus around the
dinner table amongst Lord Dawson, Henry Souftar, Rutherford and himself
would convince or browbeat Lechien of Radium BeIge to loan his radium on
the least onerous terms. Tizard indicated the importance of radar to Watt
through his invitation to lunch at the Athenaeum. This flattering inducement
of a meal at the pre-eminent gentleman's club was also an attempt by lizard
to interrogate Watt on his document and, with the additional weight of Bullock
and Wimperis, coerce him into accepting the air defence agenda of the
CSSAD. The privacy and convenience of these lunches could have been
replicated at any other club but the Athenaeum had a prestigious reputation
which could be utilised as a political and cultural resource by Fletcher and
Tizard to manipulate their guests into accepting their interests and agendas.
However, the central focus of this chapter was the misunderstanding and
division between Lindemann and the other members of the lizard
Committee. The comparison with the antagonistic relationship between Lord
Dawson and Walter Fletcher confirms an earlier argument that controversy
provides the best doorway for examining gentlemanly values in the
professional world. 'Trust' and 'confidence' were key values in the
professions and the civil service especially for the integrity of committees.
This lack of 'trust' was one of the fundamental causes for the breakdown of
the lizard Committee. All other members, including lizard, subscribed to the
basic values that underpinned the life of a committee. All agreed that
committee decisions had to be unanimous and, under the exceptional need
for secrecy, that their discussions should not be disclosed except through
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official documents and Tizard's position on the Swinton Committee. The
confidential nature of the Tizard Committee and the authority of Tizard's
chairmanship reinforced each other. Lindemann broke the confidential
consensus of the Tizard Committee by confiding in Churchill about decisions
taken behind closed doors. When Churchilll raised these matters on the
Swinton Committee, Tizard's authority was undermined since it was
demonstrated amongst his peers that he could not control his own committee
or forge an expert consensus by decisively refuting Lindemann's arguments.
Lindemann placed a greater priority on the need to change air defence policy
than on the pressure to conform to the gentlemanly values of his profession
emphasizing his patriotism at the expense of convention. As Clark noted,
"Lindemann felt that the position was too serious for scientists to abide by the
normal rules of conduct". 75 This overtly political nullification of gentlemanly
behaviour led to the breakdown of the Tizard Committee.
It is fitting to record that the Athenaeum Club was the location for one last
attempt to renew this old friendship. Brigadier Charles Lindemann, brother of
the Professor and a friend of Tizard's, tried to engineer a rapprochement for
the duration of the Second World War. A symbolic handshake did nothing to
repair the shattered friendship and indicated the gradual hollowing out of old
forms and rituals.76
75 R. W. Clark, op cit., p. 147.




These two case-studies have demonstrated that scientists, in both
unofficial and official capacities, exercised a decisive influence over areas
of policy during the interwar period. In the case of radium, a scientific and
medical problem required a political solution due to public interest caused
by a rising fear of malignant disease. In the case of radar, a solution to
the political and strategic problem of Britain's vulnerability to air attack was
sought, under close political supervision, through technological research.
Neither substantiates the general arguments of Corelli Barnett and Martin
J. Wiener that Britain's political elites were ignorant of and hostile to the
potentialities of scientific knowledge. This thesis, including its study of the
elite education of scientists in the public school and the university, has
aimed to undermine an interpretation of British history that depends upon
the inverted Whiggism of premodern survivals and antimodern attitudes -
a British Empire ruled by an aristocratic elite that glorified the countryside
and actively worked to limit or reverse the processes of industrialisation.
This aim has been achieved through the examination of two historical
phenomena: the socialization of a large proportion of the scientific elite
through public schools and Oxbridge and the position of scientists within
the civil service as administrators and advisors. Both of these show that
science was incorporated into the processes of education and career
structure that shaped the professional and political elites.
I have argued that science should be analysed as a marginal activity in
British culture and society. Its range of activities for the public were too
broad and its entanglements with politics and the civil service were too
specialised for this area of knowledge to be reduced to a simple set of
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principles or activities. One could argue that the only unifying feature for
science was the role of the scientist himself as an authoritative expert.
Chapter Three demonstrated that scientists were aware of their position
as outsiders and wished to gain greater power and influence through
domination of the educational curriculum, especially in the public schools.
This marginalisation was not caused by an anti-industrial spirit. Science
was handicapped in comparison to other professions because it was
unable to offer security of employment or high salaries and, as a
consequence, competed badly with other professional elites in the quest
for status and power. This had two political consequences. One was the
"Haldane principle" whereby scientists in the research councils supervised
the apportionment of grants to their colleagues within the general outlines
on which their departments were established under the benign neglect of
the Lord President. They were too politically unimportant to require direct
ministerial supervision. The other was the establishment of expert bodies
like the Committee of Civil Research, answerable to the Prime Minister,
the Cabinet or individual ministers, which could examine issues of
technological controversy and provide expertise on which to base policies.
In the British government system, scientists were left to administer their
own affairs or were used as technical sources to establish and legitimate
certain policies like radar and radium. Due to its subordinate position
through these institutions in the strategies of government, science was a
political and politicised activity.
Insider scientists were those who adapted to the political and professional
requirements of Whitehall. Philip Gummett has argued that the careers of
scientific advisors were too varied to draw a general picture of the criteria
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needed to attain these positions, citing the differences between Tizard,
Lindemann, Blackett and Solly Zuckermann. Yet the case-studies of this
thesis show that an understanding of the customs and values which
governed the routines of Whitehall were of the utmost importance for the
success or failure of a scientific advisor. These customs and values,
partially captured in Chapters Seven and Eight through the concept of
'confidence', were derived from the gentlemanly codes of conduct
inculcated by the public or grammar schools and modified to the local
circumstances of different professions and institutions. A knowledge of
these codes and their place within the professional worlds of science and
Whitehall were distinctive advantages as Lindemann and Dawson found
out to their cost. Education at the right school and university where these
codes became second nature was a distinct advantage and conferred a
patina of gentlemanly status compared to the products of grammar
schools and provincial universities. Scientists were therefore more likely to
be accepted by politicians and civil servants if their gentlemanly
professionalism was not called into question by their background and
education.
Despite the need for a far greater number of experts during the Second
World War, the recruitment of scientific advisors from a public school and
Oxbridge background predominated during the postwar period. Studies of
the Advisory Council on Scientific Policy, Council for Scientific Policy and
Advisory Board for the Research Councils by S. S. Blume and Gummett
from 1947 showed "a remarkably cohesive elite, constantly renewed in
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[its] own image".l Biographical details of the members of these institutions
demonstrated that between a quarter and a third attended public schools
whilst Oxbridge (predominantly Cambridge) accounted for almost half of
this group. These figures were corroborated by W. L. Guttsman who
examined the research councils between 1950 and 1955, confirming that
a third of their members had been to public school and that 27% had
degrees from Cambridge.2
The structural pattern of the British scientific elite that I examined during
the interwar period in Chapter Four retained its distinctive qualities after
the Second World War. This thesis does not study the roots of this elite
pattern but notes that it already existed before the Great War and
crystallized in the late Victorian period alongside the generational
entrance of public school alumni into the older professions. This process
was accompanied by the development of a cohesive generalist elite at
Whitehall that excluded specialists from career positions. The British
scientific elite of the twentieth century was reshaped by the gentlemanly
education of the public schools which provided a passport to influence
and patronage amongst the professional elites whilst simultaneously
contributing to the marginalisation of the scientific profession in the British
system of government.
1 Philip Gummett, Scientists in Whitehall, Manchester, Manchester University Press,
1980, p. 93; S. S. Blume, Toward a Political Sociology of Science, London: the Free
Press, 1974, pp. 199-201.
2 W. L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite, London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1965. This text
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